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Climate change has been described as the most complicated problem that the world faces 
today but the most serious problem that the world faces in the future. The problem of climate 
change is caused by an increase of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions in the atmosphere. 
During the past 150 years, human activities have led to an exponential growth in GHG 
emissions. Their heavy concentration in the atmosphere results in an increase in the warming 
potential of the atmosphere leading to global climate change. This can result in a number of 
adverse environmental effects. 
 
 In 1992 in Rio, countries negotiated and joined the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which had as its ultimate objective to achieve the 
stabilisation of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Negotiations to strengthen the 
global response to climate change led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The 
Protocol’s first commitment period ran from 2008 to 2012. Since the Kyoto Protocol entered 
into force, the UNFCCC’s aim became to negotiate what would happen after the protocol’s 
expiry. However, due to the complexity nature of the climate change problem and the 
negotiations themselves, the solution finding process has suffered serious lack of progress. 
This resulted in parties in 2011, deciding to extend the life of Protocol from 2013 to 2020. 
  
In continued attempts to negotiate the protocol’s successor, Conference of Parties (COPs) 
(The COP is the ultimate decision making and supreme body of the UNFCCC authorised to 
make and implement decisions to promote the implementation of the UNFCCC. It is 
authorised to adopt new protocols under the UNFCCC and plays a substantial role in the 
development of new obligations by the parties to the convention) meet annually. In so doing, 
the COPs contribute to the evolution of the international climate change regime. 
 
The aim of this study is to critically evaluate the extent to which the recent annual climate 
change negotiations (COP 15 to COP 19) have contributed to the legal evolution and shaping 
of the future climate change regime. The COP outcomes will be analyzed within legal lenses 
and in an attempt to answer the main research question; three fundamental mitigation related 
legal questions will be discussed. These three questions are: 
ix 
 
(i) What approach is likely to be adopted in the future climate change regime between a 
bottom up and a top down approach?  
(ii) What is the likely legal form and architecture of the future climate regime? And,  
(iii) What are the most likely interpretations of the nature and extent of differential 
treatment between developed and developing states in such an instrument? 
 
After such an extensive critical analysis of the COP decisions, a possible prognosis of the 
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL BACKGROUND  
  
“Unless we do not change our direction, we are likely to end up where we are headed.” 1 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION:  BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
According to Houghton, ‘The basic principle of global warming can be understood by 
considering the radiation energy from the sun that warms the Earth’s surface and the thermal 
radiation from the Earth and the atmosphere that is radiated out to space. On average, these 
two radiation streams must balance. If the balance is disturbed it can be restored by an 
increase in the Earth’s surface temperature.’2 Such a disturbance can be caused for example 
by an increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide.3   
 
During the past 150 years, human activities4 have led to an exponential growth in greenhouse 
gas emissions (GHGs).5 Such GHGs for example carbon dioxide and methane’s heavy 
concentration in the atmosphere results in an increase in the warming potential of the 
atmosphere leading to global climate change.6 This can lead to quite a number of adverse 
environmental effects including the rise of sea levels, extreme events such as storm surges to 
small islands and low lying areas, water and food supply shortage, threats to human health 
and the extinction of some vulnerable species to mention but a few. 7  
 
Due to the seriousness of climate change impacts, an urgent need to mitigate and manage the 
emissions of GHGs internationally arose and international agreements were made to that 
effect. By the late 1960s, a concern for addressing human environment had catalysed a 
                                                          
1 An old Chinese proverb.  
2 J Houghton Global Warming: The Complete Briefing 4 ed (2009) 18.  
3 Ibid. See also VI Grover Climate Change: Five Years after Kyoto (2004) 11-12.   
4 These include activities such as burning fossilized carbon (coal, oil and gas), widespread deforestation, 
wetland rice cultivation, livestock rearing, solid waste land filling and nitrogen fertilization of agriculture. See 
JT Hardy Climate Change: Causes, Effects and Solutions (2003) 20; Houghton (note 2 above) 13; Grover (note 
3 above) 12-13.  
5 Hardy (note 4 above) Ibid, Houghton (note 2 above) Ibid. 
6 Hardy Ibid, Houghton Ibid. 
7 Hardy (note 4 above) generally from 77-185; Houghton (note 2 above) 16.    
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proliferation of bilateral, regional and multilateral conventions on diverse environmental 
issues that were trans-boundary and these included air pollution, the world’s rivers and 
transportation of oil on high seas.8 The epitome of such conferences can be attributed to the 
Stockholm Conference held in Stockholm, Sweden from 5-16 June 1972 which led to the 
adoption of Stockholm Declaration.9 Its significance was the declaration of twenty-six 
guiding principles which represented the first global consensus on the nature and scope of the 
environmental challenge that confronted the world community.10 Since then, a rise in 
international agreements as fundamental and frequent tools for managing and addressing 
environmental problems nationally, regionally and internationally occurred.11 The famous 
Earth Summit held at Rio in Brazil from 3-14 June in 1992 preceded the development and 
gave birth to arguably two of the most important environmental multilateral agreements ever 
made, namely the two sister conventions, the  United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity.12     
 
The ongoing international negotiations being conducted under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change13 and its Kyoto Protocol14 (both of them hereinafter referred 
to as ‘The Climate Change Regime’) are attempts to tackle what has been dubbed as one of 
humankind’s biggest and most complex contemporary environmental challenges.15 The 
ultimate objective of the climate regime is the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations 
                                                          
8 VP Nanda International Environmental Law and Policy (1995) 83. See also E Louka International 




12 Nanda (note 8 above) 113, 119. 
13 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 UNTS 
107 (entered into force 21 March 1994). Hereinafter referred to as the UNFCCC. 
14 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 16 
March 1998, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005). Hereinafter referred to as the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
15 See the UNFCC official website, ‘Background on the UNFCCC: The international response to climate 
change’ available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php, accessed on 4 September 2013;  K 
Kulovesi ‘Independent Reporting: The Role of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin in Climate Change Negotiations’ 
(2011) International Law-Making and Diplomacy Review 31; B Muller ‘Global Climate Change Regime: 
Taking Stock and looking Ahead’ in VI Grover (ed) Climate Change Five Years after Kyoto (2004) 29.   
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in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.16 This has been simplified and interpreted as to, 
 
Prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change  against the backdrop of continuously 
increasing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, already observable impacts of 
climate change, and alarming projections on the extent of the damage that will follow if 
the negotiations fail and global GHG emissions are not reduced.17  
 
This implies that mitigation of anthropocentric GHGs is of paramount importance as it is the 
central objective of the regime and the solution to preventing global climate change. Despite 
the efforts put into dealing with the climate problem, the climate change regime has however 
suffered from a number of challenges. The UNFCCC itself had difficulties from the 
beginning, for example the United States of America (the US) heavily criticised the 
Convention and only agreed to sign the treaty after a huge compromise had been reached not 
to include binding targets and timetables.18 This became the UNFCCC’s main shortfall apart 
from funding mechanisms and commitment issues.19 The Kyoto Protocol itself has also been 
criticised by many academics, scholars and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as a 
flawed concept20 or even criticised as an instrument that would fail ab initio.21 The US has up 
to0 date not ratified the Kyoto Protocol22 and in 2011 Canada pulled out of the Protocol soon 
after the 2011 Durban Conference. 23 At the Doha Conference in 2012, countries including 
New Zealand, Canada, Japan and Russia made it clear that they would not be making new 
                                                          
16 Art 2 of the UNFCCC.  
17 Kulovesi (note 15 above) 31.  
18 Nanda (note 8 above) 113; See also VP Nanda & G Pring International Environmental Law & Policy for the 
21st Century (2003) 292.  
19 Nanda (note 8 above) 118.   
20 RN Cooper ‘The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept’ (July 2001). FEEM Working Paper No. 52.2001. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=278536 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.278536 (accessed on 29 
March 2014).  
21 RL Arcas ‘Kyoto and the COPs: Lessons Learned and Looking Ahead’ (2011) 23 Hague Yearbook of 
International Law, 17-90. 
22 See Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol at 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_Protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php, accessed on 04 September 2014. 
23 ‘Canada pulls out of Kyoto Protocol’ The Guardian 13 December 2011, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/13/canada-pulls-out-kyoto-Protocol, accessed on 12 April 
2013.  
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Kyoto commitments and this left the Kyoto Protocol24 covering only a small percentage of 
worldwide emitted GHGs. This reduced list already excluded all the developing countries 
from legally binding targets to reduce or limit their GHG emissions and thus the Protocol 
became weaker.25  
 
Parties to the Convention meet annually under The Conference of the Parties (COP)26 at 
which they review the implementation of the Convention; any other legal instruments that the 
COP has adopted and take necessary decisions to promote the effective implementation of the 
Convention, including institutional and administrative arrangements.27  In addition, the 
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) takes place simultaneously with the 
meeting of the COP to deal with the same issues under the Kyoto Protocol.28 As a result, the 
climate negotiations become known as the Conferences of the Parties and Conferences of the 
Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/CMP).29 The 
COP/CMP meetings have shaped the present climate regime as it exists and will shape the 
future of the regime, thus their decisions and how they interpret the available legal 
instruments are of utmost importance and deserve the attention given. Moving ahead with 
negotiations has however proved to be a challenging experience as seen in the way the 
COP/CMP meetings have been held.30  
 
There has been a serious lack of progress in the UNFCCC negotiations in recent years. The 
parties have failed to reach an international agreement on emissions targets and timetables by 
all major developed and developing country emitters.31 This has resulted in questions as to 
whether the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol is the best and most effective forum to push for 
a global climate change response or whether the world is simply flogging a dead horse. 
                                                          
24 ‘Kyoto battle lines drawn at COP 18’ Mail and Guardian 27 November 2012, available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-27-cop-18-kyoto-battlelines-drawn, accessed on 20 December 2013.  
25  MN Shaw International Law 6 ed (2008) 880. 
26 The COP is the supreme decision-making body of the Convention. All States that are Parties to the 
Convention are represented at the COP, available at http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6383.php, (accessed on 04 
September 2013).  
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid.  
30 Arcas (note 21 above) 17. 
31 Ibid.  
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Furthermore, with the way the negotiations are progressing, questions have been raised 
whether the forum is capable of producing a deal that can save the world from the dangers of 
climate change in time. 
 
This study is thus centred on the evolution of the international climate change regime as 
affected by the COP/CMP negotiations. The dissertation begins by setting the scientific 
context of climate change with a view to understand why it has received such worldwide 
attention and why it is important to have an international legal regulation. Thereafter, the 
study identifies the instruments that form the climate change regime and gives its brief 
analysis with a view to understand the current legal principles applicable and how they have 
been interpreted and evolved in the instruments. The main purpose for such an analysis is to 
ascertain the effectiveness and identify shortfalls that exist in the present regime which the 
COP/CMP seeks to address. Special attention and assessment will then be given to the 
COP/CMP meetings from 2009 to 2013, especially their contribution to the evolution of the 
climate regime. Lastly, the researcher will conclude by trying to make a possible prognosis of 
the long awaited new legally binding instrument by drawing possible routes it may take as 
hinted by the last five COP/CMP negotiations. 
 
The motivation to conduct such a study is that climate change has been described as the most 
complicated problem that the world faces today but the most serious problem that the world 
faces in the future.32 It is interesting to note that despite it being an environmental problem, 
global climate change affects almost every key aspect of human life such as development, 
poverty, world political order and economics therefore a solution that is inclusive of all these 
is critical. However, the world seems to have chosen international environmental law as the 
key to dealing with such a problem. With the Kyoto Protocol entering into force in 200533 
and the world converging to negotiate a new instrument, it is interesting that there are very 
recent developments in the climate change regime that have not yet been subjected to much 
academic analysis. 
 
The practical reasons for conducting this study are as follows: whilst under the Kyoto 
Protocol, emission targets were supposed to be regulated, some of the major emitters were 
                                                          
32 See note 15 above.  
33 See note 14 above.  
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not included under the regulated countries because they were considered ‘developing’ 
countries.34 This has created the controversies mentioned above leading to some countries 
refusing to ratify it or pulling out of the Protocol.35 Despite all these potential problems, the 
Protocol’s life was however extended for a further eight years in 2012 at Doha.36A new 
instrument is however set to be negotiated under the UNFCCC but despite all these 
weaknesses and controversies around the Kyoto Protocol, some states still want it to be 
viewed as a starting point yet others want a different approach altogether. It is thus significant 
to critically analyse the Protocol, its significance to the existing international climate regime, 
and how it may shape or affect the future of the climate change regime as a whole. As a 
result, one of the most important questions becomes the reason why the Kyoto Protocol 
remains a central figure of these negotiations. It is also of utmost importance to analyse the 
recent COP/CMP negotiation process and decisions to try and understand its implications to 
the future of the international climate change regime and whether this platform can save the 
world from the grave consequences of climate change.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS, OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
The main objective of this study is to ascertain the extent to which the annual climate change 
negotiations have contributed to the legal evolution and shaping of the future climate change 
regime. In trying to respond to this main question, a number of sub-questions are asked 
towards achieving the ultimate objective of this study. The dissertation is thus divided into 
four parts.  
Part 1 contains the first sub-question which reads as follows “what is the climate problem and 
why is there need for an international scale response”? In trying to answer this question, 
Chapter 2 will begin by explaining the major facets of climate science as it has been reported 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It will give the definition of 
climate change, declare the climate problem, and outline consequences as well as potential 
solutions to the climate problem. The study will also explain how and why international law 
plays an important role in finding the solution. It is important to note that this dissertation 
from the onset takes a stand in proclaiming that mitigation is the better of all options in 
                                                          
34 See note 25 above. 
35 See note 22, 23 & 24 above. 
36 Decision FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9. 
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dealing with the climate problem as prevention is in most cases better than cure. As a result, 
the study focuses mainly on mitigation provisions of the international climate change regime.  
Part 2 of the study poses the second sub-question which is “what constitutes the current legal 
international climate change regime and to what extent has it succeeded in achieving its 
objective”? The objective of answering this question is to identify, outline and analyse the 
current international legal regime that has been created to address the climate problem. This 
will be done in Chapter 3 which will commence by giving a brief timeline in the development 
of international climate change law institutions in general. It will then identify the legal 
instruments available and then give a brief analysis of the instruments to assess their strengths 
and weaknesses. A deeper analysis will be done in an attempt to assess the extent to which 
the instruments attempt to push for, apply and incorporate principles and achieve the ultimate 
objective of the climate change regime. This analysis will also be done to ascertain the 
influence of the current climate change regime and also to ascertain its possible influence on 
the future climate change agreement.  
 Part 3 of the study houses the central research question of this study and this principal 
research question reads, “to what extent has the annual climate change negotiations namely 
COP15/CMP5 (2009) to COP19/CMP9 (2013)37 contributed to the legal evolution and 
shaping of the future climate change regime”? The main objective of asking this question is 
to assess how the COP/CMP outcomes have affected the evolution of the international 
climate change regime and how they are actually shaping the future climate change regime. 
This will be covered in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Chapter 4 will deal with the recent climate 
change negotiation meetings in their respective order. The degree to which their decisions and 
outcomes have attempted to deal with the critical mitigation related questions that the 
negotiators face today will be assessed. The analysis will not only look at each meeting’s 
outcomes and decisions in isolation but will investigate the degree of connection between 
these meetings’ decisions and outcomes. In addition, a conclusion will be given as to whether 
each meeting’s result can be classified as successful or otherwise and the degree of progress 
of each meeting’s results in the ultimate mitigation of greenhouse gas goal. 
Chapter 5 will provide a legal analysis of the five COP/CMP outcomes side by side with the 
aim of ascertaining how they have interpreted and incorporated the legal principles found in 
                                                          
37 The research focuses on the last five meetings and excludes the 2014 Conference held at Lima in Peru 
because the research work for this dissertation was concluded before December 2014 when the meeting took 
place.  
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the current climate regime and give a possible outcome of the structure of the new agreement. 
In other words, the study agrees that the climate negotiations have resulted in the 
development and/or elaboration of certain principles of international environmental law, thus 
drawing from this analysis of the COP/CMP decisions and outcomes, this section will be 
narrowed down and attempt to answer the identified three fundamental mitigation related 
legal questions which are as follows: 
(iv) What approach is likely to be adopted in the future climate change regime between a 
bottom up and a top down approach?  
(v) What is the likely legal form and architecture of the future climate regime? And,  
(vi) What are the most likely interpretations of the nature and extent of differential 
treatment between developed and developing states in such an instrument? 
  
Furthermore, the implications of the decisions to the ultimate objective of the climate regime 
will be assessed along such an examination. After such an extensive critical analysis of the 
decisions, a possible prognosis of the structure of the anticipated future climate regime will 
be given. Lastly, possible recommendations and finally a conclusion will be given under Part 
4 of the dissertation. 
 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology used to pursue the aims and objectives of this study is entirely 
desk top based. Information and data relating to the topic will be both primary sources 
(international treaties, instruments and COP/CMP decisions) and secondary sources (journal 
articles, text books, text books chapters, internet sources, NGO publications, reports from 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE 
 
“…what we are talking about is extended world war… People would move on a massive 
scale. Hundreds of millions, probably billions of people would have to move…” 1 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Before discussing the specific core legal issues on which this dissertation focuses, the study 
will start by introducing the climate change problem. It will do so by defining climate 
change, proclaim the climate problem and outline the causes and projected consequences of 
climate change. It is important to note that the uncertainties found in the projected 
consequences and their exact impact does have a very significant role in the positions that 
countries take when negotiating, which has huge effects on the whole climate problem and 
approach. This could also have not only legal implications but political, economic and 
development implications as well. All these issues therefore need to be considered before one 
dwells in-depth in the analysis of the development of the climate regime as all these factors 
affect the evolution of the legal climate regime itself. Furthermore, this chapter will also try 
to explain the reasons why international environmental law is also seen at the epitome of 
solution-finding to the highly pronounced climate problem.  
 
2.2 CLIMATE SCIENCE 
 
2.2.1 The historical development 
The problem of human induced climate change was hypothesised in the early 1890s by the 
Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius who warned about a possibility of a so called ‘enhanced 
greenhouse effect’ caused by excess carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.2 In the year 1896, 
Arrhenius published a climate model demonstrating the sensitivity of surface temperature to 
atmospheric Carbon Dioxide (CO2).3 It however took the world another century before the 
world’s political system began to recognise and respond to the identified problem despite 
                                                          
1 N Stern, Associated Press, Feb, 21, 2009 available at http://www.climatism.net/quotes-on-climate-change-
environment-and-energy/ accessed on 10 August 2014.  
2 SB Pralle ‘Agenda-Setting and Climate Change’ (2009) 18(5) Environmental Politics 781.  
3JT Hardy Climate: Causes, Effects, and Solutions (2008) 4; JT Houghton Global Warming: The Complete 
Briefing 4 ed (2009) 23.  
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such early warnings by Arrhenius.4 The concern became visible in a series of international 
conferences on CO2 between 1985 and 1987 under the World Meteorological Organisation 
(WMO) which however had disappointing results.5  
 
In 1988, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) joined efforts with the 
WMO in order to study the scientific aspect of the climate problem.6 The same year in 
November, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change (IPCC) was created and was 
made up of scientific and political experts.7 The IPCC was given the task of exploring 
possible measures to be taken in order to protect the atmosphere.8 In December of the very 
same year, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) endorsed the setting up of the 
IPCC by the UNEP and the WMO9 thus making climate change officially a United Nations 
(UN) concern and agenda. The IPCC’s task as outlined in the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 43/53 of 6 December 1988 was to prepare a comprehensive review and 
recommendations with respect to the state of knowledge of the science of climate change, 
social and economic impact of climate change, and possible response strategies and elements 
for inclusion in a possible future international convention on climate. 10 The IPCC has thus 
far prepared four reports in 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2007 respectively, with the fifth report 
scheduled for completion in October 2014.11 To date, the IPCC has become the biggest and 
arguably the most credible science body to publish on climate science.12  
 
                                                          
4 Pralle (note 2 above).  
5 A Kiss & D Shelton International Environmental Law 2 ed (2000) 512. 
6 Ibid; See also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change History, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml, accessed on 12 September 2014.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid. 
10IPCC, History, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml, accessed on 12 
September 2013. 
11 See http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/index.shtml accessed on 14 August 2014. See also JC Dernbach & S 
Kakade  ‘Climate Change Law: An Introduction’ 2008 Energy LJ 29:1, 3. 
12 WH Rodgers at al Climate Change: A Reader (2011) 16.  
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The IPCC’s first assessment report published in 1990 covered the basics of climate science 
including the impacts.13 The second assessment report published in 199514 incorporated the 
economic and social dimensions of climate change.15 The third assessment report (TAR) 
published in 200116 had a synthesis report of the previous IPCC reports and tried to address 
quite a variety of policy-relevant questions.17 These questions included issues on adaption 
and mitigation.18 The report was even more definitive about the reality and risks of global 
warming.19 The 2007 Fourth Assessment Report (AR4)20 which is the most recent assessment 
also had a synthesis report and comprised of different reports by each of the IPPC’s Working 
Groups (WG).21 These reports included a physical science basis of climate change by the 
WGI; the impacts of climate change, vulnerability and the adaptation to climate change by 
the WGII and the mitigation of climate change by the WGIII.22 The WGI report concluded 
that warming was unequivocal, based on evidence of global surface temperatures; changes in 
precipitation patterns; and observations of ocean and arctic temperatures.23  It is important to 
note that as each report was published, increase were also observed in global average 
temperatures due to increases in anthropogenic or human caused greenhouse gas emissions.24 
This increase rose in each respective report from little observation in 1990 to discernible 
                                                          
13 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: IPCC First assessment Report: Overview and Summaries 
(1990), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#1, 
accessed on 16 April 2013, See also a summary of the IPCC Reports by Dernbach & Kakade (n11) at 3.  
14 Available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-changes-1995/ipcc-2nd-assessment/2nd-assessment-en.pdf, 
accessed on 16 April 2013.  
15 Dernbach & Kakade (note 11 above) at 3.  
16 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Synthesis Report 2 (2001), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#1, (accessed on 16 April 
2013).  
17 See note 15 above.  
18 See note 16 above.  
19 VP Nanda & G Pring International Environmental Law & Policy for the 21st Century (2003) 291.  
20 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fourth Assessment Report (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#1, accessed on 16 April 2013.  
21 Ibid.   
22 Ibid.  
23 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group I Report: The Physical Science Basis of 
Climate Change (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg1/ar4_wg1_full_report.pdf, accessed on 16 April 2013. 
24 Ibid.  
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human influence in 1995 and from a 66-90% in 2001 to a 90-99% in the 2007 report.25 This 
increase pattern calls for immediate action to be done with regards to minimising of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
2.2.2 Definition of climate change 
Under the UNFCCC, climate change usage refers to ‘[a] change of climate which is attributed 
directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere 
and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time 
periods’.26 
 
However, under the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) climate change is referred to as 
‘[a] change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by 
changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended 
period, typically decades or longer’.27 
 
The IPCC definition refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural 
variability or as a result of human activity, thus making this usage a bit different from that of 
the UNFCCC that seems to be centred on human activity. An important question therefore is 
why the UNFCCC adopted such a definition. Hardy states that scientists generally use the 
term “climate change” in the way defined by the UNFCCC when referring to the post-
industrial era.28 It is also of paramount importance to note that the UNFCCC is a legal 
document and it therefore was created with and for a purpose. Its purpose is seen widely as 
the same purpose of international environmental law which is to prevent international 
environmental harm by regulating state actions.29 The definition therefore focuses on the 
human activity since that is the conduct the UNFCCC wants to regulate, as reported by the 
IPCCC as the main cause of global climate change. The UNFCCC definition has been 
                                                          
25 See note 23 Chapter 9 at 699. See also summary as provided by Dernbach & Kakade (note 11 above) at 4.  
26 Art 1(2) of the UNFCCC. 
27 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 30 (2007) available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm, 
accessed on 20 December 2013. 
28 Hardy (note 3 above) at 11.  
29 Kiss & Shelton (note 5 above) at 5.  
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described by some authors as the valid, legal and official definition of climate change.30 As a 
result, the definition by the UNFCCC will be adopted for the purposes of this research. 
 
2.2.3 Causes of climate change 
There are many factors, both natural and of human origin, that determine the climate of the 
earth.31 The natural factors are not an issue as far as science is concerned since one cannot do 
much about them. Science states that naturally, the sun heats the earth and the earth intercepts 
solar radiation (including that in the short-wave, visible, part of the spectrum). About a third 
of the solar radiation is reflected, the rest is absorbed by the different components 
(atmosphere, ocean, ice, land and biota) of the climate system.32 The energy absorbed from 
solar radiation is balanced (in the long term) by outgoing radiation from the Earth and 
atmosphere.33 This terrestrial radiation takes the form of long-wave, invisible, infra-red 
energy and its magnitude is determined by the temperature of the earth atmosphere system.34 
There are several natural factors which can change the balance between the energy absorbed 
by the earth and that emitted by it in the form of long wave infra-red radiation and these 
factors cause the radioactive forcing on climate.35 One of the most important factors is the 
greenhouse effect.36 This has been described in simple terms as the natural system that 
regulates the temperature of the earth.37  
  
Basically, the earth is covered by a ‘blanket’ of gases which allows light energy from the sun 
to reach the Earth’s surface, where it is converted to heat energy.38 Most of the heat is 
reradiated towards space; however some of it is trapped by greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere and this natural effect which keeps the Earth’s temperature at a level necessary to 
                                                          
30 RL Arcas ‘Is the Kyoto Protocol an adequate Environmental Agreement to resolve the climate change 
problem?’ 2001 European Env Law Review 282-293. 
31 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change: The 1990 and 1992 IPCC Assessments 
available at https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_90_92_assessments_far.shtml, 
(accessed on 12 January 2014) 65. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 VI Grover Climate Change: Five years after Kyoto (2004) 12. 
38 Ibid. 
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support life.39 This blanketing is known as the natural greenhouse effect and the gases are 
known as greenhouse gases.40 It is called natural because all the atmospheric gases were there 
long before human beings. 41 However, some greenhouse gases (GHGs)42 have been defined 
in the UNFCCC as ‘those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and 
anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation’.43 This definition suggests that 
these gases naturally maintain the heat balance that is necessary to life on earth by trapping 
infrared radiation which warms the surface temperature while permitting excess heat to 
escape.44 
 
However, human activity such as extraction and burning fossilised carbon from coal, oil and 
gas for fuel, forest clearing and burning, wetland rice cultivation, livestock rearing, solid 
waste land filling and nitrogen fertilisation of agriculture are all responsible of generating 
more GHGs.45 An excess build-up of such GHGs can upset the important equilibrium and 
cause a rise in the Earth’s surface temperature.46 This causes what is termed the ‘enhanced 
greenhouse effect’ which means the added effect caused by the gases present in the 
atmosphere due to human activities.47 Scientists are convinced that this will trap more heat 
and raise the Earth’s surface temperature48 therefore leading to global climate change. 
 
There is strong scientific consensus that the Earth’s climate is being affected by the build-up 
of GHGs caused by human activities and that action should be taken now. As a result, the 




                                                          
39 Ibid. 
40  J Houghton Global Warming: The Complete Briefing 4 ed (2009) 21. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide. See Hardy (note 38 above) 20; Houghton (note 40 
above) 35.  
43 Article 1.2 of the UNFCCC. 
44 L Guruswamy International Environmental Law in a Nutshell 2 ed (2003) 180. 
45 Hardy (note 3 above) 20. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Houghton (note 40 above) 21. 
48 Grover (note 37 above) 12. 
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2.2.4 The potential impacts and consequences of climate change  
Rapid and large climatic changes can be expected to have far reaching and in many instances 
unpredictable consequences not only for human societies but also for all forms of life on 
earth.49 Global climate change will impact substantively but like Arcas,50 this researcher will 
only focus on the three main effects namely an increase in temperatures; an increase in 
precipitation; and a rise in sea levels, since most of the other effects are associated with these 
three impacts. 
  
2.2.4.1 Temperature increase 
The Twentieth Century was the warmest century and 1990 and 2000 were the warmest 
decades of the past millennium.51 There has been evidence of recent temperature increases 
and warming in recent decades has been greater too.52 The AR4 states that 
 
For the next two decades a warming of about 0.2°C per decade is projected for a range of SRES 
emissions scenarios. Even if the concentrations of all GHGs and aerosols had been kept 
constant at year 2000 levels, a further warming of about 0.1°C per decade would be expected. 
Afterwards, temperature projections increasingly depend on specific emissions scenarios.53 
 
Such an unprecedented rise in temperature change will have discernible and problematic 
effects.54 So far, the effects include the decrease in the snow cover in the Northern 
Hemisphere and floating ice in the Arctic Ocean.55 The year 2012 saw a record in that Arctic 
sea ice reached its minimum extent for the year and this was also a record for the lowest 
summer cover since satellite data collection began.56 Scientists expect that the average global 
                                                          
49 Ibid at 23.  
50 Arcas (note 30 above) 283.  
51 Hardy (note 3 above) 40. 
52 Ibid at 41.  
53 IPCC (note 20 above) 45.  
54 Guruswamy (note 44 above) 178.  
55 Arcas (note 30 above) at 283.  
56 P Rincon ‘Record minimum for Arctic Sea’ British Broadcast Cooperation 19 September 2012 available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-19652329 accessed on 14 August 2014. See also M Scott 
‘Summer 2012 brought record-breaking melt to Greenland’ 4 December 2012 available at   
http://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/summer-2012-brought-record-breaking-melt-
greenland accessed on 14 January 2014. 
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surface temperature could rise by more than 1°C by 2100 and this will have serious 
consequences.57 
 
2.2.4.2 An increase in precipitation 
It is also projected with higher confidence that there will be an increase in the global average 
precipitation, most likely in areas of high-latitudes, whilst there will be a decrease in 
precipitation in most sub-tropical land regions.58 As a result, future tropical cyclones (which 
are the typhoons and hurricanes) will become more intense and frequent with larger peak 
wind speeds and more heavy precipitation which is associated with increase of tropical sea 
surface temperatures.59 The climate change conference in Doha became dramatic as amid the 
climate talks at COP18/CMP8 in 2012, more than 400 lives were lost in a hit by Typhoon 
Bopha in the Philippines.60 This situation raised concerns amongst members of the UNFCCC 
in consideration of these events when negotiating. A year later during the opening of 
COP19/CMP9 in Warsaw saw The Philippines being hit by typhoon Haiyan and Yeb Sano, 
the Head of Delegation for the Philippines made a very emotional plea to the conference as 
he emphasised that ‘this, “massive devastation” should be a warning to the whole world and 
“it's time to stop this madness”.’61   
 
2.2.4.3 Sea Level Rise 
Sea levels have risen 4-10 inches over the past century as a consequence of global warming 
and it is likely to rise more in the next future.62 This rise in sea levels has been described as 
unprecedented.63 The sea rise is a result of ocean water warming which then leads to a rise in 
sea levels relative to the land.64 Sea level rise in short could contaminate the aquifers that 
                                                          
57 IPCC (note 20 above) 45.  
58 IPCC (note 20 above) 46.  
59 Ibid. 
60 ‘Typhoon Bopha: Death Toll Passes 400’ The Telegraph 6 December 2012 available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/philippines/9726094/Typhoon-Bopha-death-toll-passes-
400.html accessed on 10 January 2014.  
61 The opening of COP19 in Warsaw in the shade of Philippines' super typhoon Haiyan available at 
http://www.cop19.gov.pl/latest-news/items/the-opening-of-cop19-in-warsaw-in-the-shade-of-philippines-super-
typhoon-haiyan, accessed on 14 January 2014. 
62 See note 55 above.  
63 Hardy (note 3 above) 48.  
64 Ibid. 
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supply drinking water for Caribbean Islands while the entire Pacific could simply disappear 
under the sea.65 Half of humanity lives in the coastal lands and for them, even half a metre 
rise could have serious consequences as they will lose the most fertile land.66 Even half a 
metre rise where there is no flood defence will leave a substantial number of people living in 
large river deltas and small islands liable to flooding.67 In addition, the people become more 
vulnerable by the likelihood of storm surges either due to more intense tropical cyclones or 
mid latitude storms and by other problems such as local land subsidence and the increased 
intrusion of salt into groundwater.68 
 
2.2.5 The climate problem 
The climate problem can therefore be summed up as outlined in the IPCC’s Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4) as it lists what it terms as ‘the five reasons for concern’ which 
were identified in its predecessor the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report  (TAR). These include 
the following: 
a. heightened risk to unique and threatened ecosystems and communities, 
b. likely increase in the frequency of and damage from droughts, floods and heat waves, 
c. greater vulnerability of the poor and elderly to the adverse effects of climate change, 
d. growing economic costs of impacts over time as atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations increase, and  
e. the possibility of significantly rising sea levels from melting of the Greenland and Antarctic 
ice sheets.69  
 
All of the above potential impacts are just a glimpse of the projected effects of climate 
change. In summary therefore, climate change will lead to an increase in temperatures, a 
serious increase or decrease of precipitation (which will differ per regions) and an 
unprecedented increases in sea level rise. This will have serious impact on fresh water 
supplies, ecosystems, food supplies and human health. In addition, there will also be more 
unbearable extreme weather events. 70 
                                                          
65 See note 55above.  
66 Houghton (note 40 above) at 181.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid.  
69 IPCC (note 60 above) at 64-65 as expanded by Dernbach & Kakade (note 11 above) 5.  
70 Houghton (note 40 above) generally at 172-234. See also Hardy (note 3 above) 77-183.  
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2.2.6 Potential solutions to the climate problem 
As climate change seems to be more of an environmental science problem, scientific 
solutions have been offered. These have over the time been moulded into potential policy 
options and these options mainly include mitigation, energy efficiency and conservation, 
carbon storage and adaptation.71 These will briefly be discussed briefly in turn. The first 
solution suggested is mitigation. This involves a direct reduction in GHG emissions and takes 
a more traditional approach as pollution control.72 The second option is energy efficiency and 
conservation which focuses more on an indirect reduction of GHGs emissions from fossil 
fuels by reducing the amount of energy used73 as well as increasing the amount of energy 
generated per GHG emitted.74 The third option is carbon storage (also referred to as carbon 
sequestration) which involves the reduction of CO2 at the source thus eliminating much of 
greenhouse warming potential.75 This is a long term option in which CO2 is then stored 
underground in the soil, bedrock or other places so that it no longer returns to the atmosphere 
and cannot return to the atmosphere.76 The final option is adaption and this works in the 
anticipation of climate change being inevitable thereby preparing for it.77 Adaptation means 
adjusting to climate change (including climate variability and extremes) to moderate potential 
damage, to the advantage of opportunities or to cope with consequences.78 Therefore, the 
object of adaptation is to anticipate and minimise the negative consequences of climate 
change.79  
 
The above solutions are believed to be the possible solutions to effectively address climate 
change. Most of the other solutions fall in one of these four as well.80 It is however important 
to note that the greatest efforts to date have been focused on the first two options as 
evidenced in the international climate talks under the UNFCCC. This researcher strongly 
considers mitigation of GHGs as the key to addressing the climate problem. Since climate 
                                                          
71 Dernbach & Kakade (note 11 above) 8-9; See also Hardy (note 3 above) 187. 
72 Dernbach & Kakade (note 11 above) 8.  
73 Ibid.  
74 Hardy (note 3 above) 201.  
75 Ibid at 187.  
76 Dernbach & Kakade (note 11) above 8-9.  
77 Ibid at 9.  
78 Houghton (note 40 above) at 173.  
79 Dernbach & Kakade (note 11 above) at 9.  
80 Ibid at 8.  
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change results from collective states’ GHG emissions which build up in the atmosphere for a 
period of time, a better solution is to control by reducing this emission rate as this helps as 
time progresses. A failure in mitigation means adaptation becomes the only available solution 
for the future. This is not guaranteed as most developing countries have very limited adaptive 
capacity. It has also been established that the cost of mitigation is lower than that of 
adaptation81 thus a failure in mitigation actions most probably means the least developed 
countries (LDCs) and Small Island States (SISs) are in serious danger. To this effect, this 
thesis focuses mainly on the mitigation provisions of the climate change negotiations 
outcomes as shall be seen in Chapters 4 and 5 which address the central question of this 
study. The rationale behind such a focus is that there are a number of issues that are discussed 
at the COP/CMP negotiations. Due to space constraints this dissertation focuses only on the 
mitigation aspect. 
 
2.2.7 Climate change scientific uncertainties: The political and legal implications 
 
The IPCC in its first assessment report plainly admits that, 
  
There are many uncertainties in our predictions particularly with regard to the timing, 
magnitude and regional patterns of climate change, due to our incomplete understanding of: 
 sources and sinks of greenhouse gases, which affect predictions of future concentrations; 
 clouds, which strongly influence the magnitude of climate change;  
 oceans, which influence the timing and patterns of climate change; 
 polar ice sheets which affect predictions of sea-level rise. 
These processes are already partially understood, and we are confident that the uncertainties 
can be reduced by further research. However, the complexity of the system means that we 
cannot rule out surprises.82 
 
This statement regarding the climate change’s scientific uncertainty was formulated more 
than two decades ago but Houghton asserts that it remains a good statement of the main 
factors that underlie scientific uncertainty in climate science today.83 This however does not 
                                                          
81 Houghton (note 40 above) 285-286. The same assertion has recently been confirmed. See D Campbell ‘After 
Doha: What Has Climate Change Policy Accomplished?’ (2013) 25:1 Journal of Environmental Law 11.  
82 IPCC (note 13 above) 63.  
83 Houghton (note 40 above) 262.  
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mean there has been little or no progress in the understanding of climate science as 
significant progress has taken place in understanding development of models as evidenced by 
the IPCC reports.84 In 2005, the Joint Science Academies in a statement also submitted that 
“there will always be uncertainty in understanding a system as complex as the world’s 
climate”.85 However despite such a statement, the same report goes on to say that there is 
now strong evidence that significant global warming is occurring.86 Despite all the serious 
attempts to make climate change appear controversial and casting the uncertainty debate in 
the popular media to try and disregard the need to act now, there is an overwhelming 
scientific consensus today that human activity that releases GHGs is causing a change in the 
Earth’s climate.87 An excellent source of information and authority in this field is the IPCC, 
as mentioned in the previous chapter.88    
 
Uncertainties and controversies however remain with regards to the extent of possible 
impacts that climate change will have on human and natural systems as this cannot 
unequivocally be ascertained and also the causal nexus between anthropogenic forced climate 
change and the adverse effects.89 The predictions by the IPCC have been challenged by a 
large group of dissenting scientists who have expressed themselves through some petitions.90 
They have given quite a number of arguments to discredit the IPCC’s findings and 
predictions. The IPCC is however confident that the world will face significant adverse 
impacts91 which have been discussed above. 
 
Therefore, what can be adduced from the above discussion is that together with the 
uncertainty in the basic science of climate change, including the causal nexus and the 
predictions of future climate change impacts, there are bound also to be uncertainties in our 
assessment of the impacts of climate change.92 The question to be asked now is how the 
                                                          
84 Ibid.  
85 Rodgers et al (note 12 above) 29.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Rodgers et el (note 12 above) 16; Guruswamy (note 44 above) 180; See also Houghton (note 40 above) 261.  
88 For more information see http://www.ipcc.ch/. 
89 Guruswamy (note 44 above) 185.  
90 Ibid at 181.  
91 Ibid at 185-186.  
92 Houghton (n40) at 261.  
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uncertainty debate by scientists has been interpreted by policy makers and to what extent it 
has played a part in negotiating towards a climate solution. As a result, the issue about 
climate change due to this whole uncertainty debate becomes not only how much action is 
required to address the climate problem, but also when this action needs to be taken.93 It is 
important to note that due to such uncertainty allegations, some policy makers have actually 
came forward and argued that the climate change case is not so strong enough for much 
action to be taken now.94 Alestalo states that, 
 
Political negotiations and decisions concerning regional adaption to or global mitigation of 
human-induced climate change require solid and unequivocal scientific information as 
background material. This is obvious as the decisions about adaptation and especially 
mitigation are extremely far-reaching, influencing global economy and relations between 
sovereign countries. The evidence concerning the negative impacts of the human-induced 
climate change must be so clear and concrete that there remains no reasonable doubt about the 
necessity of the counter actions. And yet, as the science is expressing its best and honest 
understanding of future conditions, there are always certain scientific uncertainties in the 
analyses and calculations which just must be accepted.95 
 
It is of paramount importance to note that these political negotiations lead to the adoption of 
legal instruments that are meant to deal with the climate problem. Clearly, today’s decision-
making takes place in a situation where there remains scientific uncertainty. This has affected 
the political will of some statesmen as well as holding hostage the process that can bring to 
life a reasonable legal solution to what has been described by countless scientists, statesmen, 
economists, environmentalists as well as academics in all different fields as one of the biggest 
environmental challenges facing the world today. These uncertainties in science delayed the 
ratification and the immediate implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and continue to haunt 
the climate talks as well as the possibility of a better legal instrument today.  
 
 
                                                          
93 Ibid at 274.  
94 Ibid.  
95 M Alestalo ‘Man-made Climate Change: The Scientific Basis and the Main Implications’ 2010 International 
Environmental Law-Making and Diplomacy Review 7&8. 
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2.3 WHY ARE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS BEING USED TO ADDRESS THE   
CLIMATE PROBLEM? 
Given that climate change is more of an environmental and scientific problem and even a 
sustainability issue, an important question that should come to mind is why the world under 
the United Nations has decided to rely on international multilateral legal instruments to drive 
the need to deal with global climate change or alternatively the source of the mandate of 
international law to address such a problem. One of the central questions that have been 
raised in the climate negotiations is whether the new instrument needs to be legally binding. 
This question will not be addressed in this section of the study, but rather in Chapter 6 which 
analyses the fundamental questions of the evolution of the climate change regime which is 
the core of this study. For now, the question as to where international law gets its mandate to 
address the climate problem and why it has been preferred is going to be addressed 
 
Due to the fact that climate change is a problem which can be described as an environmental 
problem ‘beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’96 and is a result of the combined activities 
of many nations, international law has the basis to address the issue as with stratospheric 
ozone depletion and other global harms.97 The basis of this is found under Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration.98 Principle 21 reads ‘States have a responsibility to ensure that the 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
states of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’. 
 
Authors such as Birnie and Boyle present a contrasting view. They attempt to argue that the 
global atmosphere does not quite fit the precise terms of Principle 21 as it is not an area 
‘beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’ but rather falls by analogy within the protection 
afforded by international law to common areas such as high seas.99 They conclude that such a 
conclusion is implicit in the Ozone Convention and the UNGA Resolution 43/53 and in the 
designation of climate change as a matter of ‘common concern’ in the UNFCCC.100 
                                                          
96 PW Birnie & AE Boyle International Law and The Environment 2 ed (2002) 516. 
97 VP Nanda & G Pring International Environmental Law & Policy for the 21st Century (2003) 290. 
98 Ibid at 290, See also Birnie and Boyle (note 96 above) 516, See also VP Nanda International Environmental 
Law and Policy (1995) 247. 
99 Birnie & Boyle (note 96 above) 516.  
100 Ibid. See also The Preamble of the UNFCCC. 
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However, authors such as Nanda view the principle of state responsibility enshrined under 
Principle 21 as an emerging doctrine of customary law which will allow international law to 
control emissions which cause global warming.101 Thus international law still has a firm basis 
to address global climate change. Whichever view one decides to take however, it is of 
paramount importance to note that international law or international environmental law forms 
a strong basis to address global climate change. This has become evident through the existing 
climate regime which consists of international treaty law.  
 
Now that the basis for international law has been established, the next question is why 
international law is a preferred route and why such legal regimes are important. As pointed 
out by Nanda firstly, the law creates what can be termed “state responsibility” which will 
allow international law to control emissions which cause global warming.102 Spencer also 
further puts this state responsibility claim by stating that: 
 
Legally binding regimes represent the highest level of commitment by governments 
and provide the greatest certainty to private actors. By providing the strongest 
assurances of global cooperation, and of gradually changing markets, legally binding 
regimes can shift countries’ perceived interests and strengthen their actions. By 
anchoring interactions in stronger normative frameworks, binding regimes provide 
more effective scientific benchmarks for action.103 
 
Hare, Stockwell, Flachsland and Oberthur also strengthen the assertion and outline that 
legally binding agreements have several benefits, which in most cases add to the benefits 
discussed above.104 These academics further outline that legally binding agreements bring 
about a global coordination which is needed to address the climate problem since it is a 
collective action which could assist in achieving rapid GHG emissions which is needed 
urgently.105 They identify five functions that the so called ‘global coordination’ could provide 
and these can be summarised as follows: 
                                                          
101 Nanda (note 98 above) 247.  
102 Ibid.  
103 TA Spencer ‘A legal Form Proposal for Durban and Beyond’ November 25, 2011 available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1964697 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1964697, accessed on 13 July 2013. 
104 Hare et al “The architecture of the global climate regime: A top-down perspective” (2010) 10 Climate Policy 
606-607.   
105 Ibid at 606.    
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(i) Enhanced confidence in making commitments 
Basically, a legally binding agreement signals the seriousness with which Parties to the 
agreement intend to take their commitments. As a result, credibility of commitments is 
enhanced which adds confidence in other parties to also follow suite and this will have a 
positive effect of increasing the real level of action.106 
 
(ii)  Enhanced confidence in the delivery of commitments 
If legally binding agreements are compared to mere pledges (non-binding agreements), 
legally binding agreements actually increase the confidence of delivery since these are 
incorporated into domestic law by the domestic ratification process which means that they 
can bind future governments if they are long term because of their true legal nature and that 
true legal standing will be evidence of the level of commitment of the parties.107 There are 
also substantial likely increased costs of non-compliance which almost all countries want to 
avoid where possible.108  
  
(iii) Facilitates domestic implementation  
Basically, there will be implementing ministries which are better equipped to deal better and 
effectively with other ministries. The reason for this is the need by the respective 
governments to comply and implement international legal agreements which they have 
committed to and which have become their legal mandates.109  
 
(iv) Reduced transactions costs 
The authors argue that theoretically there are reduced transaction costs since governments 
won’t continue renegotiating and also as noted in the climate change context there have been 
benefits of burden sharing agreements through different mechanisms.110 
 
One therefore comes to the conclusion that international law has a strong basis to address 
global climate change as there are solid principles that can compel countries to act 
                                                          
106 Ibid.  
107 Ibid.  
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid at 606 & 607. 
110 Ibid at 607. 
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responsibly as well as holding the same countries responsible for their actions. Furthermore, 
it seems that using legal regimes provides assurance and insurance that the states involved 
will do their best in meeting with their commitments. These legally binding regimes on an 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 
“Global warming is a fact. Now it's up to liberals to make it a reality. Hence there is 
crucial importance in preventing powerful, greedy free market forces from getting in the 
way of worsening storms and rising sea levels. The Kyoto Accord is a good first step”.1 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
According to Shaw, ‘[i]n the long march for mankind from the cave to the computer a central 
role has always been played by the idea of law – the idea that order is necessary and chaos 
inimical to a just and stable existence’.2 He further pinpoints law as that element which binds 
the members of the community together in the adherence to recognised values or standards.3 
This has become a model in which almost every community exists and the international 
community has not been an exception thus the development of international law. Modern 
international law in general can be tracked back some 400 years back but certain basic 
concepts of international law can be discerned in political relationships thousands of years 
ago.4 International law has not stopped growing and developing but it has continued to 
develop rapidly to this day. Today’s significant developments have also been observed in its 
other branches such as international environmental law which has grown from being a narrow 
specialty field within the general context of international law to become a field in its own 
right.5 It is important to note that international environmental law has continued to grow. 
Such a development can be traced to the climate change law which has also developed within 
the confinements of international environmental law and all can be looked at through lenses 
of international law. 
The general pattern of growth of international environmental law has been summarised by 
Bodansky as follows, 
                                                          
1 A quotation by an American Comedian PJ O'Rourke available at 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/p/pjorour617638.html, accessed on 21 August 2014. 
2 MN Shaw International Law 6 ed (2008) 1.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid at 14.   
5 D Bodansky ‘The Development of International Environmental Law’ (2011) International Law-making and 
Diplomatic Review 11.  
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[A] problem is discovered, often with alarm, as a result of a dramatic event such as an oil spill; 
public interest is aroused, leading to new initiatives; environmental legal responses spread to 
other countries through a process of mimicry; the difficulties and the true, often hidden, costs of 
addressing the problem gradually become apparent; the public becomes discouraged, bored, or 
diverted by the emergence of a new issue; and the issue becomes quiescent, continuing to be 
addressed in a routine, ‘administrative’ manner.6 
This is arguably the same pattern that the international climate change regime has followed. 
This chapter introduces the international climate change regime. In the first part of this 
chapter, the researcher outlines the general history and institutional development within the 
climate change regime is from the Stockholm 1972 United Nations Conference on Human 
Development through to the famous Rio 1992 United Nations Conference on Environmental 
and Development (UNCED). The second part of the chapter introduces the existing 
international climate regime comprising of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto Protocol/The Protocol). 
The UNFCCC will be outlined for contextual set up and understanding. An assessment of it 
as a global instrument, its ultimate objective and its conceptual framework including 
important principles enshrined within it will also be assessed. After that, a brief analysis of 
the Kyoto Protocol will also be undertaken. The researcher will give a brief critical analysis 
of the Kyoto Protocol to assess its strengths and weaknesses, the extent to which the Kyoto 
Protocol have pushed for the ultimate objective and the principles in the Convention. The last 
part will assess the Protocol’s successes, shortfalls and the effects it has had in the overall 
climate regime as well as the effects it may have on the future climate change regime. 
3.2 HISTORY ON INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT: FROM 
SVANTE ARRHENIUS (EARLY 1890S) – THE POST-KYOTO PROTOCOL (1997 
AND BEYOND).  
Bodansky and Rajamani assert that,  
The development of the climate change regime can usefully be divided into six periods: the 
foundational period, during which scientific concern about global warming developed; the 
agenda setting phase, from 1985-1988, when climate change was transformed from a scientific 
into a policy issue; a pre-negotiation period from 1988 to 1990, when governments became 
heavily involved in the process; the constitutional period from 1991 to 1995, leading to the 
                                                          
6 Ibid at 12.  
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adoption and entry into force of the FCCC; and a regulatory phase, focusing on  the 
negotiation, elaboration and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol from 1995 to 2007, and a 
second constitutional phase, from 2001 to the present, focusing on the negotiation and 
elaboration of the future climate regime.7 
This is the most accurate breakdown and explanation. This study will briefly highlight such a 
development for a foundational understanding of the origins of climate change regime and 
where it is headed. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, scientifically, the problem of human induced climate 
change was hypothesised in the early 1890s by a Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius who 
warned about a possibility of a so called ‘enhanced greenhouse effect’ caused by excess 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.8 It however took the world almost another century before 
the world’s political system began to recognise and respond to the problem despite such early 
warnings by Arrhenius.9 Furthermore, in Chapter 2 of this study’s discussion of international 
law’s basis to deal with climate change in the previous chapter, a conclusion was reached that 
the 1972 Stockholm was a stepping stone to addressing the climate problem. International 
law gets such mandate in terms of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration10 which 
declares that, ‘[s]tates have a responsibility to ensure that the activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states of areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction’.11 
This therefore has been believed to encompass the principle of state responsibility for CO2 
emissions that causes climate change. As a result of the Declaration, the development of the 
climate regime can be traced from this point. Kiss and Shelton however assert that the first 
signs of international concern over the problem of climate change only emerged in a series of 
international conferences on CO2 between 1985 and 1987 under the World Meteorological 
                                                          
7 D Bodansky & L Rajamani ‘Evolution and Governance Architecture Draft’ 2012 International Relations and 
Global Climate Change available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2168859, accessed on 9 
December 2013.  
8 SB Pralle ‘Agenda-Setting and Climate Change.’ (2009) Environmental Politics 18:5, 781.  
9 Ibid. 
10 VP Nanda & G Pring International Environmental Law & Policy for the 21st Century (2003) 290, See also 
PW Birnie & AE Boyle International Law and The Environment 2 ed (2002) 516, See also VP Nanda 
International Environmental Law and Policy (1995) 247.  
11 Declaration of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972 (Stockholm Declaration). 
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Organisation (WMO) which however had disappointing results.12 Good examples of these 
meetings include the International Conference on the Atmosphere in Evolution and its 
Implications for the Safety of the Globe held in Toronto from June 27 to 30, 198813 and the 
Noordwijk Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change which was held in 
November 1989.14 Amongst the Noordwijk’s significant decisions was the recommendation 
that developed countries stabilise their greenhouse gas emissions ‘as soon as possible’.15 This 
provision faced serious opposition up to the negotiation of the UNFCCC itself16 but it went 
on to survive the UNFCCC negotiations and exists up to today. 
A major institutional development however took place in 1988. In that year, the United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) joined efforts with the WMO to study the 
scientific aspect of the climate problem.17 In November of 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climatic Change (IPCC) was created, made up of scientific and political experts and given 
the task of exploring possible measures to be taken in order to protect the atmosphere.18 In 
December of 1988 also, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) endorsed the 
establishment of the IPCC by the UNEP and the WMO.19 The IPCC’s task is as outlined in 
the UN General Assembly Resolution 43/53 of 6 December 1988 was to prepare a 
comprehensive review and recommendations with respect to the state of knowledge of the 
science of climate change; social and economic impact of climate change; and possible 
response strategies and elements for inclusion in a possible future international convention on 
climate. 20 The IPCC has thus far prepared four reports, in 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2007 
respectively.21 The IPCC is currently working on the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) and 
                                                          
12 A Kiss & D Shelton International Environmental Law 2 ed (2000) 512. 
13 Ibid; See also D Bodansky ‘A Tale of Two Architectures’ March 2011 available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1773865  or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1773865, at 5 accessed on 1 July 2014. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, quoting The Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, Nov 7, 1989, 12 
Int’I EnvrI. Rep. (BNA) 624 (Dec.13 1989).  
16 Ibid at 6.  
17 Kiss & Shelton (note 12 above) at 512; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s history, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml, (accessed on 12 September 2013).  
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid. 
20 IPCC history available at http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml, accessed on 12 
September 2013. 
21 Ibid; See also JC Dernbach & S Kakade ‘Climate Change Law: An Introduction’ 2008 29:1 Energy LJ  at 3. 
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plans to release it in October of 2014.22 On the 6th of December 1988, the UNGA also 
adopted a resolution on the conservation of the global climate for present and future 
generations of mankind which stated that climate change is a ‘common concern for 
mankind’.23 
After the IPCC, a number of conventions took place but one of the most notable gatherings 
was the Second World Climate Conference which was held in Geneva from 29 September to 
7 November in 1990 which had more than 100 delegates from different states who were in 
some cases even led by their Heads of State or Government.24 The meeting contained as its 
Final Declaration of the Conference a compromise solution requesting developed countries to 
establish either reduction objectives by specific dates or feasible national programmes and 
strategies which should have a significant effect on the limitation of CO2 and other gases 
having a greenhouse effect.25 On 21 December 1990, the UNGA adopted a new resolution on 
the protection of the world climate for future generations and the establishment of an 
International Negotiating Committee (INC) which was to prepare a general and effective 
convention on climate change.26 The INC negotiations concluded in 1992 with the opening 
for signatures of the UNFCCC at the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.27 The 
Convention entered into force less than two years later on March 21, 1994 as a result of its 
ratification by 50 countries and takes pride in having 196 parties today.28 This marked the 
constitutional phase as named by Bodansky and Rajamani.29  This however did not give a 
final solution to the climate change problem. By 1995, countries realized that emission 
reductions provisions in the Convention were inadequate.30 They launched negotiations to 
strengthen the global response to climate change and, two years later, adopted the Kyoto 
                                                          
22 Information available at http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml , (accessed on 08 April 
2013).  
23 Kiss & Shelton (note 12 above) 512.  
24 Ibid at 513.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid at 514. Nanda (note 10 above) 250.  
28 Bodansky & Rajamani (note 7 above) 8; Also see https://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php 
accessed 10 December 2014. 
29 Ibid Bodansky & Rajamani. 
30 Information available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php, (accessed on 09 December 
2014 2014).  
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Protocol.31 The Kyoto Protocol legally binds developed countries to emission reduction 
targets.32 The Protocol’s first commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012 and the 
second commitment period began on 1 January 2013 and will end in 2020.33 
It is clear that neither the convention nor the Protocol and its two commitment periods 
offered a final solution to the climate problem thus negotiations continue to happen annually. 
The Protocol has suffered a lot of criticism and a significant number of developed countries 
have withdrawn their support of the Protocol. This leads to asking the most fundamental 
question which is what happens after it finally expires. This is what the researcher will be 
tapping into by tracing the progress of the climate negotiations in this second constitutional 
phase which focuses on negotiation and elaboration of the future climate regime. 
3.3 THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 
The international climate change regime34 consists of two instruments which are the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.35 These two will now be discussed in turn.  
3.3.1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
After all the above mentioned scientific and political breakthrough, in 1992 countries joined 
an international treaty to cooperatively consider what they could do to limit average global 
temperature increases and the resulting climate change and to cope with whatever impacts 
were by then inevitable.36 The result was a binding international treaty which became known 
as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (herein after referred to as 
the Convention or UNFCCC).37 The UNFCCC was opened for signature in June 1992 during 
                                                          
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid.  
34  The term ‘regime’ can be loosely defined as a system of principles and rules governing something and which 
is created by law. It is framework of legal rules, available at http://definitions.uslegal.com/l/legal-regime/, 
accessed on 21 August 2014. 
35 See note 30 above. 
36 Ibid.  
37 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 UNTS 
107 (entered into force 21 March 1994). (UNFCCC), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/essentialbackground/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf.  
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the Rio de Janeiro Conference and came into force on 21 March 1994.38 The UNFCCC has 
been described as the centrepiece of global efforts to combat global warming as it sets the 
general objectives, goals and arrangements for cooperation in addressing climate change. 39 
Furthermore, it provides a forum for negotiating a more intense and detailed international 
agreement for the limitation of GHGs.40  
The convention was negotiated by consensus thus it was a huge compromise and the intention 
was to attract universal participation.41 It therefore reflects deep differences of opinion among 
the different participating states as to the measures needed and the allocated responsibility for 
addressing the problem42 and this has interestingly become the convention’s weaknesses and 
strengths.43  
3.3.1.1 The Objective of the Convention 
The Convention’s objective is enshrined in Article 2 and it reads:  
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference 
of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas (GHGs) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level 
should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner.44 
The objective of the Convention and that of related instruments is not to reverse greenhouse 
gas emissions but to stabilize them45 ‘at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system’.46 It is important to note that the Convention realizes 
                                                          
38 Ibid. 
39 RL Arcas (a) ‘Kyoto and the COPs: Lessons Learned and Looking Ahead’ 2011 (23) Hague Yearbook of 
International Law at 20. RL Arcas (b) ‘Is the Kyoto Protocol an adequate Environmental agreement To Resolve 
the Climate Change Problem?’ 2001 European Env Law Review at 284. 
40 Ibid.  
41 PW Birnie… et al International Law and the Environmental 3 ed (2009) 357.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Nanda (note 10 above) 250.  
44 Article 2 of the UNFCCC. 
45 Birnie et al (note 41 above) 358.   
46 Ibid at 357. 
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that it is only by stabilising the concentration of greenhouse gases (especially carbon dioxide) 
in the atmosphere that the rapid climate change which is expected to occur with global 
warming can be halted.47 The Convention’s objective however does not specify the level nor 
does it envisage that it should be achieved immediately except for simply stating that it 
should be ‘achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner’.48 According to Birnie and others, the 
wording of this objective reflects that the parties see some degree of climate change as 
inevitable and that the policy makers seem to be prepared to tolerate climate change provided 
it happens slowly enough to allow natural adaptation.49 
3.3.1.2 The Convention’s Guiding Principles 
Article 3 sets out the principles to guide the parties in their actions to achieve the objective of 
the Convention and to implement its provisions.50 These have become very important 
guidelines in the battle against global climate changes as the researcher will highlight. Birnie 
and others submit that these principles “reflect the contours of global environmental 
responsibility elaborated in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration”.51 These principles include the Inter-generational Equity52 and the Common but 
Differentiated Responsibility Principle (CBDR).53 The CBDR principle assigns the lead to 
combat climate change to developed country parties.54 This principle has grown to be a 
strong principle under the UNFCCC and it has greatly shaped the climate negotiations. This 
dissertation will show how and to what extent it has done so in the next two chapters. The 
other guiding principle is the precautionary principle or approach which states that,  
 
 
                                                          
47 J Houghton Global Warming: A Complete Briefing 4 ed (2009) 293.   
48 Birnie et al (note 41) 558.   
49 Ibid. 
50 Article 3 of the UNFCCC.  
51 Birnie et al (note 41 above) 358. 
52 Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC.  
53 The Preamble, Article 3(1) and 4(1) of the UNFCCC. 
54 Birnie & Boyle (note 10 above) 101.   
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Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should 
not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and 
measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at 
the lowest possible cost.55  
Louka argues that this precautionary version in the UNFCCC is just a diluted version of the 
real precautionary principle although he does not support this assertion.56 The other principles 
include the right of all parties to sustainable development as well as the need to promote ‘a 
supportive and open international economic system’.57 There is also much focus on the 
aspects of promoting sustainable development and also the special needs and fears of 
developing countries that measures to curtail climate change could become an arbitrary 
restriction on trade.58  
The above were set as the Convention’s guiding principles. It is important to note that the 
Convention rearticulated in a binding text the principles of international law.59 Most of these 
however had yet to be fully fledged.60  However, despite these principles being ‘half baked’, 
it is important to note that Article 3 in this ‘context of a dynamic and evolutionary regulatory 
regime such as the Climate Change Convention, it has the important merit of providing some 
predictability regarding the parameters within which the parties are required to work towards 
the objective on the convention’,61 As a result, when the parties go for Protocol negotiation, 
they are not faced with a ‘complete blank sheet’ but do have a framework.62 These principles 
however do not have a legally binding force but at the same time are not without legal 
effect.63 They have a soft legal effect which is indicated in Article 3 by the use of the word 
‘should’ instead of ‘must’. The article is thus relevant for interpretation and implementation 
                                                          
55 Article 3(3) of the UNFCC. 
56 E Louka International Environmental Law: Fairness, Effectiveness, and World Order (2006) 364.  
57 Art. 4(5) of the UNFCCC.  
58 Louka (note 56) 364 quoting Art. 3(4) and Art. (5) of the UNFCCC.  
59 Ibid Louka at 364. 
60 Ibid.  
61 Birnie et al (note 41 above) at 359.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid.  
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of the Convention in addition to creating expectations concerning matters which must be 
taken into account in good faith in the negotiation of further instruments.64  
3.3.1.3 The General Commitments of Parties under the Convention 
In the quest of achieving GHG stabilisation as stated by Article 2, the Convention carries 
commitments for its member parties and these are outlined and dealt with by Article 4.65 
These commitments are split into two sections. Firstly, Article 4(1) makes reference to ‘all 
parties’66 thus member parties, that is both the developed and the developing countries, under 
this article accepted a number of general commitments under the Convention.67  These 
general or less onerous commitments are based on the principle of CBDR.68 The list of 
commitments under Article 4(1) are tenfold and stretch from environmental issues to 
economic and scientific and technological cooperation.69 The provision, despite encouraging 
all parties to think about climate change however does not compel the parties to adhere to any 
specific international standards for controlling it.70  
The second sets of commitments are listed under Article 4(2).71 These are more onerous and 
only apply to the developed countries member states and those described as ‘economies in 
transition’ namely parties of Eastern Europe which are referred to as the Annex I countries.72 
The Convention mentioned one particular aim with a relatively short-term and one long far-
reaching objective.73 This is under Articles 4(2) (a) and (b) stating that Annex I countries 
should take action to return individually or jointly emissions of CO2 and other GHGs not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol to their 1990 levels by the year 2000.74 It is important to 
note that this provision only applied to the developed country parties.75 The reason behind 
                                                          
64 Ibid.  
65 Art 4 of the UNFCCC.  
66 Art 4(1) of the UNFCCC. 
67 Arcas (b) (note 39 above) 284.  
68 Birnie et al (note 41 above) 359.  
69 Art. 4(1) (a)-(j).  
70 Birnie et al (note 41 above) 358.  
71 Art 4(2) of the UNFCCC. 
72 Art. 4(2) of the UNFCCC.  
73 Houghton (note 47 above) 291.  
74 Article 4(2)(a) & (b) of the UNFCCC. 
75 Also referred to as the Annex I parties. Art. 4(2) of the UNFCCC.  
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this approach was that the developed/industrialised countries have contributed the greatest 
share of historical and current global GHGs.76 As a result, the developed/industrialised 
countries agreed upon ratifying the Convention that they would adopt policies and measures 
that demonstrated that they were ‘taking a lead’ in addressing climate change.77 Despite such 
a commitment, Article 4(2) (a) sets no specific timetables and targets for limiting such 
emissions.78 It only establishes that the obligations differ in that Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries should take the strongest measures whilst 
the countries in transition to a market economy are granted a ‘certain degree of flexibility’.79 
Despite such a precise time frame, however, the wording of the commitment provisions does 
not create to a strong or a clear commitment.80 However, the provision that the first Congress 
of Parties would review the adequacy of these policies as early as the first meeting and at 
regular interval afterwards balance this shortcoming.81  
Furthermore, the Convention also creates commitments on financial issues. Article 4(3) 
partly reads, ‘[t]he developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex 
II shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred 
by developing country Parties in complying with their obligations under Article 12, 
paragraph 1’82 indicates the obligation developed countries have towards developing 
countries. In addition to providing such funding, the richest and developed countries are 
obliged to also facilitate technology transfer.83 By doing so, the Convention seems to 
recognize that the extent to which developing countries implement their commitments will 
depend significantly on financial and technical assistance from developed countries.84  
3.3.1.4 The UNFCCC: An assessment 
Before one delves much into criticism of the Convention, one needs to look at its name which 
clearly states that it is a ‘framework convention’. Louka outlines the purpose of a framework 
                                                          
76 Preamble of the UNFCCC.  
77 Art. 4(2)(a) Ibid.  
78 Kiss & Shelton (note 12 above) 514.   
79 Arcas (b) (note 39 above) 284.  
80 Birnie et al (note 41above) 360.  
81 Art. 4(2)(d) of the UNFCCC. For analysis see note 80 above. 
82 Art. 4(3) of the UNFCCC.  
83 Ibid.  
84 Arcas (b) (note 39 above) 284. 
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convention as being ‘to set the general tone for the future climate change discussions and to 
compromise in a single text the often irreconcilable interests and ideologies of state parties’.85 
Due to the complexity of the matter negotiated as well as the scientific uncertainties available 
at the time it was negotiated, the UNFCCC was regarded as a remarkable outcome which was 
constructed of compromises.86 The Convention has been praised for this as it managed to 
achieve an equitable balance that was acceptable between the great majority of developed and 
developing countries.87 Currently, 196 member states have ratified the UNFCCC which is a 
substantial membership.88 The UNFCCC however suffered criticism in a number of aspects. 
Firstly, it was criticised for carrying the vaguest commitments regarding stabilisation and no 
commitments at all on reductions.89 With regards to this, Louka expressed surprise at the 
Convention’s inclusion of a section on “commitments” under Article 4.90 Despite 
interpretations by other authors on Article 4(2) as placing specific commitments on 
developed countries on carbon sources and sinks, he however concludes that it is highly 
contestable as to whether this Article could be classified as establishing real enforceable 
commitments.91 Probably one of the most notable shortfalls is that the Convention recognises 
climate change as a serious threat; carries as its objective to achieve stabilization of GHGs; 
has as its goal the reduction of these GHG emissions to the 1990 levels by the year 2000, yet 
the same Convention does not have the concrete steps to achieve its obligation nor does it 
develop any binding state targets and timetables to help achieve its 1990 GHG levels goal.92 
Furthermore, the Convention has also been criticized for having provisions that do not 
attempt to resolve differences but just papered over them.93 The Convention also did not 
acknowledge the responsibility of industrialised countries to compensate vulnerable states for 
the harm caused by their GHG emissions.94 Instead there is just a vague commitment which 
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has as its objective to assist vulnerable developing member states to meet the costs of 
adaptation.95 On this note, despite acknowledging that the developed countries were the 
largest sources of GHG emissions, and then recognising that the developing countries have 
common but differentiated responsibilities, the Convention does not resolve what or how this 
responsibility is to be shared.96 
Therefore, one may come to the conclusion that it is clear that the Convention failed in as 
much as mandating of firm targets and timetable; and failed to decide on major outstanding 
issues that included mechanisms for funding, solid commitments of the developed countries, 
the countries in economic transition as well as the developing countries.97 Despite these 
claims of failing, one must not forget the realities that the Convention is merely a framework. 
Louka states that the UNFCCC contains the realities of every framework convention thus it 
can be judged lightly for straddling the ‘world of firm commitments and vague hortatory 
articulations’.98 Instead the test of Convention success lies not in its commitments but in its 
subsequent evolution under the Protocols which it allows and the COP negotiations which it 
established.99 The Convention thus offered hope and a platform to discuss the world’s 
greatest environmental threat of all times, thus it can be regarded as a huge first step in the 
right direction. 
3.4 THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
After the adoption of the UNFCCC, the parties realized that emission reductions provisions in 
the Convention were inadequate and insufficient to seriously tackle climate change.100 As a 
result, negotiations that were intended to strengthen the global response to climate change 
were launched by the parties beginning in 1995. Two years later, the Kyoto Protocol 101 was 
adopted. The Protocol only came into force on 16 February 2005. The reason it took so long 
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was that by 2003,102 the 120 countries which had ratified it failed to represent a 55% of 
Annex I country emissions as per requirement.103 The requirement for the Protocol to come 
into force was that 55 countries had to ratify it together with sufficient Annex I countries to 
represent 55% of Annex I country emissions.104  The Protocol only came into effect after 
Russia had ratified it towards the end of 2004.  The Kyoto Protocol now boasts 191 state 
member parties.105  
In summary, the Kyoto Protocol legally binds developed countries to more ambitious 
emission reduction targets.106 The Protocol’s first commitment period started in 2008 and 
ended in 2012 and its second commitment period which started on 1 January 2013 will end 
on 31 December 2020.107  
3.4.1 Objectives of the Kyoto Protocol 
The Protocol is clear about its objective. As a Protocol to the UNFCCC, it ultimately declares 
that, ‘the Parties to this Protocol...in pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention as 
stated in its Article 2’.108 As a result, the Kyoto Protocol’s intention is to advance the ultimate 
objective of the UNFCCC namely ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system’ or simply to reduce worldwide GHG emissions.109 Thus therefore if one is to 
measure any success or failure of the Protocol it must be measured against this ultimate 
objective.  
3.4.2 Guiding Principles   
As the Protocol is part of the Convention, one expects it to have the same principles as its 
mother-Convention. The Kyoto Protocol satisfies this as it reflects the same principles in the 
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Convention itself. It however does not have an expressly laid out section on guiding 
principles as the UNFCCC does. The Protocol in its preamble however clearly states that it is 
‘being guided by Article 3 of the Convention’110 and for the purposes of this research, a 
number of guiding principles have been identified namely the principle of inter-generational 
equity,111 the common but differentiated responsibility principle (CBDR);112 and the 
precautionary principle/approach.113 These same principles have been discussed above under 
the UNFCCC section. The interpretation or identification of these principles will be done in 
the discussion of the Protocol specifically in the commitments section and whenever 
necessary matters arise.   
3.4.3 Commitments 
On 21 March 1994, the UNFCCC came into force and in April of that year, the first COP 
meetings were held in Berlin.114 The central issue was to decide on the Convention’s vague 
commitments so as to develop more specific and quantified obligations as well as a time 
frame for action on reduction of GHGs.115 The Conference developed a negotiated paper 
known as ‘The Berlin Mandate’.116 The Berlin Mandate gave birth to the Kyoto Protocol. It is 
a paper that was negotiated at Berlin in 1994 which set a process and time line for the 
development of another instrument to achieve the UNFCCC objective.117  
The Kyoto Protocol strengthened commitments of the UNFCCC.118 The central feature of the 
Kyoto Protocol consists of the targets that were adopted.119 Under the Kyoto Protocol,  
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The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate 
anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A 
do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at 
least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.120 
According to Arcas, this provision presents three variables which are used visibly throughout 
the Protocol.121 The first is the target to reduce GHGs by the Annex I countries; the second 
being the timetables in form of time frames which the objective and commitments should be 
met which is from 2008-2012; and the third being the actors in the Protocol where developing 
countries are not legally bound by that Protocol.122 Therefore under the original first Kyoto 
Protocol, thirty-eight developed countries123 agreed to cut back their emissions of GHGs by a 
total of 5% below the 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. The number of parties has 
however reduced for the second commitment period.124 The Protocol’s original quantified 
reduction targets called on the US to reduce its emissions by 7%, the European Union (EU) 
by 8% and Japan by 6%.125 Countries such as Ukraine and Russia were however allowed only 
to stabilize or freeze their emissions whilst Australia, Iceland and Norway were allowed to 
increase their emissions by 8%, 10% and 1% respectively.126 These emissions to be 
controlled were from six GHGs which included Carbon Dioxide (C02), Methane (CH4), 
Nitrous Oxide (N20), Hydro-fluoro-carbons (HFCs), Perfluoro-carbons (PFCs), Sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6).127 These gases are therefore converted into an amount of CO2 equivalent 
through the use of their global warming potentials.128 
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Countries going through a process of transition to a market economy but also classified along 
with the EU, Japan, the US and as Annex I parties to the UNFCCC such as Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Russia, Ukraine and Poland, among others, were supposed to freeze or stabilize 
their emissions at the 1990 levels, meaning they were not bound to reduce their GHG 
emissions.129 Most of these are referred to as the Annex II countries.130 
Lastly, the developing country parties, those defined as ‘countries in the process of becoming 
industrialised but have constrained resources with which to combat their environmental 
problems’ under the Kyoto Protocol do not have any formal binding targets.131 This means 
therefore that those countries in the process of industrialising under the Kyoto Protocol 
(including China, Brazil and India) were left without formal binding targets except for their 
commitments under the UNFCCC.132 The developed countries according to the CBDR 
principle in the Convention were to take a lead in dealing with global climate change.  The 
Kyoto Protocol was thus formulated in such a way that these industrialised countries would 
take commitments first as they were believed to have contributed more to the climate change 
problem.133  
3.4.4 The Kyoto Protocol’s Flexibility Mechanisms 
A very significant aspect of the Kyoto Protocol was the introduction of the three so called 
‘flexibility mechanisms’ which were created with an intention to assist to lower the costs of 
achieving GHG emissions reductions.134 These three are as follows: 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),135  
Emissions Trading,136 and  
Joint Implementation. 
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Basically, the purpose of these three mechanisms was to maximise cost-effectiveness of 
climate mitigation by providing an opportunity to reduce GHG emissions abroad at a lower 
cost.137 
3.4.4.1 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
The CDM is reflected in Article 12 of the Protocol. It allows countries and companies in the 
developed countries to invest or finance projects aiming at reducing anthropogenic emissions 
in the non-Annex I parties.138 It is aimed at promoting international investment in climate 
friendly technologies for the benefit of developing countries.139 The CDM projects also aim 
to help developing countries achieve sustainable development and ultimately helping in 
achieving the objective of the UNFCCC as at the same time developed countries are helped 
in meeting their Kyoto targets.140 A summary provided by The Greenpeace,141 states that 
activities under the CDM are meant to: 
 Deliver real, measurable and long term greenhouse gas emission reductions and climate 
change mitigation benefits which would otherwise not have occurred; 
 Avoid adverse impacts of projects in host countries, e.g. environmental, social and 
developmental and contributing to a host country's achievement of its national 
environmental and development goals; and 
 Provide investment that is additional to a donor country’s own overseas aid budget and to 
its contributions to the GEF.142 
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Therefore, as its title suggests, the CDM is supposed to be used for clean development in 
developing countries.143 
By investing in the CDM project activities, the industrialised countries receive credits for 
emission reductions from projects in the developing countries in the form of certified 
emission reductions (CERs) which may be used by the industrialised countries to meet their 
Kyoto Protocol’s emissions targets.144 The CERs can then be traded on carbon markets. This 
provides an incentive for industrial firms to invest in CDM projects aimed at reducing 
emissions in developing countries.145 It is important to note that the structure of the CDM is a 
decentralised and mostly private sector oriented.146 There are currently 7552 registered CDM 
projects.147 These projects have managed to produce 2,203,953,309 CERs by the end of the 
first Kyoto Protocol commitment period, i.e. December 2012.148 What is important to note is 
that the CDM is the only flexibility mechanism available that involves developing country 
member states.149 
3.4.4.2 Joint Implementation (JI)150 
The Kyoto Protocol does not expressly state this mechanism however Article 6151 establishes 
the basis for this mechanism which became known as the “JI”.152Under the JI, developed 
countries can implement projects that are aimed at reducing emissions or increase removals 
by sinks in the territories of other industrialised countries.153 By investing in the JI, the 
investing country receives ‘emissions reduction units’ (ERUs) which will count towards 
meeting their own targets under the Kyoto Protocol.154 A JI project (unlike the CDM) must 
provide a reduction of GHGs by sources or an enhancement of removal by sinks in addition 
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to that which would otherwise have occurred.155 Furthermore, projects must have approval of 
the host party and the participants have to be authorised to participate by a party involved in 
the project.156 The similarity between the JI and the CDM is that they both offer a flexible 
and cost-efficient means of fulfilling a part of the Kyoto Protocol commitments.157  
3.4.4.3 Emissions trading (ET) 
Under this mechanism which is housed under Article 17158, Annex I parties with emissions 
commitments are able to trade their emission allowances with other parties with the aim of 
convalescing the overall flexibility and economic efficiency and of making emissions cuts.159 
This mechanism is more attractive to states that are energy efficient and those that would face 
more costs by further reducing their emissions unless emissions are undertaken in other less 
efficient states.160 The ET mechanism is very attractive to states such as Russia and Ukraine 
with their present emissions way below their permitted allowance, as they could sell at a 
profit from their large surplus.161 The Protocol however left the Conference of the Parties to 
finalise the issue of how the Emissions Trading were to be conducted by requiring the COP to 
‘define the relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, 
reporting and accountability for emissions trading’.162  
3.4.5 Compliance and Supervision under the Kyoto Protocol 
Under The Convention,  
The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of this Convention, shall keep under 
regular review the implementation of the Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt, and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions 
necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention.163 
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The Kyoto Protocol also reads, ‘the Conference of the Parties, the supreme body of the 
Convention, shall serve as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol’.164 As a result, the COP 
is identified as the principle supervisory institution for both the Convention and the Protocol 
and is thus required to meet regularly and to review the adequacy, implementation and 
effectiveness of both instruments.165 The COP therefore assesses on the basis of information 
made available to it, the overall effects of the measures for implementation of the Protocol.166 
Furthermore, it approves appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to determine 
and to address cases of non-compliance with the provisions of the Protocol.167  
  
The Protocol also creates two important subsidiary bodies to advice the COP.168 The first is 
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the second one is 
the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), both established by Articles 9 and 10 of the 
Convention respectively.169 The SBSTA function is to assess the state of scientific knowledge 
relating to climate change and the effects of implementation measures.170 The SBI on the 
other hand assists the COP in the assessment of the review of the effective implementation of 
the Convention171 and the Protocol172 and considers the reports submitted by the member 
parties under the provisions of the Convention and the Protocol concerning implementation 
and projected emissions.173 Both these bodies comprise of experts acting as governmental 
representatives, and together the COP, the SBSTA and the SBI provide the essential political 
oversight and management of the whole climate change regime.174  
 
The regime in general depends a lot on expert review which is meant to provide a thorough 
comprehensive, technical assessment of all aspects of implementation by any party and to 
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identify problems or other factors influencing the fulfillment of commitments.175 These 
reviews are coordinated by the Secretariat with the experts selected from nominees of 
governments and international organizations.176  
 
In the event that a member party is failing to fulfill its commitments according to the reviews, 
a ‘multilateral consultative process’ is available to resolve questions of implementation.177 
There is no provision for sanctions but merely a power to recommend measures to facilitate 
cooperation and implementation and to clarify issues and promote understanding of the 
Convention.178 A further option available where there are non-compliance matters is under 
the provisions of the Convention which reads: 
 
In the event of a dispute between any two or more Parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Convention, the Parties concerned shall seek a settlement of the dispute 
through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their own choice.179  
 
This however can only work if both parties to the dispute declare acceptance of the 
International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction and arbitration or else the provision will not come 
into play.180  
 
3.5 WHAT HAPPENED AFTER KYOTO? 
After the original text of the Kyoto Protocol was adopted by consensus in 1997 by COP3 at 
Kyoto, the following COP meetings were used to resolve the operational details and means to 
implement the Kyoto Protocol.181 The first most notable of these COP meetings was the one 
held in Marrakech in November 2001 under the title ‘COP7’. This conference brought about 
a set of agreements popularly known as the “Marrakech Accords”. The accords are applauded 
for providing what has been described as ‘the much needed framework of guidelines, 
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modalities and rules for moving forward with the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol’.182 
The accords tried to meet the concerns of both developing and developed countries on issues 
such as the flexibility mechanisms on the part of the developed countries; and on part of the 
developing countries, the accords have decisions to promote the implementation of capacity 
building.183 Furthermore, the accords try to promote technology transfer.184 They also 
established the much debated and contentious Climate Fund and other two new funds namely 
the Least-developed Countries Fund and an Adaptation Fund.185 A Compliance Committee 
was also created in terms of the accords.186 Today, the Kyoto Protocol is active after a 
decision was reached to renew it and establish a second commitment period which began on 
1 January 2013 and will end in 2020.187  
 
3.5.1 The Kyoto Protocol: An assessment  
After a brief discussion of the Kyoto Protocol, the researcher now turns to an analysis and 
assessment of the Protocol. This helps in understanding the reasons why the climate change 
regime is still evolving and needs to evolve and why the member parties still meet annually 
under the Convention. The Kyoto Protocol can be considered as a product of mutual 
concessions.188 In this concession, the USA conceded on the stringency of the emission 
targets whilst the EU conceded on the flexibility mechanisms and the developing countries 
received exemption from mitigation targets.189 The Protocol has also been described by 
authors such as Stephens as representing ‘the most complex and ambitious international 
treaty process ever attempted’.190 Such a conclusion was drawn on the basis of the Protocol’s 
content and the way it developed. 
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As in most instances where something is described as complex and ambitious, the Protocol 
has received less praise in comparison to the criticism it received from individual academics, 
governments, NGOs and research institutions internationally. The areas that have received 
much attention have been identified inter alia as:  
(i) the setting of targets and timetables; 
(ii) (ii) the imposing of GHG reduction targets by industrialized countries without any 
corresponding obligations by developing countries;  
(iii) a lot of gaps in terms of how the flexible mechanisms will be implemented;  
(iv) inadequate provisions on implementation and enforcement mechanisms; and 
(v)  whether the Protocol can tackle the climate change problem effectively.  
 
After careful scrutiny of the above essentials of the Protocol, the shortfalls as well as issues 
that the Protocol blindfolded makes the researcher wonder whether it is the right regime to 
deal with the inevitable and dangerous climate change. The Protocol holds a number of 
strong provisions that are worthy of praise. This does not mean however that it is free from 
criticism. The main identified areas of critique will be discussed in turn. 
  
3.5.1.1 Targets and timetables 
The objective of the Kyoto Protocol as discussed above was to reduce worldwide GHG 
emissions averaging about 5% below 1990 levels.191 To achieve this objective, the parties 
decided to have a set of targets and timetables in form of commitments in terms of the 
Protocol. The target in terms of the UNFCCC is to reduce world GHG emissions by at least 
5% below the 1990 levels.192 The timetable is that the above target should be achieved by the 
period 2008-2012 as stipulated by the Protocol.193 Authors such as Bodansky argue that the 
targets and timetable approach made under the Protocol represent a good policy in the long 
term run but suffer in terms of political viability.194 The reasons for such lack of political 
viability are that the individual actors who are supposed to act in this collective action of 
mitigation will incur real costs without achieving any real immediately visible environmental 
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benefits as climate change only occurs in the far future.195 This leads to the loss of political 
will to push for action thus the use of targets and timetables does not become the best 
solution.196 In summary, the main problem with this policy of targets and timetables is that 
the Protocol tried to address a long-term problem with unfeasible short term measures.197 As 
a result, one can conclude that the Kyoto Protocol’s approach is a good policy which however 
was and is still faced with bad politics as suggested by  Bodansky.198  
 
3.5.1.2 The GHG emissions reduction  
The Protocol’s commitments have been the center of controversy thus has received a lot of 
criticism. The Kyoto Protocol is the first and the only agreement under the UNFCCC that 
imposes binding GHG emission limitations on its member parties.199 Furthermore, it is the 
only current legally binding instrument which contains some sort of legally binding 
constraints on GHG emissions.200 It has to be acknowledged that it is a huge success and 
strength that the Protocol just managed to come into force. As discussed above, the Protocol 
imposes legally binding GHG emissions targets on developed countries and developing 
countries are left with no formal legally binding targets.201 The KP GHG emissions 
reductions are binding to 38 developed countries and the EU.202 Of these developed 
countries, the USA which was by far the largest source of GHG emissions (accounting for 
approximately 25% of the world total in 2001) was and is still not bound by the Protocol 
because it chose not to ratify it.203 By binding only developed countries, the Kyoto Protocol 
failed to take into account the fact that rapidly growing countries such as China, Brazil and 
India and other developing countries will become major contributors of GHG emissions in 
the very near future.204 This means that by the time the Protocol was adopted, it left over a 
                                                          
195 Ibid at 63.  
196 Ibid. 
197 Arcas (b) (note 39 above) 288. 
198 Bodansky (note 195 above) 63, 65. 
199 JC Dernbach ‘Achieving Early and Substantial Greenhouse Gas Reductions under a Post-Kyoto Agreement’ 
(2008) 20 Georgetown Int'l Law Review 573. 
200 Ibid.  
201 Art 3(1) of the Kyoto Protocol.  
202 See Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol for the list and their reduction targets.  
203 Arcas (b) (note 39 above) 288. 
204 RN Cooper ‘The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept’ (2001) FEEM Working Paper No. 52.2001 at 4 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=278536, accessed on 29 March 2013 4. 
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third of GHGs unregulated.205 Furthermore, at that time, the developing countries were 
expected to contribute more than 45% of total GHG emissions by 2010206 and this can only 
increase over time. Even today, the developing countries are still not under a legal obligation 
in terms of the Protocol to reduce their emissions. This is the point that the USA made as its 
justification for not ratifying the Protocol as its delegation argued that there was supposed to 
be ‘meaningful participation’ by developing countries in the treaty to reduce GHGs.207 As a 
result of its commitments, the Protocol has been criticized by many as fatally flawed208 due to 
this fact that it only places the responsibility of reducing GHG emissions on the developed 
countries whilst leaving the developing countries not legally bound.209  To other academics, 
this was a serious flaw which rendered the Protocol to be doomed to failure from the moment 
it was adopted.210  
 
3.5.1.3 Flexible Mechanisms 
This area remained unfinished despite most member parties declaring victory by having a 
legally binding instrument with targets and time tables. Neither the institutional form nor 
structure of the Executive Board for the CDM was defined in the original Kyoto text. 211 In 
addition, despite the concept behind the JI and the CDM being clear enough, the important 
details of the flexible mechanisms, for example what type of projects would be admissible 
were not clear.212 A good example being the question as to what type of projects were to be 
included in the CDM in which there was substantive debate on whether the carbon sinks 
should also be included in the projects.213 It is interesting to note that Article 3.3 covered land 
use and forestry projects initiated since 1990, and Article 3.4 introduced pre-existing 
biological sinks which created more interpretation confusion.214 It is even  more interesting to 
note that even at COP16/CMP6 in Cancun, carbon markets (CDM and JI) were quite 
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prominent on the agenda in the two Conferences of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) processes; three Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) processes; one Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) 
process; and several sessions in both the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments 
for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWGLCA). 215 Furthermore, there 
was no guarantee that because of the CDM, actual deforestation would have been lower than 
it would otherwise have been since deforestation activities could simply move to another 
location.216 The CDM in itself has faced much criticism for a number of reasons such as its 
lack of environmental integrity and transparency, its undue governance structures, its lack of 
regional distribution and its cumbersome procedures.217 Other authors also criticise the fact 
that since the CDM was a mechanism conceived of a financial incentive, most of the 
participants who entered into the projects did so mainly on that incentive and have stayed 
focused on such economic incentives of the CDM projects whilst ignoring the environmental 
impacts.218  
 
One must however not ignore the fact that despite such weaknesses, the Protocol has also its 
merits. The CDM has, arguably, created benefits for developing countries through its 
contribution to sustainable development and the transfer of technologies.219 Technology 
transfer was not a stated mandate of the CDM but it occurred at a significant rate.220 
Furthermore, the CDM also helped in furthering sustainable development initiatives although 
not as much as technological transfers and this lesser contribution was partially attributed to 
the insistence of national governments on preserving sovereignty over their own domestic 
development decisions.221 It is also important to note that changes were said to be underway 
                                                          
215 H Laurikka & A Schreyögg ‘The Global Carbon Market – A Disappearing Vision?’ 2010 International Law-
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which could later promote sustainable development within the CDM and this could lead to 
more projects that and these include the adoption of rules to allow a ‘program of activities’ or 
‘programmatic CDM’ (for example multiple small-scale energy efficiency improvements).222 
The most important of all probably is that the CDM set into motion the GHG emission 
reductions without looking at how environmentally effective they were since it should be 
recognized that any emissions reduction is better than no reduction at all.223      
 
3.5.1.4 Inadequate provisions on implementation and enforcement mechanisms 
Since the adoption of the Protocol in 1997, implementation was an issue and it continued to 
be a heated argument until at the second session of  COP 6 held in Bonn in July 2001, several 
issues regarding the Kyoto mechanisms and the compliance system were agreed upon under 
the Buenos Aires Plan of Action.224 These included implementation rules on the legally 
binding commitments for the developed countries under the Protocol.225 Positively, the Kyoto 
Protocol’s compliance regime has been regarded by some authors as strong as it is 
characterized by rigorous reporting and also with strict eligibility rules for participation in its 
flexibility mechanisms which constitutes its central element for environmental integrity.226 
The Protocol also had to find ways to develop a practical and credible compliance regime 
especially on emission-reduction rules.227 The Joint Working Group on Compliance (JWG) 
was established under the Buenos Aires Plan of Action and has been operating since 1999.228 
Efforts to develop the Protocol’s enforcement mechanisms failed to bear fruits in The Hague 
in December 2000.229 In 2001, COP 7 produced an enforcement agreement of the Kyoto 
Protocol following the Buenos Aires Plan.230 The agreement included decisions on 
compliance rules; flexible mechanisms and monitoring and reporting obligations for parties. 
COP 11 brought some progress in that this was a compliance regime for the Protocol in 
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which the Compliance Committee was created which comprised of two branches, namely the 
facilitative branch and the enforcement branch.231 The facilitative branch provides advice and 
facilitation to parties in implementation of the Protocol while the enforcement branch is 
responsible for determining whether a Party in Annex I is not in compliance with its 
emissions targets, its methodological and reporting requirements for GHG inventories and its 
eligibility requirements under the mechanisms.232 Despite the enforcement mechanisms being 
proven effective, there is still need for improvement.233 There was also a loud outcry on the 
penalties that are created in terms of the Protocol and on how the non-compliance provisions 
could be enforced.234 The original text of the Protocol did not provide for ‘binding 
consequences’ in case of non-compliance.235 The Marrakech Accords comprise of a 
compliance penalty involving suspension of eligibility to use the flexibility mechanisms 
included a deduction of any first-period.236 Furthermore, one of the biggest weaknesses of the 
Protocol today is that it does not also penalize members who leave the Protocol. As a result of 
this, countries such as New Zealand, Canada, Japan and Russia made it clear that they will 
not be making new Kyoto commitments237 after failing to achieve their pledged targets and 
decided to withdraw their membership. They surprisingly have the privilege of walking scot-
free with no penalty whatsoever. 
3.6 THE KYOTO PROTOCOL’S SIGNIFICANCE AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON 
THE FUTURE CLIMATE REGIME 
Despite all of the above criticism, the climate change regime (especially the Kyoto Protocol) 
has actually turned out to be an important part of the quest to finding the climate solution. 
The most important and significant fact is that when it came into force, the Kyoto Protocol 
became the only instrument that established legally-binding commitments consisting of 
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quantitative national performance standards.238 It continues to be so up to date. Spencer 
highlights the significance of the Kyoto Protocol when he asserts that ‘[I]n several ways, 
Kyoto represents a high point of global environmental multilateralism as it provides for a 
multilateral and rules-based system as a means to ensure comparability and integrity of 
actions’239 thus being a solid first step for action.  
 
The Protocol also reflected the wishes of the developing states by giving the developed 
country states members the burden first or by making them “take a lead” since they were 
believed to have contributed most to causing climate change and had greater capacity to 
respond to climate change than their developing country member states counterparts.240 This 
argument has become very significant and has turned out to be an influential aspect in the 
negotiations to the post-Kyoto era. After the Kyoto Protocol came into force, a new question 
arose namely, what would happen after the Protocol expired? This question is still yet to be 
answered and settled and one could easily point to the Kyoto Protocol as the instrument that 
has caused this stagnation in the climate negotiations. One could also point at it as a possible 
tiebreaker of this UNFCCC solution seeking no progress phase. This is so because before the 
launch of the Protocol’s second commitment period when the UNFCCC members were 
discussing the future climate regime, major developing countries such as China and India 
wanted the Protocol to continue in its present form by imposing quantitative limitations on 
GHGs on developed country emissions but not on them.241 The European Union on the other 
hand, was willing to take a new commitment period under the Protocol but only as part of a 
global and comprehensive framework engaging all major economies.242  It is important to 
note how the Protocol was at the center of the discussions in major respects and that these 
arguments became so recurrent and significant to the extent that the only way forward to 
getting close to agree on the legal form of the future climate change agreement in 2011 at 
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COP 17 was to adopt these options. This shows the significance of the Kyoto Protocol on the 
negotiating process.243 The Protocol has thus proven to be very significant not just as the first 
step to fighting global climate change, but also in having huge potential to shape the future of 
the climate change regime thus worthy of discussion before one focuses on the post-Kyoto 
era. Its success provisions and stories such as its implementation mechanisms and the way it 
dealt with differentiation by demonstrating that developed countries remain strongly 
committed to a rules and equity-based multilateral agreement actually resulted in bringing on 
board the major developing countries for emission reductions.244 All these Kyoto inspired 




In this chapter, the study introduced and gave an in-depth analysis of the current international 
climate change regime. It established that the climate change regime consists of two 
instruments namely the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. The thesis observed that the 
UNFCCC set out a number of legal principles and much generalised commitments for all its 
members. Most importantly, it set up a platform where the climate change problem could 
continue to be negotiated, thus a step in the right direction. It however lacked in terms of 
assigning commitments on GHG reduction. To address this weakness, the Kyoto Protocol 
was created. It had firmer commitments that were directed at reduction of GHG emissions by 
only developed country member states. It has been criticised substantially by a number of 
academics, governments and action groups for its chief weaknesses which include binding 
only a few developed countries whilst leaving major emitters with no commitments leading 
to the US refusing to ratify the Protocol. In addition to this was the insufficient guidance on 
the flexibility mechanisms as well as the insufficient compliance measures. It however should 
also be applauded for successfully coming into force; being ‘fair’ by making the wealthiest 
countries with greatest historical emissions to take the lead in the fight against climate 
change; creating flexibility mechanisms for nations to comply with commitments as well as 
creating a market-based approach which was meant to be cost effective. These need to be 
noted despite its overall success in adequately reducing meaningful GHG emissions highly 
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questionable. The Protocol had its flaws but was probably a needed small step to the big 
journey which actually became significant as it has proven itself to have that significance in 
the negotiations for a new and post-2020 agreement. The gaps left by the Convention and its 
Protocol thus paved the way for further needed negotiations that the following section of this 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS: COPENHAGEN TO WARSAW 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
After the entry of the Kyoto Protocol1 in 2005, the focus of the United Nations (UN) climate 
change regime and negotiations shifted.2 Its central question became what to do after 2012 as 
this was when the Kyoto Protocol’s initial legally binding limits on GHG emissions would 
expire.3 This however was resolved after seven years of intensive negotiations at COP 18 in 
Doha, Qatar as the Kyoto Protocol’s life span was extended for a further eight years in Doha 
in 2012, with the Protocol therefore expiring in 2020.4 This however did not do much in 
answering the main question which was what is next after the Kyoto Protocol. This issue still 
remains the central focus of the UN’ climate change negotiations and current debate. The 
need for effective way to regulate greenhouse gases (GHGs) is essential and central to 
slowing global climate change. Moving the climate change agenda successfully forward 
multilaterally amongst the 196 parties to the UNFCCC5 has however proven to be a serious 
challenge.6 The lack of progress in the UNFCCC negotiations in recent years, especially the 
failure to internationally agree on emission limitation targets and timetables by all major 
developed and developing country emitters, has led to questions such as whether the 
UNFCCC process is the best and most effective platform for mobilising a global response to 
                                                          
1 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 16 
March 1998, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005). Hereinafter referred to as the Kyoto 
Protocol or The Protocol. 
2 D Bodansky (a) ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Accord’ (2010) 14:3 The American Society of International 
Law 1; D Bodansky (b) ‘A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N. Climate Change Regime’ 
March 2011 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1773865  or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1773865, at 2 
accessed on 1 July 2013. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Doha Decision FCCC/KYOTO PROTOCOL/CMP/2012/L.9 
5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 
(entered into force 21 March 1994). (UNFCCC), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf 
6 RL Arcas (a) ‘Kyoto and the COPs: Lessons Learned and Looking Ahead’ 2011 (23) Hague Yearbook of 
International Law 17; See also https://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php, accessed on 10 
December 2014. 
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climate change.7 In trying to map a way forward, the parties to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol meet under the COP annually to negotiate and agree on with decisions to determine 
what will happen next in the international climate change arena. 
Before discussing the specific legal questions that have risen under these negotiations, this 
chapter will give a brief summary of events from the COP15/CMP5-COP19/CMP9. A special 
focus will be on the significant events that occurred during the meetings and the meetings’ 
outcomes concerning to emissions of GHG mitigation. An analysis of the outcomes or 
decisions of each respective conference will then be undertaken. The discussion of these 
meetings will be broken into the following focus questions: 
 
(i) What was the main and intended GHG emissions agenda of the meeting?  
(ii) What transpired at the meeting? 
(iii)  What ultimately emerged by the end of the negotiations? 
(iv)  What significance and contribution does such a result have on the ultimate objective 
of the Convention and what impact does such an outcome have on the development 
of the climate regime and to the much needed climate solution? 
 
A conclusion will be given as to whether each meeting’s results can be classified as 
successful or otherwise in light of the Convention’s GHG mitigation objective. This 
undertaking is important because it gives detailed information about the negotiation meetings 
and their results and also gives an understanding on how the negotiations were conducted. It 
is also important to note that the negotiations deal with a number of issues but this study, as 
mentioned in the first chapter, will focus on the GHG mitigation provisions in-depth and not 
the other issues not directly related to mitigation efforts.  
4.2 THE CONFERENCE OF PARTIES (COP) 
The UNFCCC8 established the platform to deal with such issues under the Conference of 
Parties (COP) which is defined and described as, 
[T]he supreme body of this Convention, shall keep under regular review the implementation of 
the Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt, 
                                                          
7 Ibid.  
8 Art 7(2) of the UNFCCC. For details on the UNFCCC bodies visit http://unfccc.int/bodies/items/6241.php, 
accessed on 28 August 2014. 
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and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effective 
implementation of the Convention.9 
 
The rest of the provisions give the detailed description of the COP’s duties and functions.10 In 
summary, the COP has three broad functions and these are: 
 
a) Adoption of Protocols to the Convention.11 
b) Supervision of the implementation of the Convention by the parties.12 
c) Mobilise financial resources.13 
 
Under its first function, the parties have been met annually to discuss the way forward with 
regards to developing the Convention and the Convention of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP). 
Ever since the Kyoto Protocol came into force, the COP has also served as the meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). The annual meetings of the parties to the Convention 
and the Protocol therefore became known as the Conference of the Parties /Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/CMP).14  The 
COP/CMP meetings have shaped the present climate regime and no doubt will shape the 
future of the regime. Decisions and how members interpret and possibly develop the 
available legal principles and instruments are therefore of utmost importance. 
For a clear illustration of the UNFCCC Bodies refer to the diagram below.15  
 
                                                          
9 Ibid.  
10 See Articles 7(3)-7(6) of the UNFCCC.  
11 Article 17(1) of the UNFCCC.  
12 Articles 7(2), 10, 12(1)-(2) of the UNFCCC. A Kiss & D Shelton International Environmental Law 2 ed 
(2000) 515.   
13 Article 7.2 (h) of the UNFCCC. See also Kiss & Shelton (note 12 above) 516.  
14 See http://unfccc.int/bodies/items/6241.php, accessed on 30 August 2014. 
15 Diagram accessed at the Official UNFCCC website, available at http://unfccc.int/bodies/items/6241.php, 
accessed on 30 August 2014.  




4.2.1The legal nature of the COP/CMP Decisions 
The COP and CMP are empowered to adopt decisions concerning a range of matters provided 
for in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.16 The extent of this power depends however on the 
wording of its parent provision (the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol). This can range from 
the adoption of operating procedures to establishing of new mechanisms and facilitating 
information exchange.17 If validly adopted, the COP/CMP decision could create valid legal 
structures and rules which bind the parties legally.18 French and Rajamani submit that the 
rationale whether the COP decisions are formally binding or not is irrelevant as they can be 
                                                          
16 Art 7 of the UNFCCC. 
17 ‘The Cancun Agreements: Summary and Analysis’ (January 2011) Climate Focus available at 
http://climatefocus.com/documents/files/Cancun%20Briefing%20Jan%202011%20v.1.0.pdf, accessed on 30 
August 2014, 2. 
18 Ibid. 
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binding in their operational impact.19 Decisions are however adopted only if parties reach a 
consensus.20 The term consensus has commonly been understood both inside and outside the 
UNFCCC as the absence of formal objection21 or the absence of express opposition.22 The 
UNFCCC however provides for the COP/CMP to adopt its own voting rules thus consensus 
decision-making is the default procedure for adopting decisions.23 However, the term 
consensus has not been formally defined under the UNFCCC process24 and has been 
interpreted in different ways under the UNFCCC system as shall be discussed below on the 
different negotiating meetings. 
 
4.3 THE ROAD TO COPENHAGEN  
It is important to note that before the COP15/CMP5 at Copenhagen, the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol members had met the previous year in Bali, Indonesia. The meeting took place in 
December 200725 and its significance was that it had to set in motion the negotiations on a 
follow-up agreement to be concluded before the expiry of GHG emission targets set for 
industrialised countries in 2012.26 It obliged all parties to work for a new global climate 
change treaty.27The result was the Bali Road Map28 which brought about a two way formal 
process to deal with the post Kyoto issues.29 The first being the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
                                                          
19 D French & L Rajamani ‘Climate Change and International Environmental Law: Musings on a Journey to 
Somewhere’ (2013) 25(3) Journal of Environmental Law 444.  
20 Art 7(2)(k) of the UNFCCC; Climate Focus (note 17 above) at 2, French & Rajamani (note 19 above) 449. 
21 Climate Focus (note 17 above) 2.  
22 French & Rajamani (note 19 above) 449. 
23 Climate Focus (note 17 above) Ibid 2; French & Rajamani (note 19 above) 449. 
24 Ibid. 
25 IISD (a) ‘Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7-19 December 2009’ (2009) 12(459) 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2 available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12459e.pdf, accessed 30 August 
2014.  
26 H Van Asselt ‘Copenhagen Chaos? Post-2012 Climate Change Policy and International Law’ (2010) 2(2). 
Amsterdam Law Forum, 11. 
27  RL Arcas (b) ‘Is the Kyoto Protocol an adequate Environmental agreement To Resolve the Climate Change 
Problem?’ 2001 European Env Law Review at 284. 
28 Decision 1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, held 
in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007, Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its 
thirteenth session, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008) (hereinafter ‘Bali Action Plan, 2007’). 
29 Arcas (b) (note 27 above) 26. 
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Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) established with a mandate to focus on key 
elements of long-term cooperation identified during Convention Dialogue namely mitigation, 
adaptation; finance and technology; and capacity building.30 This forum includes all parties to 
the UNFCCC. The second forum is the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Kyoto Protocol 
(AWG-KYOTO PROTOCOL) which aimed to reach an agreement on targets for the 
developed countries’ (the Annex 1 countries) participation in the Protocol.31 The Bali Road 
Map also generated a call for articulating of a ‘shared vision for long-term cooperative 
action,’ including a long-term global goal for emissions reduction.32  
4.4 COP15/CMP5, 2009 
4.4.1 The Copenhagen Conference 
Copenhagen expectations were high and this was for a justified reason.33 As mentioned 
above, the ‘Bali Action Plan’ was there to launch a new international agreement and 
Copenhagen was the place where this had to be done.34 In other words, the conference was a 
historic event as it marked the end of two years of intensive negotiations under the UNFCCC, 
a period which was supposed to give birth to a new global climate change agreement in 
simple terms a new climate change treaty.35 To show the seriousness of Copenhagen, six 
formal negotiating sessions took place in 2009 alone between Bali and Copenhagen.36 To 
prove its significance, the Conference brought together 115 Heads of States and Government 
which was reported as one of the largest high level gathering outside of New York (Normal 
United Nations Head of States meetings) and had more than 40 000 applicants for 
accreditation for the Conference which had a venue capacity of 15 000 people.37 Large and 
violent demonstrations were reported to have taken place in the city as people and action 
groups tried to push world leaders to come to a meaningful agreement.38 
                                                          
30 IISD (a) (note 25 above) 2. 
31 Ibid.  
32 IISD (a) (note 25 above) 2. 
33 Van Asselt (note 26 above) 11.  
34 Ibid.  
35 IISD (a) (note 25 above) 27.  
36 Van Asselt (note 26 above) 11. 
37 IISD (a) (note 25 above) 27.  
38 Ibid. 
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The fifteenth Conference of Parties (COP 15) of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the fifth Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting 
of the Parties (COP/MOP 5) of the Kyoto Protocol opened on the morning of Monday 7 
December 2009 in Copenhagen, Denmark.39 It had the theme ‘Seal the Deal’ as the Mayor of 
Copenhagen Hon Ritt Bjerregard was quoted as saying that COP 15 needed to “go very far 
and fast” and he called on the delegates to turn Copenhagen into “Hopenhagen” and to live 
up to the theme ‘Seal the Deal.’40 The parties elected Connie Hedegaard, the Minister for UN 
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen 2009, Denmark as the COP 15 President.41 
4.4.2 The negotiating process 
The Copenhagen Conference was characterised by many dramatic events.42 In the first week, 
the major problem for the delegate was to tackle complex issues such as deciding on a surfeit 
of texts that were competing for attention in the very limited time available.43 At the 
COP/MOP Plenary on Thursday 10 December 2009, a number of proposals regarding 
Protocol amendments were received from countries such as Australia, Belarus, Bolivia, 
Columbia, Japan, the European Union (EU),44 New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the 
Philippines, China and two from Tuvalu.45 Tuvalu’s proposal that argued on complementing, 
but not replacing, the Kyoto Protocol by creating a contact group to bring about a Protocol 
                                                          
39 IISD (a) (note 25 above) 3.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid at 28.  
43 G Nagtzaam ‘What Rough Beast? Copenhagen and Creating a Successor Agreement to the Kyoto Protocol’ 
(2010) 36(1) Monash University Law Review 218.  
44 The European Union (E.U) is a union of European countries and has up to 28 member states that are united in 
an economic and political union. Information about the E.U and its member states available at 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm, accessed on 31 January 2014. The E.U is a strong supporter 
of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol in particular and wants to do more with regards to the Kyoto 
commitments but is worried about the little action concerning the Protocol thus its concerns with the positions 
of the U.S, China and India. All this worries the E.U and affects its decision to offer more unless these countries 
agree to offer better action too on the negotiating table. The E.U has also taken a hard stance against the U.S. 
See Arcas (note 27 above) at 290-291. 
45 Nagtzaam (note 43 above) 218. 
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amendment and a new 'Copenhagen Protocol' requiring binding emissions targets from both 
wealthy and developing nations was the one that garnered the most attention.46 
4.4.3 The Danish Text 
From the onset, rumours about a certain ‘Danish Text’ which was a document intended to be 
tabled at Copenhagen circulated. The rumours stated that this text had been shown to selected 
countries which had participated in the Pre-COP 15 negotiations.47 The document was leaked 
to the public in the first week of negotiations first through the Guardian Newspaper in the UK 
and then other media.48 This angered many delegates especially those from the developing 
countries who voiced their concern over the text’s undermining of the negotiations and their 
transparent and democratic efforts which they had shown throughout the year to develop a 
negotiating text under the rightful paths of the AWG-LCA and AWG-KYOTO 
PROTOCOL.49 The text was believed to have been a product of the hosting Danish 
government and a number of unnamed developing states and it argued that “the process it 
was undertaking was pursuant to the Bali Road Map and was building on the two Ad Hoc 
Working Groups”.50 A full day was consumed to address this Danish Text problem and it was 
later agreed that only texts developed by the AWG-LCA and AWG-KYOTO PROTOCOL 
would be used as basis for further discussion.51  
 
In addition to the Danish text drama, there were also other time consuming procedural 
hurdles that started in the second week of negotiations.52A good example being on Monday, 
14 December when the African Group and the Least Developed Countries (LDC’s)53 with the 
                                                          
46 Ibid.  
47 IISD (a) (note 25 above) 3.  
48 IISD (a) (note 25 above) 28; ‘Copenhagen climate summit in disarray after 'Danish text' leak’ The Guardian 8 
December 2009, available at, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/08/copenhagen-climate-summit-
disarray-danish-text, accessed on 11 April 2014; ‘Copenhagen: Danish text row rumbles on’ Business Green 9 
December 2009, available at http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/1801812/copenhagen-danish-text-row-
rumbles, accessed on 18 April 2014.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Nagtzaam (note 43 above) 220.  
51 IISD (a) (note 25 above) 28.  
52 Ibid. 
53 This group has the least developed countries of the world and some of the most vulnerable member parties to 
the effects of climate change. As a result, they want developed countries to lead the action against climate 
change as they also feel that since the developed countries are responsible for almost 90% of the GHG 
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support of G-77/China54 called for the suspension of negotiations under the AWG-LCA and 
also issues under the AWG-KYOTO PROTOCOL. They protested against the discussion of 
AWG-LCA issues being discussed in informal ministerial discussions.55 This move which 
was described as a ‘walk out’ frustrated most developed nations.56 This hurdle also disturbed 
vital key meetings such as the AWG-KYOTO PROTOCOL which was supposed to report the 
following day to the plenary.57 The argument also triggered transparency issues not only 
between the negotiating parties such as the G-77/China but also amongst civil society, 
especially those who had not been granted access into the negotiations.58 It is important to 
note that the AGW-KYOTO PROTOCOL text was only presented to the COP President for 
review on the evening of 15 December and to delegates the following day (five days later 
than what had initially been planned).59 The text was surprisingly supported by the G-77 but 
seriously opposed by the developed nations since it had GHG emissions levels reductions for 
industrialised nations.60 Furthermore, the AGW-LCA text was not seen at this time and 
questions were asked by the Brazilian and Chinese delegations as to why they had not seen a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
emissions that has occurred to date then they should take the lead. List of these countries available at 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/aldc/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-list-of-Least-Developed-Countries.aspx, 
accessed on 19 April 2014. 
54 The G8 is an assembly of world leaders who meet annually to discuss global issues. They meet each year at a 
Leaders’ Summit in which Heads of State and Government of member countries meet to discuss and attempt to 
reconcile and tackle global issues including important contemporary topics such as the economy and climate 
change. It comprises of the heads of government from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Russian 
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States and also The European Union which is represented by 
both the president of the European Commission and the leader of the country that has European Union 
presidency. The G8 discusses and creates global policies but adherence to these policies is not obligatory, and 
other countries can decide whether or not to obey. It acknowledges the efforts under the UNFCCC and wish to 
continue negotiating under the UNFCCC tracks. However, it is interesting to note  that as discussed under 
different nations, the different member states of the G8 have different positions with countries like the US and 
Canada not being members of the Kyoto Protocol and the EU supporting the Protocol. Information available at 
http://www.g77.org/doc/ accessed on 17 August 2014, See also T Stephens ‘Kyoto is Dead, Long Live Kyoto! A 
New Era for International Climate Change Law’ (April 2008) Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 08/45 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121605, accessed on 30 August 2014. 
55 IISD (a) (note 25 above) 28.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Nagtzaam (note 43 above) 23-224. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid at 225. 
60 Ibid. 
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draft that was supposed to have been before them on 11 December.61 China then raised issues 
of trust between the host nation and the parties as the text was being endlessly postponed62 
and all these arguments and unsettling events wasted precious time.                   
4.4.4 The ‘Heads of States’ intervention 
The Head of States started arriving on Friday 18 December to supposedly sign a new 
agreement but alas no such instrument had been concluded.63 This changed the dynamics and 
the routine of the negotiations64 and the US65 and the BASICs66 using the name ‘Friends of 
the Chair’ took it upon themselves to try and come up with an agreement.67 The US 
President, President Barack Obama led these discussions. This meeting angered a number of 
leaders who became very upset on two main points namely the lack of respect for them and 
the failure to be consulted when such a decision was being made behind ‘secret closed door 
meetings’.68 
 
                                                          
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid.  
64 IISD (a) (note 25 above) 28. 
65 The US is not a member of Kyoto Protocol and it has as its agenda the pushing for a new treaty which should 
include major developing countries especially China as they argue that at that major leading emitters are 
developing countries but are not under a legal obligation to cut their GHG emissions.  For UNFCCC state of 
ratification see http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php, and for 
the Kyoto Protocol state of ratification available at 
https://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_Protocol/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/Kyoto Protocol_ratification.pdf, 
both accessed on 30 August 2014. 
66 The BASIC group is a group which includes a list of countries like Brazil, South Africa, India and China 
which have cooperated in international climate negotiations, reflecting their aspiration to have a larger say in 
global politics. They stand together in pushing their developmental concerns so that they are considered in how 
far they can contribute to the climate discussions and actions. Available at http://www.sei-
international.org/publications?pid=1963, accessed 12 January 2014. Furthermore, together these developing 
nations are reluctant to accept global goals for emissions reductions in the absence of equitable burden-sharing 
arrangement. See L Rajamani (a) ‘The Cancun Climate Agreements: Reading the text, subtext and tea leaves’ 
(2011) 60(2) ICLQ 501. 
67 Nagtzaam (note 43 above) 227. 
68 Ibid at 227-228.  
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4.4.5 The Outcome 
In the end, an agreement was reached and it became known as the Copenhagen Accord.69 It is 
an agreement that was reached among 28 parties to the UNFCCC including all the major 
emitters and economies and also some countries representing the least developed and most 
vulnerable states.70 This was a major shift from the normal and formal official negotiations 
which meant that the negotiating countries did not have the COP’s authorisation to negotiate 
the Accord in the first place.71 This triggered a lot of debate and emotions amongst the 
world’s leaders with some agreeing with the move, but others calling it a not so ‘democratic 
and diplomatic’ move.72 The Accord received substantial opposition. There was thus no 
consensus to adopt it and instead, it was simply agreed to ‘take note’ of the Copenhagen 
Accord.73 
The Copenhagen Accord is a very short document consisting of two and half pages, including 
two tables for members who join, contains five preambular recitals and twelve operational 
paragraphs, covering the pillars of the Bali Action Plan.74 
4.4.6 A general outline of provisions 
The Copenhagen Accord as mentioned above covered the five pillars of the Bali Action Plan 
which include a shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, finance and technology.75 
In terms of the Shared Vision, it recognised the scientific view that the global temperatures 
should be kept below 2 degrees Celsius76 and that deep cuts in global emissions would be 
needed in order to achieve this.77  
                                                          
69 Decision 2/CP.15 Copenhagen Accord in Report of the Conference of Parties on its fifteenth session held in 
Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009, Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties 
at its fifteenth session FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010) 4 (hereinafter ‘Copenhagen Accord’) 
70 L Rajamani (b) ‘The making and unmaking of the Copenhagen Accord’ (2010) 59 ICLQ 825.  
71 Ibid. 
72 IISD (a) (note 25 above) 28. 
73 Rajamani (b) (note 70) 826. 
74 See analysis in Rajamani (b) (note 70) 827.  
75 Ibid at 826.  
76 Ibid; See Para 1 of the Copenhagen Accord, 2009. 
77 Para 2 of the Copenhagen Accord, 2009. 
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On mitigation, the Accord required Annex I parties to commit to targets and non-Annex I 
parties to undertake mitigation actions.78 To allow for transparency amongst the mitigation 
actions, the Accord required non Annex I parties to submit national communications every 
two years and to ensure domestic measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of 
mitigation actions, report these through national communications and provide for 
‘international consultation and analysis.79 With regards to adaptation, the Accord recognises 
the need for urgent adaptation action and it required developed country parties to support 
adaptation action and support in developing countries.80 On finance, the Accord captured an 
agreement by developed countries that they would raise $US30 billion in the period 2010-
2012 (short term financing) and mobilise a $US100 billion per year by the year 2020 (long 
term financing).81 The sources of the finance were identified as very wide and they included 
public and private, bilateral and multilateral including alternative sources of finance.82 
Finally, the Accord established a Technology Mechanism and a REDD+ Mechanism 
(reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries).83        
 
4.4.7 An analysis of the mitigation related provisions  
After outlining the general provisions of the Accord, an assessment of the agreement with 
special focus on the mitigation related provisions shall be done in order to see how important 
and effective the agreement is, as well as assisting in assessing whether it can be regarded as 
a success or a failure. 
Despite the Accord acknowledging and recognising the need to make deep cuts in global 
emissions so as to keep the global temperatures below 2 degrees Celsius, the Accord fails to 
either quantify the ‘deep cuts’ needed to reach the 2 degrees Celsius goal or indicate how the 
burden will be shared between states.84 It also fails to specify a bench mark from which the 2 
degree Celsius increase is to be judged as well as prescribing a specified peak year or frame 
                                                          
78 Paras 5 & 12 of the Copenhagen Accord (respectively), 2009.  
79 Para 5 of the Copenhagen Accord, 2009. 
80 Para 3 of the Copenhagen Accord, 2009.  
81 Para 8 of the Copenhagen Accord, 2009.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Para 11 & 6 of the Copenhagen Accord, 2009.  
84 Rajamani (b) (note 70 above) 827.  
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but rather leaves all this to be determined by states.85 On mitigation, analysts say that the 
mitigation provisions and agreements by the developed countries are ‘clearly weak’ and ‘a 
step backwards from the Kyoto Protocol’.86 This is because in terms of the Accord, the 
developed country parties do not commit themselves to legally-binding emissions 
reductions.87 In addition, the Accord does not prescribe aggregate or individual targets in 
either the mid-term or long-term for either the developing countries or developed countries.88 
States have to make their own pledges as to how much they will reduce their emissions and 
the existing cuts pledges so far fall short of the necessary reduction to achieve the 2 degree 
Celsius stabilisation.89 Furthermore, the distinction between targets (set for developed 
countries) and actions (set for developing countries) is not explained at all.90 There is also a 
provision in which developing countries are required to submit national communications 
every two years which is a more frequent reporting system (MRV) than the Annex I states 
currently.91 The reason for this provision was to ensure transparency. This created tension 
between the developed and developing countries especially between the US and China who 
did not agree with international interference in its MRVs. In order to reach some sort of 
compromise, the negotiators included some language stating that there would be some 
provisions for “international consultations and analysis”, a concept that was yet to be 
defined.92 
Lastly, The COP and COP/MOP also agreed to extend the mandate of the AWG-LCA and 
AWG-KYOTO PROTOCOL for another year.93 However, no decision was taken on when 
and where the negotiations would continue. 
4.4.8 The legal implications and the significance of the Copenhagen Accord 
The Copenhagen Accord could not rally the support of all the parties thus it was not adopted 
as a decision by the COP.94 Despite having the support of the likes of EU, the Maldives, 
                                                          
85 Ibid. 
86 IISD (a) (note 25 above) 29.  
87 Ibid. 
88 Rajamani (b) (note 70 above) 828. 
89 Ibid at 827. 
90 Ibid; IISD (a) (note 25 above) 29.  
91 Rajamani (b) (note 70 above) 827. 
92 Ibid.  
93 ISSD (a) (note 25 above) 29. 
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LDCs, UK, Russia, Philippines, Singapore, Ethiopia and the African Union (AU) represented 
by Algeria, the Accord still faced opposition from states such as Bolivia, Venezuela, Sudan, 
Nicaragua, Cuba and Tuvalu and thus no consensus was reached according to the UN 
consensus decision-making rules.95 As a result the document was not adopted and does not 
have a legal standing of a treaty or a legally binding international agreement, but is simply a 
political declaration by a limited number of countries.96 
A delegate at the conference was quoted as saying that had the Copenhagen Accord been 
adopted, “it would have been an important step towards a better and legally-binding 
outcome”.97 In addition, upon leaving the conference, many delegates were somewhat 
reluctant to analyse the legal and operational implications of the Accord after long nights of 
tense negotiation.98 However, the significance and relevance of the Accord had to be 
reviewed at some point. Scholars such as Rajamani clearly stated that there was a huge 
uncertainty that existed in relation to the status and significance of the Accord and this would 
create a political drag as well as pose serious operational and legal challenges.99 It was quite 
clear that despite the Accord’s aim to be “operational immediately”, it could not be 
operationalized in its current form but needed further negotiation to add more details to it.100 
Furthermore, the reception of the Accord and the reaction of the parties left a lot to be 
desired. Most member parties reacted to the Accord with mixed feelings and most 
Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (ENGOs) were unhappy with the final draft 
and regarded it as an absolute failure.101 Most delegates agreed to the document being weak 
by carrying little weight as it had not been formally adopted but simply taken note of, yet 
others still remained hopeful that the Accord could still be a good catalyst to a future legally 
binding agreement102 or that it was even a potential breakthrough.103 A lot of countries 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
94 Ibid.  
95 Nagtzaam (note 43 above) 231.  
96 Van Asselt (note 26 above) 13.  
97 IISD (a) (note 25 above) 29. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Rajamani (b) (note 70 above) 831.  
100 Ibid at 835.  
101 Nagtzaam (note 43 above) 232.  
102 Ibid. 
103 D Bodansky (c) ‘The Copenhagen Conference: A Post Mortem’ (2010) 104 American Journal of 
International Law 239.  
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acknowledged it as a political instrument, a political agreement or a mere political 
statement104, of which all acknowledgements highlight on its political significance but not its 
legal significance.                        
4.4.9 Conclusion 
As its main agenda, the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference was highly acclaimed and it 
was supposed to finalise two years of work by producing a legally binding outcome.105 It 
even became clear a few weeks before the Conference that a legally binding agreement was 
not going to be achieved in the Copenhagen Summit but probably just a ‘set of detailed 
political decisions including a timeline’.106 Indeed, the Copenhagen Conference did not bear 
the expected fruits only the Copenhagen Accord which is just a political decision with no 
legal standing within the UNFCCC framework. Whether the Copenhagen Conference was a 
success or a failure depends on which angle one looks at it from. With regards to producing a 
legally binding outcome as it was mainly intended to, the COP in Copenhagen failed to 
deliver.107 Furthermore, Copenhagen failed to clarify how stabilising GHGs was going to be 
achieved.108 As a result, the Accord failed to advance the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC 
namely to stabilise GHGs. The Conference also raised a number of transparency issues and 
this was marked by endless protests by NGOs who had been denied access to the venue.109 
The most contested of this aspect was the fact that the Accord was only negotiated by a few 
selected countries. This resulted in a number of delegates including attending Head of States 
feeling disrespected which contributed vastly to failure in reaching a consensus to adopt the 
Accord.110 According to Asselt, ‘the COP in Copenhagen was one of the most chaotic UN 
conferences in recent history…and certainly the most bizarre conference’.111 This has led 
many scholars and NGOs claiming that the Conference was a total failure, a disaster or even 
worse.112 However, a reasonable number of academics still saw light inside the Copenhagen 
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Accord dark tunnel. Cantley-Smith quotes de Boer who was the COP President in 
Copenhagen from a positive viewpoint stating,  
Three key things that Copenhagen produced are: 1) It raised climate change to the highest level 
of government; 2) The Copenhagen Accord reflects a political consensus on the long-term, 
global response to climate change; 3) The negotiations brought an almost full set of decisions to 
implement rapid climate action near to completion.113  
 
In such a statement, hope in breaking the impasse between developed and developing 
countries is found especially with regards to vital issues concerning emissions reduction 
targets, mitigation as well as adaptation commitments.114 As a result, a number of authors, 
delegates and NGOs saw the Copenhagen Accord not as a total failure per se but as a small 
step which could help in the fight against global climate change.115 
 
In conclusion therefore, the Copenhagen Conference left a lot of disagreements on the 
substantive issues unresolved by not finalising the legally binding agreement as intended. 
Primarily, it failed in its quest to effectively regulate GHG emissions. Besides the hope 
depicted by some authors, it can be concluded that realistically, the climate negotiations after 





                                                                                                                                                                                    
change in its current form, but also because even in this weak form it faces considerable legal and procedural 
challenges to its operationalization.”’ Lavanya Rajamani, Copenhagen Accord: Neither Fish nor Fowl 26, 26 
(Feb. 2010) (Centre for Policy Research Seminar 606, paper), available at http://www.cprindia.org/. Similarly, 
Navroz Dubash refers to the Accord as a “paper-thin cover-up of what was a near complete failure,” and 
suggests that the results in Copenhagen may “represent[ ] the worst possible outcome the overlay of a thin 
veneer of success over what is a deeply flawed outcome, perpetuating a process that is unable to overcome 
entrenched differences.” Navroz K. Dubash, Copenhagen: Climate of Mistrust, 44 ECONOMIC & POLITICAL 
WEEKLY 8, 10 (Dec 26, 2009).” 
113 R Cantley-Smith ‘Climate Change and the Copenhagen Legacy: Where to From Here?’ (2010) 36(1) Monash 
University Law Review 278. 
114 Ibid.  
115Van Asselt (note 26 above) 16; Nagtzaam (note 43 above) 237, Cantley-Smith (note 113 above) 303, 
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4.5 COP16/CMP6, 2010 
After the Copenhagen Conference was described by many observers as a near failure, the 
expectations for the next conference were modest.116  A few people were looking forward to a 
legally-binding outcome or agreements on the outstanding issues whilst many still hoped that 
Cancun would produce meaningful progress on some of the key issues though. 117. A number 
of matters had been identified during the Conference build up period in which a ‘balanced 
package of outcomes could be agreed’.118 These issues included mitigation; adaptation; 
financing; technology; reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in 
developing countries including conservation; sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+); monitoring, reporting and verification 
(MRV); and international consultation and analysis (ICA).119 These were the key issues that 
negotiators focused on in the two weeks of the Conference.120 
   
4.5.1 The negotiating process 
The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Mexico, took place from 29 
November to 11 December 2010.121 It was the sixteenth session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP 16) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and served as the sixth session of Conference of the Parties serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP 6).122 The negotiations brought 
together almost 12 000 participants, including almost 5 200 government officials, 5 400 
representatives of the UN bodies and agencies, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, 
and 1 270 accredited members of the press.123   
The main focus of the Cancun Conference was on a two-track negotiating process aiming to 
enhance long-term cooperation under the Convention and the Protocol (the AWG-LCA and 
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the AWG-KYOTO PROTOCOL).124 The original deadline for completing these negotiations 
was supposed to be the previous Conference in Copenhagen.125 However, a number of 
fundamental issues had remained outstanding, thus the mandates of the two AWGs were to 
be extended until Cancun. 
 
After the dramatic events in Copenhagen, little was expected in terms of achieving any 
meaningful global action on climate change, let alone restoring the trust that had been lost in 
the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol negotiations.126 The Copenhagen Conference however 
had an influence on the negotiating process and expectations for Cancun.127 Due to feelings 
of such mistrust, the Mexican Presidency led by COP President Espinosa realised that change 
in the negotiation procedure and tone was needed in Cancun.128 As a result, the Conference 
was marked with serious commitment to a ‘transparent and inclusive’ process which was 
achieved.129 The Conference carefully followed the multi-pronged process in which the main 
two way negotiating process under the AWG-LCA and the AWG-KYOTO PROTOCOL 
were used as forums for all parties to bring forward views and to come up with a 
‘compromise text’ on the central issues.130 Furthermore, NGOs were updated of the 
negotiations and press conferences held as well as open sessions with various groups who had 
a keen interest in the result and these were conducted by the Mexican President Felipe 
Calderon and this method of openness yielded results.131  
   
4.5.2 The Outcome: Reaching a ‘consensus’  
After the two weeks of negotiating, there was a prodigious sense in the negotiating room that 
everyone was willing to accept the agreements that the parties had come to settle on.132 
However a crucial moment came when Bolivia went on to mention a number of substantive 
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concerns and stated their refusal to agree to the decisions being adopted.133 Despite the clear, 
stated and noted objections by Bolivia, the decisions were nevertheless adopted.134 In 
adopting the decisions and ‘taking note’ of the objections, the COP President Espinosa said, 
Consensus requires that everyone is given the right to be heard and have their views given due 
consideration, and Bolivia has been given this opportunity. Consensus does not mean that one 
country has the right of veto, and can prevent 193 others from moving forward after years of 
negotiations on something that our societies and future generations expect.135   
Basically, parties of both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol supported the Mexican 
Presidency’s decision stating that the concept consensus did not necessarily require 
unanimity thus the agreement to adopt the Cancun agreements was made.136 Due to this 
decision however, the integrity of the process became questionable.137 A small number of 
observers expressed displeasure and upset as to why the decisions had been adopted despite 
Bolivia’s opposition.138 The vast number however supported the decision by Madam 
President Espinosa as the right and correct approach.139 It is however not a secret that the 
Cancun agreements represent the first instance under the UNFCCC that a decision was 
adopted despite positive objection, thus disturbing the traditional consensus rule.140    
4.5.3 The Cancun Agreements 
The negotiations produced and adopted decisions known as the Cancun Agreements. The 
Cancun Agreements consist of a decision under the UNFCCC outcome of the work of the 
AWG-LCA141 and a decision under the Kyoto Protocol on the outcome of the work of the 
AWG-KYOTO PROTOCOL.142  The two will be briefly discussed below. 
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(a) The AWG-LCA Outcome Decision 
This is a 30 page document which covers the pillars of the Bali Action Plan of 2007 including 
a shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, finance and technology.143 The following is an outline 
on the mitigation related outcomes. 
Firstly, on a shared vision for long-term cooperation, the outcome recognise that ‘deep cuts in 
global GHG emissions are required’ in order to hold the temperature increase below 2 
degrees Celsius.144 The Cop agreed that the 2 degrees Celsius goal was to be subject to a 
periodic review so that it could be strengthened to a more ambitious 1,5 degrees Celsius 
goal.145 
Under mitigation, the Cancun Agreements follow the Copenhagen Accord method by 
formally putting the pledges of parties under the Copenhagen Accord in the UNFCCC 
documents.146 While recognising the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities, the Agreements emphasize the need to make ‘deep cut’ in global 
GHG emissions by both developed and developing nations.147 Developing country parties are 
to take measures aimed at achieving a “deviation in emissions” relative to business-as-usual 
emissions in 2020, with developed country support.148 A registry will be set up by the 
UNFCCC Secretariat to record and match finance, technology, and capacity building needs 
with international support.149 Internationally supported mitigation actions will be subject to 
domestic and international measuring, reporting, and verification measures (MRV) similar to 
those already applicable to developed countries in accordance with guidelines to be 
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developed.150 Domestically supported mitigation actions will be subject to domestic MRV in 
accordance with guidelines yet to be developed.151 On the other hand, developed country 
parties decided to enhance reporting on progress made in emission reductions and provision 
of finance, technology and capacity-building support to developing countries as well as to 
enhance reporting on their progress in reducing GHG.152 
 
Furthermore, an incentive mechanism for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation, and Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of 
Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries (REDD+) was established. Under the 
REDD+, developing country parties were encouraged to reduce emissions from deforestation 
and degradation, to conserve and enhance forest carbon stocks and to practice sustainable 
forest management.153 As part of this objective, developing countries are requested to develop 
a national strategy or action plan, national forest reference emission levels, a robust and 
transparent national forest monitoring system, and a system for providing information on how 
the safeguards are being addressed throughout implementation.154 The Cancun Agreements 
affirmed that adequate and predictable financial and technological support would be given to 
all developing country parties who should ‘aim to slow, halt and reverse forest cover and 
carbon loss’.155 
 
(b) The AWG-KYOTO PROTOCOL Outcome Decision 
 
The Kyoto Outcome decision is a two-page document that covers mitigation for Annex I 
Parties.156 The decision urged Annex I countries to increase their level of ambition in their 
GHG emissions reduction.157 It was also agreed that further work was required in order to 
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make the Copenhagen targets by Annex I countries binding commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol.158  
     
4.5.4 An analysis of the Cancun Agreements 
4.5.4.1 The AWG-LCA Outcome Decision 
Under the ‘shared vision’ decision, despite an acknowledgement of making ‘deep cuts’ to 
meet the 2 degrees Celsius goal, the Cancun Agreements still did not clarify the issue of how 
and in what time frames this goal was to be achieved as this was left as yet to be 
determined.159   
On mitigation commitments and actions, the Cancun Agreements have been praised for their 
very ‘artful drafting’ which incorporates the Copenhagen mitigation proposals which 
reflected differences which were seemingly irreconcilable into the UNFCCC process.160 
Despite not having a formal legal standing in the UNFCCC process, they have an agreed 
significance and since they were ‘taken note of’ thus being acknowledged by all parties, 
developed and developing countries, this means they are capable of being built on.161 It is 
however worrisome that the language used before in the Kyoto Protocol, which indicated and 
signified some kind of obligatory undertaking of targets has been slowly transforming and 
giving way to the aspirational language of targets.162 The obvious result is that the parties 
now declare their own aspirations and so far the declared proposals under the Copenhagen 
Accord and endorsed by the Cancun Agreements, even if they are faithfully implemented will 
not hold temperature increase to the required 2 degrees Celsius.163 In short, these targets fall 
short of the required recommendations of the IPCC.164 
4.5.4.2 Agreement under the AWG-KYOTO PROTOCOL 
 Despite the language that was used in order to try and reduce emissions and adopting a set of 
rules that would assist parties in progressing towards a second commitment period, the text 
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left a number of important issues such as accounting for forest management emissions and 
removals that had been discussed in the previous three years unfinished.165 The Cancun 
Agreements also failed to decide on the very important and fundamental issue regarding the 
Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period.166  
4.5.5 Legal status and significance of the Cancun Agreements 
The Cancun Agreements clearly are not legally binding as mentioned by a number of 
authors167despite the decisions having been adopted with Bolivia’s objection. The fact that 
they were however adopted elevates them higher than the previous mere political statement, 
the Copenhagen Accord. The Cancun Agreements received overwhelming support. The 
Climate Focus (an NGO) argues that despite not being legally binding or rather, the doubts 
with regards to the agreements’ legal status, the support the Cancun Agreements got simply 
means that their legal status may be of little consequence.168  
The Cancun Agreements despite the critics however in many areas made significant progress 
and positively created the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Technology Mechanism and the 
Cancun Adaptation Framework.169 Despite failing to agree on the second commitment period 
under the Kyoto Protocol, the agreements succeeded in bringing the developed countries’ 
mitigation targets and developing countries’ mitigation action formally under the UNFCCC 
negotiating process.170 Probably the most significant aspect of the Conference in Cancun was 
the fact that it managed to restore faith in the multilateral climate change negotiating process 
under the UNFCCC which had been lost at Copenhagen.171   
4.5.6 Conclusion 
Despite the Cancun Agreements succeeding in restoring faith in the UNFCCC negotiating 
system and succeeding in other areas such as establishing the Green Climate Fund, the 
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Technology Mechanism and the Cancun Adaptation Framework as well as making further 
advancement on MRVs and the REDD+, the question as to whether they can be regarded as a 
success still needs to be looked at in the light of what was expected of them and what 
progress was made with regards to the key decisions that are needed to address global climate 
change which are the mitigation related decisions. The Cancun Agreements still failed to 
decide on the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, they did not 
conclude the negotiations that had been launched under Bali which was to produce a new 
legal agreement (or agreements) addressing the post-2012 period. Furthermore they made 
decisions that fell short of advancing the main objective of the UNFCCC by allowing 
mitigation targets and actions that fall short of the required target. Therefore, the Cancun 
Conference while not labelled by a number of academics and critiques as a failure, was 
perceived widely as a stepping stone to a future agreement and as laying a robust framework 
for a future legally binding agreement. Its result however only extended the negotiating 
process, left open the final form of the regime, the possibility of a second commitment period 
under the Kyoto Protocol and still falls short of what is required to tackle dangerous global 
climate change.    
4.6 COP17/CMP7, 2011  
The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Durban, South Africa, was held from 28 
November to 11 December 2011. It involved a series of events including the seventeenth 
session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 17) to the UNFCCC and the seventh meeting 
of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP 7).172 The Conference drew over 12 480 participants, including over 5 400 government 
officials, 5 800 representatives of UN bodies and agencies, intergovernmental organizations 
and civil society organizations, and more than 1 200 members of the media.173 The Durban 
Conference was facilitated by the newly elected COP President Nkoana-Mashabane and 
adopted the informal motto “Working together saving tomorrow today”.174            
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The COP President made it clear from the outset that the negotiations were going to be 
transparent.175 As in Cancun, expectations for Durban were also modest with many countries 
feeling that ‘operationalizing’ the Cancun Agreements was all that could be achieved.176 
Others however wanted a balanced and interdependent package within a year that resolved 
the Kyoto Protocol question and a package that moved to a new legally-binding treaty and 
operationalized the Green Climate Fund.177 As a result, the key issues that were dominant on 
the Durban Conference negotiating table were the second commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol, finance under the Green Climate Fund and the mandate for negotiating of a new, 
comprehensive agreement.178 The Conference was marked by tension, high drama and 
protracted negotiations. The parties only came to agreement on a set of historic decisions 
under the climate regime some 36 hours after the scheduled end of the conference.179 
 
4.6.1 Negotiating positions 
Part of the drama at the Conference was the unusual alliances which ended up being created 
in Durban.180 The US in maintained a position that it would accept a mandate to negotiate a 
new outcome of a legal nature only if that mandate applied to both developing and developed 
countries.181 The E.U, which was allied with the LDCs, on the other hand sought an 
immediate start mandate to negotiate a new legally-binding instrument engaging all countries 
and this was a condition set by the E.U to agree on a second commitment period under the 
Kyoto Protocol.182 The BASIC group stood firm in its position that it would accept legal 
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commitments only for the post-2020 instrument.183 Amongst this group however, India stood 
out as it resisted any calls by the E.U and other members for it to agree to a new legally-
binding instrument and China also wanted to view the contents of this new instrument first.184  
The Umbrella Group,185 who have always been against the Kyoto Protocol’s extension, 
managed to slow the process down after they fabricated a fake text that caused confusion.186 
The African Group also made it clear that what they wanted in Durban were two outcomes as 
mandated by the Bali Road Map including an agreed outcome to implement the Convention 
and secondly, a Kyoto Protocol second commitment with clear mitigation ambitions.187  
4.6.2 The negotiating process 
The negotiations took place in a period of two weeks and a further 36 hours had to be added 
to reach an agreement between negotiators who were extremely tired and had had sleepless 
nights.188 As discussed above, remarkable ‘progressive’ alliances were formed in Durban, for 
example between the E.U, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)189 and the LDCs.190 
These alliances actually helped break the impasses and the development of an agreement. The 
Conference was praised for trying to be transparent and for trying to facilitate a clear 
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dialogue. This was achieved by the use of what was termed the ‘Durban Indaba’ which was 
held throughout the first week, and involved all party members and observers to try and 
promote an open process of deliberation.191                        
4.6.3 Reaching the decision in Durban 
In the end, the Durban Climate Change Conference reached an agreement after 36 more 
hours had been added.192  The outcomes covered a wide range of topics, notably the 
establishment of a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, a decision on long-
term cooperative action under the Convention and agreement on the operationalization of the 
GCF. Parties also agreed to launch the new ADP with a mandate ‘to develop a Protocol, 
another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention 
applicable to all Parties and is scheduled to complete negotiations by 2015’ and this outcome 
should enter into effect from 2020 onwards.193 
4.6.4 The Durban Platform: A general outline 
The outcome in Durban was named the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action and it has 
three main elements.194       
The first decision was the birth of the “Durban Platform for Enhanced Action” (Durban 
Platform) which is a working group which will work to develop a ‘new Protocol, another 
legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force’.195 This is basically a new negotiating 
process which has as its goal to reach an agreement by 2015 that will bring all countries 
under the same legal regime by 2020.196 It is interesting to note that the Durban decision 
established a new Ad Hoc Working group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
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(ADP) and then provides that the current AWG-LCA which was established in Bali by COP-
13 terminates at the end of 2012.197    
Secondly, COP-17 in Durban came to an agreement with regards to the extension of the 
Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period.198 It was agreed that there would be a second 
commitment period commencing on 1 January 2013 but the length of this period was not 
agreed upon and was left to be decided in the next COP.199      
The third main decision that was made was that concerning finance through the launching of 
the Green Climate Fund and agreements on the operationalization of the fund. The progress 
in this decision included the work completed in mobilising funds from both public and 
private funders to provide for a balanced allocation of resources for adaptation and mitigation 
activities including the REDD+.200 The GCF therefore became the intended main global fund 
for climate change finance.201           
4.6.5 An analysis of the Durban Platform 
The Durban Conference outcome has been received with mixed feelings and has also been 
critiqued by many. The outcome needs to be analysed in light of the outcomes. However, the 
study will analyse Durban’s success in light of its decisions that are mitigation related.  
The launching of the Ad-hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform  for Enhanced Action 
(ADP), has been dubbed the potentially most important decision202 as it launched a new 
negotiating to develop a “new Protocol, another legal instrument or agreed outcome with 
legal force” that will be applicable to all Parties to the UNFCCC.203 This has caused a 
number of concerns especially with regards to the language used, as to the accommodation of 
principles such as the CBDR as many writers state. This will be deeply discussed at in the 
next chapter of this study. Unfortunately, nothing really measurable in tonnes with regards to 
GHG emissions was achieved in Durban204 despite a mere mention of the 2 degrees Celsius 
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goal that Fuhr says the Durban Platform simply ‘pays lip service to’.205 Furthermore, despite 
the Durban Platform’s addressing of issues such as timing, it is completely silent on the 
substance that is to be negotiated and is thus ‘an empty vessel which can be filled with 
whatever content the parties choose’.206 Despite all that however, a lot of hope has been put 
in the ADP by many who think it will be able to come up with a mandate by 2015 even if it 
may start with low beginnings.207      
Furthermore, Durban successfully agreed on extending the Kyoto Protocol’s commitment 
period and it is believed that without this development, the talks would have collapsed as 
speculations had it that the emerging economies China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Korea 
and Mexico among others planned to walk out if that was not going to be the case.208 This 
was however only agreed upon after the E.U had been granted its wish that the major 
developing economies including the BASICs agreed to take ‘legal commitments’ but they 
only agreed to do so after 2020.209 The parties however failed to agree on how long this 
second commitment period will be and they decided to finalise that in the next meeting the 
following year.210  
It is not a secret that the Kyoto Protocol in allocating emissions reduction targets to a few 
industrialised countries thus lacked an instrument to address the climate change problem in a 
meaningful way. The fact that the US is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol, the major rising 
economies are not legally bound by the Protocol, and Canada at Durban announced its 
intended withdrawal from the Protocol together with Japan and Russia makes the Protocol 
even weaker than before.211  It is thus ineffective as a tool to limit global temperature increase 
to no more than 2 degrees Celsius.  
4.6.6 Legal status and significance of the Durban Outcome 
In Durban, parties managed to reach consensus and the agreement was adopted as a COP 
decision, hence the Durban outcome has a legal standing in the UNFCCC process. In 
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addition, the delegates reached a non-bonding agreement to reach an agreement by 2015 that 
will bring all countries under the same legal regime by 2020.212 From this, one can adduce 
that the Durban Platform itself is not a legally binding agreement but a COP decision which 
shall create a legally binding instrument in the future. 
Durban however was marked with great significance as compared to the ‘Copenhagen trauma 
as well as the Cancun struggle’ which was to rescue the multilateral climate change 
regime.213 Durban was hailed for not only turning a corner and resuscitating the nearly dead 
Kyoto Protocol but also in taking a step forward by making a decision that would see 
negotiations on a move to a new 21st century climate regime ‘with something approaching 
symmetrical reporting systems for country efforts on mitigation.’214 In addition, the Cancun-
Durban packages managed to restore sufficient momentum for new negotiations that will 
need to be shaped by moving beyond the old lines that divided developed and developing 
countries.215 In addition, the creation of a new negotiating process to address the fundamental 
issue of developing a ‘new Protocol, another legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal 
force’ which involves all parties was a very significant and departure from the ‘traditional’ 
view point.216 By doing so, COP-17 turned away from the distinction between Annex I/Non-
Annex I parties’ distinction which had been central to the climate change negotiations as 
established by the Berlin Mandate in 1995 which gave birth to the Kyoto Protocol.217 By 
doing so, the Durban Platform opened a new window in which delegates are challenged to 
come up with a new climate change policy that follows this proposal, but still in line and 
consistent with the mother Convention, the UNFCCC.218  
Also by extending the Kyoto Protocol, the Durban outcome also saved the talks from 
collapsing given that the key emerging countries planned to walk out had the Protocol not 
had an extended life. Despite Canada and other countries being no longer interested in the 
second commitment of the Protocol, this move managed to keep the major emerging 
economies in the talks. The Durban Outcome also managed to proceed with the main 
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agreement above which gave way to creation of the ADP which will decide on an instrument 
that binds all parties.219 Furthermore, the uncertainty surrounding the Kyoto Protocol was 
cleared, a legally binding instrument was endorsed and the leadership by industrialised 
countries in tackling the climate problem was once again reinforced.220 
4.6.7 Conclusion 
If the Durban outcome is judged by the objectives of the Convention, the outcome leaves 
much to be desired. Durban may not be considered a ‘success’ if judged according to that and 
also according to putting the world on a path to solve the climate problem by making 
reasonable emissions reductions of GHGs.221 Furthermore, as a response to the Bali Action 
Plan, the Durban outcome also did not do much as well. The Durban outcome has been 
described as, ‘far from perfect’222 and ‘a large empty package,’223 by some academics just to 
name a few. However, besides lacking in these fundamental areas and such criticisms, the 
Durban Climate Conference has also been viewed in a positive light. This has been done 
especially by those who choose to judge the outcome based on the complexities of the 
process and taking into consideration the fact that global climate change is a long-term 
problem thus negotiations are to be viewed as to whether the negotiations at hand managed to 
put the world on a trajectory where it is more likely to reduce GHGs than it was 
previously.224 In this light, Durban managed to build upon the Cancun progress to move 
forward especially by creating a new negotiating process where an instrument that includes 
all parties will be made as this is a mandate of change.225 Rajamani also applauds the Durban 
outcome for ending the uncertainty surrounding the Kyoto Protocol and also the launching of 
the ADP which she says is a necessary step forward despite the fact that it leaves a number of 
issues such as differentiation unresolved which the ADP will need to deal with as it starts its 
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work.226 In conclusion therefore, the Durban Platform judgement depends on the angle one 
decides to judge the Conference on. 
4.7 COP18/CMP8 
4.7.1 Introduction 
After Durban, expectations for Doha were modest since the Conference was not as important 
as compared to its predecessors which had very high expectations as they carried deadlines 
with them.227 The most crucial task to be completed was to decide how long the Kyoto 
Protocol’s second commitment period was going to be as well as defining short-term 
emissions reduction strategy.228 Basically, Doha had as its major objective to decide and 
define on the amendments to the Kyoto Protocol.229 Also, the work of the AWG-LCA and the 
AWG-Kyoto Protocol were supposed to be closed and concluded in Doha as this was long 
overdue.230 The issue on long term funding of the developing countries was also on the 
agenda.231  
4.7.2 Negotiating Process 
The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Doha, Qatar, took place from 26 
November to 8 December 2012.232 It included the eighteenth session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP 18), the UNFCCC and the eighth session of the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 8).233 The Conference also 
included meetings by five subsidiary bodies and amongst these included the second part of 
the seventeenth session of the Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I 
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Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KYOTO PROTOCOL 17), the second part of the 
fifteenth session of the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
UNFCCC (AWG-LCA 15) and the second part of the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP1).234 This was the first time that UN climate change 
negotiations took place in the Middle East.235 The conference attracted about 9 000 
participants, including 4 356 government officials, 3 956 representatives of UN bodies and 
agencies, intergovernmental organizations and civil society organizations, and 683 members 
of the media.236 Negotiations in Doha focused on ensuring the implementation of agreements 
reached at previous conferences. 
 
The Conference was marked by dramatic events such as the protests by activists against the 
Qatari hosts’ emissions record for the host nation as they wanted them to reduce their GHG 
emissions and show leadership.237 Campbell also ridicules the hosting venue which he in 
depth describes as, 
[The] magnificence of the Qatar International Convention Centre, where desert temperatures 
can be agreeably mitigated by a very effective, if sadly very local, system of climate control. 
Though we are inevitably told that the Centre has been designed to ‘the highest level of 
environmental and sustainable standards’ and is ‘32 percent more efficient compared to a 
similarly designed building’ operating that system contributes to the energy consumption of 
Qatar, the absolute emissions of which have at least doubled since 1990, to now make its 
emissions the largest per capita in the world, three times those of the USA.238 
 
Despite this drama, the Conference went well and managed to produce an agreement.239 
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4.7.3 The Doha Climate Gateway  
Finally, on the evening of Saturday 8 December, a package of decisions was adopted in Doha 
and it became known as the Doha Climate Gateway.240 The package included amendments to 
the Kyoto Protocol to establish its second commitment period.241 In addition, having been 
launched at CMP 1 in 2005, the AWG-Kyoto Protocol had its work terminated in Doha.242 
Furthermore, the parties also agreed to terminate the AWG-LCA and negotiations which had 
been long held under the Bali Action Plan.243 In addition, the key elements of the outcome 
included agreement to consider loss and damage, ‘such as institutional mechanism to address 
loss and damage in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects 
of climate change’, which however is not a mitigation related decision.244 
   
4.7.4 An analysis of the Doha Climate Gateway 
Amendments to the Kyoto Protocol stated that the second commitment period would run 
from January 2013 to December 2020.245 This means that the Annex I parties continue to be 
bound by the Kyoto Protocol in the mandate to achieve average emission reduction of 5% 
below 1990 levels. Despite the members such as the EU willingness to be involved in the 
second commitment period, countries such as Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Russia made 
their intentions of ‘jumping off the ship’ quite clear.246 With major developing country party 
emitters and the USA not bound by the Kyoto Protocol, this leaves less than 15% of world 
GHG emissions covered by the Protocol.247 This leaves a lot to be desired if the fight against 
global climate change is to be achieved. Clearly, the 2013-2020 GHG emissions reduction 
will not be enough in putting the world on the path to avoid a 2 degrees Celsius temperature 
increase but it was adopted anyway.248  Termination of the AWG-Kyoto Protocol which had 
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been established in 2005 was also done.249 It had been tasked to present its results ‘as soon as 
possible’ but it however took seven years to ‘complete’ its task and surprisingly, at its 
termination a number of outstanding issues were raised and arguments were visible until the 
last minute thus resulting in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus attempting to block the adoption of 
the AWG- Kyoto Protocol outcome.250 The outcome was adopted despite Russia’s objection 
and the same Cancun incident which had transpired against Bolivia repeated itself in which 
an express objection was simply ignored thus raising questions of legitimacy of the Doha 
decision within the UNFCCC process.251 Doha however have been credited for achieving the 
AWG- Kyoto Protocol mandate which it did by creating a second commitment period but 
only if one closes eyes to its actual environmental effectiveness.252 
Doha also made a significant decision by achieving the planned termination of the AWG-
LCA after five years of its birth in Bali 2007.253 However, one wonders whether at its 
termination, the AWG-LCA had managed to achieve its mandate of creating a new 
agreement. In 2009 at Copenhagen which was the AWG-LCA’s supposed deadline to its 
mandate, instead of delivering, the meeting nearly collapsed and it was unfortunate the life of 
the AWG-LCA had to be extended for another year.254  The following year in Durban also, 
the AWG-LCA’s life had to be extended and only a decision to terminate it in Doha in the 
following year was boldly reached.255 The question becomes therefore whether the AWG-
LCA managed to achieve its mandate after its prolonged life had been extended? There has 
however been a number of praises given to the AWG-LCA. The first achievement under this 
Bali established negotiating track was that it managed to convince the developing countries to 
undertake mitigation efforts whilst developed countries agreed to undertake measurable 
reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions.256 
Furthermore about 85 countries, both developed and developing countries, have signed their 
pledges to reduce GHG emissions since the Copenhagen agreement.257 However, many of 
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these pledges have been found to be very unclear, established to be too low to achieve the 
much needed below 2 degrees Celsius rise or were made based on conditions.258 The Doha 
Agreement also further urged members to adopt more ambitious emission reduction targets259 
despite not defining these targets.  
The AWG-LCA also before being terminated managed to make a number of important 
financial issues which will not be discussed as they are not directly related to mitigation 
actions. 
With these unsettled issues, the AWG-LCA was terminated. However, for one to give a 
judgement as to whether it effectively succeeded in its mandate will be a difficult task which 
may only be passed on how effectively the institutions under it as discussed above implement 
their mandate.260 The baton to carry on with the negotiations to a new climate change 
agreement which must be completed by 2015 was then passed to the ADP. 
4.7.5 Legal status and significance of the Doha Climate Change Gateway 
The Doha Climate Gateway was adopted as a COP decision. This meant it could create valid 
legal structures and rules which bind the parties legally.261 Issues of legitimacy which could 
be raised however especially with the AWG-Kyoto Protocol decision where the outcome was 
adopted despite Russia’s objection are not to be ignored as these could come with 
commitment issues.262 In fact, this has been evident as other countries including Russia itself 
clearly communicated their non-support for the Kyoto Protocol second commitment which 
will have obvious commitment consequences. 
The Doha Conference however was very significant in a number of ways. It was described as 
a ‘closing down’ conference as it closed down a number of negotiating tracks including the 
AWG- Kyoto Protocol and the AWG-LCA, extending the only legally binding agreement 
available to limit GHG emissions and opening of the next negotiating track which is the 
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ADP.263 It therefore was accordingly described as the ‘transitional’ conference as it was about 
‘moving forward on a trajectory towards adopting a universal climate change agreement by 
2015 rather than immediately raising ambition as demanded by many youth and NGOs’.264  
Therefore, the significance of the Doha Climate Change Conference was in its special task on 
decisions it made which, although were not directly linked to the objective of the UNFCCC 
were decisions that affected the negotiation strategies and tracks.265 This will help in the 
climate change negotiation process especially focusing on the development of a new climate 
change agreement. 
4.7.6 Conclusion 
It is no secret that the Doha Climate Gateway is by no means a breakthrough but probably a 
successor to the line of least achieving climate change negotiations.266 In summary, Doha 
‘successfully’ terminated the two track negotiations and left the action to be taken by the 
newly established ADP, extended the Kyoto Protocol’s life, endorsing the Republic of Korea 
as the headquarters of the GCF and negotiating the institutional development to compensate 
developing countries for climate change related loss and damage.  With all this, the question 
becomes whether it was a ‘success’ or not. COP President Al-Attiyah on being quoted 
admitted that the package by no means a perfect package by saying, “I am not saying what is 
in store is a perfect package”.267 He thus acknowledged that despite reaching an agreement, 
Doha had fallen short.268 Authors such as Campbell see the conference as a failure and even 
go as far as saying, 
 
[T]he Doha Conference is arguably the most embarrassing episode in the history of 
environmentalism. Whatever spin-doctoring pronouncements are now made about the 
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http://www.ceps.eu/book/dohacop-18-gateway-new-climate-change-agreement, accessed on 28 September 2014, 
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Conference, the thousands who flew in had no possibility of achieving any global emissions 
reductions.269 
 
However, some have described the Doha Conference as a ‘modest step towards the 
achievement of a coordinated action to effectively tackle climate change’270 Probably as it 
has been described as a ‘transition’ from the old negotiation tracks to the new and back to 
focusing only on the making of a new climate agreement by 2015, it achieved what it was 
supposed to if one is to look at the bigger picture and maybe its success shall be judged only 
after 2015.271 
 
4.8 COP19/CMP9, 2013 
4.8.1 Introduction 
The annual conference commenced in Poland just a few days after Typhoon Haiyan, the 
strongest storm to ever make landfall, ravaged the Philippines leaving a serious trail of 
destruction.272 Naderev Saño, the lead negotiator of the Philippines chose actions over words 
to drive his message by undertaking a voluntary fast which was joined by over 200 supporters 
and they vowed not to stop until a meaningful outcome was reached in Warsaw.273 The fast 
and super typhoon and the many marches and protests, became touchstones of the urgency of 
climate action, backed by alarms sounded by the scientific community leading up to COP 
19.274 In addition, the IPCC’s Working Group I had also launched a report two months before 
the Conference which called for the need to reduce anthropogenic GHG emissions if climate 
change was to be limited and the World Meteorological Organisation had confirmed that 
2013 was in the top ten warmest years of all times and that the melting ice caps and glaciers 
brought global sea level to a new record high.275 On the other hand, the UNEP Emissions Gap 
Report showed an increase in emissions in 2013 which meant that the 2 degrees Celsius 
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target was not going to be possible.276 Basically, there was a backdrop of urgency for 
ambitious mitigation, serious adaptation and firm efforts on loss and damage for the Warsaw 
Conference.277 
   
4.8.2 The negotiation process 
The Warsaw Climate Change Conference took place from 11-23 November 2013 in 
Poland.278 It included the 19th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 19) to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the ninth session of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 
9)279 and this was the second time that the UN climate change negotiations had taken place in 
Poland.280 Over 8 300 participants including 4 022 government officials, 3 695 
representatives of UN bodies and agencies, intergovernmental organizations and civil society 
organizations, and 658 members of the media attended the meeting.281 
  
Expectations for the conference were modest with many expecting it to focus only on either 
finance or implementation whilst others wondered whether it was going to be a REDD+ 
COP.282 Negotiations in Warsaw however did put some focus on implementation of 
agreements that had been reached at previous meetings, including pursuing the work of the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). 
 
Unlike its predecessors after Copenhagen who managed to take control of the process and 
retain confidence in the process, the Warsaw Conference was marked by some unfortunate 
events. Firstly was the issue of trust within the negotiation process which seemed to be losing 
its grip and this was observed by the endless complaints from the developing countries 
member parties as they were discontent about broken promises especially on the 
                                                          
276 See http://www.unep.org/newscentre/default.aspx?DocumentID=2755&ArticleID=9683, accessed on 1 
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implementation of agreed commitments on finance.283 There was also a lot of finger pointing 
and blame game which ensued between member parties.284 Accusations were also thrown and 
controversial statements directed at each other were said during press conferences.285 The 
Guardian Newspaper even described the event as ‘characterized by discord and acrimony’.286 
 
Despite all the drama, mistrust and lack of confidence, 27 hours after its scheduled closing 
time, the meeting adopted some decisions including an ADP decision that invited parties to 
initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally-determined 
contributions, and resolved to accelerate the full implementation of the Bali Action Plan and 
pre-2020 ambition. Parties also adopted a decision establishing the Warsaw International 
Mechanism on Loss and Damage, and the “Warsaw REDD+ framework,” a series of seven 
decisions on REDD+ finance, institutional arrangements and methodological issues.287  
 
4.8.3 The Warsaw Outcomes: A general outline 
Decisions were adopted under the ADP for the purposes of advancing the Durban 
Platform.288 The main expectation was that the ADP would intensify its work on the content 
of the 2015 agreement and on concrete outcomes on pre2020 ambition.289 The Warsaw 
Outcome saw a timeframe being proposed and agreed upon. This stated that parties were to 
communicate their ‘intended nationally-determined contributions’ by March 2015 and that 
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the ADP was requested to identify before COP20 in Lima the information provided by parties 
when they put forward their contributions.290 
Warsaw also achieved what was described as a long ‘overdue success’ on the REDD+ by 
establishing the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ which had been on the negotiation list for 
almost a decade.291   
Outside mitigation, other key decisions in Warsaw included the establishment of an 
institutional arrangement which is the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and 
Damage and also finance related decisions292  
4.8.4 An analysis of the outcomes 
Under the ADP decision, parties are still working on developing of a ‘Protocol, another legal 
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all.’293 
Therefore, main work and expectations of the ADP is that it should be intensifying work on 
the 2015 agreement.294 In Warsaw, the parties pressed on and managed to come up with a 
time frame by which countries should submit their pledges by the first quota of 2015 which 
will be considered by the ADP for the new instrument.295 It is interesting to note that the 
Warsaw ADP decision focuses on member countries to communicate their own pledges 
because this raises questions as to whether it will be possible to have meaningful, ambitious 
and effective GHG emissions reductions.296 Many countries went on to give pledges that 
were substantially less than what had been prescribed for them under the Kyoto Protocol 
which makes the mitigation pledges inadequate.297Apparently, this is the only ‘success’ they 
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made under their mandate of producing a new instrument298 which directly relates to real 
GHG emissions in the future instrument.  
However, another decision at Warsaw that has a link with GHG emissions reduction was the 
REDD+ decision. It was regarded as the most successful aspect of the Warsaw Outcomes.299 
Under the REDD+, a new mechanism was completed with the purpose of keeping the world's 
remaining forests standing thus reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation.300 
This had been work in progress and was long overdue. The parties agreed on a package 
agreement but institutional and financial arrangements proved to be difficult tasks.301  
4.8.5 Legal status and significance 
The Warsaw Outcomes were basically adopted as COP Decisions thereby implying that they 
have the potential to create valid legal structures and rules which bind the parties legally.302  
With regards to significance, the Warsaw Conference failed to meet its expectations even 
though these were very modest.303 However, it brought about some significant decisions as 
well. With regards to mitigation of GHGs, the finalising of the REDD+ agreement package 
was a ground-breaking and significant outcome. Special reference was also given to the 
decision making process of adopting decisions as the procedures had raised a number of 
legitimacy issues starting from Cancun where a decision was adopted ignoring Bolivia’s 
objections304 and in Doha where Russia’s objection was also quashed by the then COP 
President Al-Attiyah.305 In addition to all the above issues was the long standing question as 
to whether the UNFCCC negotiating process still had the ability to deliver. This was so 
because there has been lack of progress which is indeed a paramount enquiry.306 Feeling 
frustrated due to the lack of progress in the process, it was reported that hundreds of civil 
society representatives some of them known for their engagement couldn’t take it anymore 
                                                          
298 Ibid. 
299 Ibid; The Guardian (note 284 above). 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid.  
302 Climate Focus (note 17 above) 2. 
303 IISD (e) (note 272 above) 29. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid at 30. 
103 | P a g e  
 
and they decided to walk out of COP19 as a way of demonstrating their worry.307 This 
therefore should send a message to the member party negotiators and help in questioning and 
probably retaining relevance of the UNFCCC process.308 
4.8.6 Conclusion 
Warsaw therefore successfully adopted a number of decisions, including an ADP decision 
inviting parties to initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally-
determined contributions;  and to accelerate the full implementation of the Bali Action Plan 
and pre-2020 ambition; a decision establishing the Warsaw international mechanism on loss 
and damage, and the ‘Warsaw REDD+ framework,’ which is a series of seven decisions on 
REDD+ finance, institutional arrangements and methodological issues. However, these 
decisions have been described as modest and failing to meet even the modest of COP19 
expectations.309 Primarily, nothing positively addressed fundamental issues such as ambitious 
mitigation efforts at the centre of avoiding a more than 2 degrees Celsius increase in global 
temperature, the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC.310  
4.9 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, this dissertation gave a brief summary of events that happened from the 
COP15/CMP5 to COP19/CMP9, these are the recent five climate change negotiations 
meetings. The study observed that the central focus as per the Bali Action Plan was to create 
a new instrument to uplift the objectives of the Convention thus creating an instrument with 
ambitious GHG emissions reductions to keep the global temperatures from rising beyond 2 
degrees Celsius.  A look into the negotiations analysis of all the discussed COP/CMP 
meetings observed that with regards to the new instrument, nothing except the prolonged life 
of the Protocol happened. Secondly, after a thorough analysis of the outcomes, all the 
meetings as much as they tried to come up with GHG emissions targets, they all fell short of 
the required ambition. It was also observed that the negotiations moved on a string of 
decisions that encouraged countries to determine their own mitigation targets as done at 
Copenhagen and confirmed in Cancun and Durban, despite the reality that the pledges fall 
short of the required emissions cuts. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
COPENHAGEN AND BEYOND: TOWARDS A POST-2020 CLIMATE 
AGREEMENT 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
After the entering into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the only legally binding agreement that 
obliged countries to cut their greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), the focus of the climate 
change negotiations shifted to focusing on what would be next after its exit. To try and 
respond to this question, Parties to the UNFCCC launched the Bali Action Plan (BAP)1 in 
2005 which was to reach “towards an agreed outcome” by 2009. The mandate of the BAP 
failed to be reached in 2009 and 2010 but finally a direction was provided in 2011 at Durban 
where the life of the Kyoto Protocol was extended to 2020. To answer the fundamental 
questions, countries agreed to negotiate on a new agreement to reach an agreement by 2015. 
This takes place under the realm of the UNFCCC COP/CMP negotiations held annually and 
the quest to the new agreement continues and most probably is its peak. 
In the previous chapter, the study provided a detailed summary of events at the climate 
change negotiations from Copenhagen 2009 (COP15/CMP5) to Warsaw 2013 
(COP19/CMP9). The chapter gave the brief outcomes and analysed these decisions as well as 
their legal standing within the UNFCCC process. It is an undeniable fact that the decisions 
adopted during the negotiations have resulted in the development, evolution and elaboration 
of certain principles in international law and international environmental law. In this chapter, 
the study undertakes a legal analysis of the recent five negotiating meetings on how by trying 
to settle the fundamental questions within the regime which include the legal form and 
architecture of the future climate regime; the approach likely to be adopted by the climate 
change regime between a bottom up or a top down approach; and the interpretation of the 
nature and extent of differential treatment between developed and developing states in such 
an instrument; have actually affected the legal evolution of the climate change regime and the 
actual future climate change regime. The researcher also tries to analyse possible routes the 
negotiations are directing towards agreement on the new instrument as hinted by the 
                                                          
1 Decision 1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, held in 
Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007, Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its 
thirteenth session, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008) (hereinafter ‘Bali Action Plan, 2007’). 
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decisions, thus attempting to give a prognosis of what the long awaited new legally binding 
instrument may look like. 
5.2 THE QUESTION ON LEGAL FORM OF THE NEW INSTRUMENT 
It is almost impossible for one to start mentioning the legal form of a new climate change 
regime without mentioning the developments that happened in 2007 at the Bali Climate 
Change Conference. Under the decision named the Bali Action Plan (BAP), a process to 
reach an ‘agreed outcome’ to advance the climate regime with a scheduled end at COP15 in 
2009 at Copenhagen was launched.2 The phrase ‘an agreed outcome’, in the BAP indicated a 
lack of agreement on both the legal form that the likely outcome of this process could take, 
and the level of ambition that it should reflect thus the next COP negotiations had to clarify 
this. The following section of the study gives an analysis as to what extent the question of the 
legal form of the so called ‘agreed outcome’ has been settled or at least tried to be settled by 
the COP meetings from Copenhagen in 2009 to Warsaw in 2013. 
 
5.2.1 The possible forms available at Copenhagen 
The Kyoto Protocol3 is the only legally binding instrument with obligations to developed 
countries to reduce GHG emissions under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change.4 It took the form of a protocol whereas the UNFCCC itself is regarded as a 
treaty. A treaty is defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties for the purposes 
of the Convention as ‘an international agreement concluded between states in written form 
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or 
more related instruments and whatever its particular designation’.5 A Protocol is defined as 
the original draft of a diplomatic document, especially of the terms of a treaty agreed to in 
conference and signed by the parties.6 These two are thus far the existing ‘forms’ in existence 
within the climate change regime. After the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, 
                                                          
2 Ibid. 
3 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change opened for signature 16 
March 1998, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005). Hereinafter referred to as the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 
(entered into force 21 March 1994). Hereinafter referred to as the UNFCCC. 
5 Article 2(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.  
6 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/Protocol accessed on 10 October 2014.  
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questions as to what would happen after its expiry in 2012 became the centre of attention as 
well as a fundamental question of the climate change negotiations. The question was whether: 
 
a) Kyoto Protocol was to be extended through the adoption of a second commitment period, 
with a new round of emission reduction targets for developed country parties?  
b) A new agreement be adopted under the UNFCCC which addresses the emissions of 
countries that either are not parties to the Kyoto Protocol (the United States) or do not have 
Kyoto emissions targets (developing countries)? Or  
c) Should a single new agreement be adopted that replaces the Kyoto Protocol and is more 
comprehensive in coverage, addressing both developed and developing country emissions?7  
 
This question still remains the central focus of the negotiations, despite the first option being 
removed as shall be indicated later by the thesis. The reasons why legal instruments are 
important and have been preferred have been discussed by Chapter 2. Basically legally 
binding instruments provide assurance and insurance that the states involved will do their 
best in meeting with their commitments. As a result, it is therefore important for the form of 
the post 2020 climate change instrument to be defined for the above mentioned reasons. This 
section of the thesis analyses the negotiations in the light of this fundamental aspect. 
 
5.2.2 What the COP decisions suggest: An analysis 
5.2.2.1 Copenhagen 2009 
The Copenhagen Conference in 2009 was intended to be the deadline to resolve the question 
on the legal form on the post-2012 climate regime. This was reflected in its unofficial slogan 
which the conference adopted which read ‘Seal the deal.’8 The result of this Conference (as 
already dealt with thoroughly in the previous chapter) was the Copenhagen Accord which 
was simply a political agreement and not a legal instrument. It is unfortunate that with 
regards to the legal form question, the Copenhagen Accord failed to offer any guidance on 
                                                          
7 D Bodansky (a) ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Accord’ (2010) 14(3) ASIL, 1. 
8 IISD (a) ‘Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7-19 December 2009’ (2009) 12(459) 
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the future of the climate change regime.9 As a result, the BAP’s ‘agreed outcome’ under the 
Copenhagen Accord was left uncertain.10 
 
It is however on record that by June 2009 five proposed agreements, including Protocols 
from Japan, Australia, Tuvalu and Costa Rica and an Implementing Agreement from the 
United States had been submitted for communication to Parties and appeared on the agenda 
of COP15 but these were never discussed at Copenhagen.11 It had become clear by June 2009 
that some countries favoured a new legally binding instrument under UNFCCC. However, 
the fate of the Kyoto Protocol and its relationship to such a new agreement still remained 
ambiguous.12 Interestingly, the EU, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Russia 
(arguing that the two-track process was burdensome) were believed to be in support of a new 
single integrated instrument replacing the Kyoto Protocol to ensure greater participation and 
effectiveness in the climate regime which would include the US.13 The G77/China 
(developing countries) however were believed to be against such an instrument as they 
considered that this instrument, given the emerging political realities, would have a 
fundamentally different character to that of the Kyoto Protocol such as reflecting a bottom up 
approach and not the top-down thus breaching the perceived Bali ‘firewall’14 (commitments 
versus actions) and top “cherry-pick” from the Kyoto Protocol.15 They thus feared the 
balance of responsibly in this new climate regime. Developing countries however were 
believed to be divided in their approach too, with India and China opposing a new instrument 
which made them address their own emissions whereas some developing countries including 
the small island states supported negotiating a new instrument which would complement the 
Kyoto Protocol and include the US and major developing countries like China, India and 
                                                          
9  L Rajamani (a) ‘The making and unmaking of the Copenhagen Accord’ (2010) 59 ICLQ 841.  
10 Ibid at 838. 
11 Ibid at 839. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 The Kyoto Protocol by  dividing countries between Annex I and non-Annex I parties succeeded in 
establishing what has been termed  a firewall which the developing countries are unwilling to give that up now 
by replacing Kyoto with a new legal instrument which could end up giving them the same responsibilities as the 
developed or Annex I parties. 
15 Rajamani (a) (note 9 above) 839. 
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Brazil.16 Furthermore, an earlier draft of the Accord is believed to have carried a paragraph 
requiring Parties to negotiate ‘one or more legal instruments under the Convention, ideally 
within six months but no later than December 2010’.17 This provision however disappeared in 
the final draft, together with a similar reference to a ‘legally binding instrument in the COP 
decision extending the work of the AWG-LCA’.18 
At the end of the Conference however, there was no reference to the adoption of a ‘legally 
binding treaty’ at COP1619 except that the mandate of the AWG-LCA to develop an ‘agreed 
outcome’ was extended to COP16 in Mexico the following year.20 
 
5.2.2.2 Cancun 2010 
In Cancun, six agreements including Protocols from Japan, Australia, Tuvalu, Costa Rica and 
Grenada as well as an Implementing Agreement from the US had been communicated to 
parties.21 These all appeared on the agenda of COP16 and were discussed in conjunction with 
the discussion on the legal form of the AWG-LCA.22 The negotiating positions of different 
countries and their respective options remained the same as in Copenhagen. After intensive 
negotiations, a set of decisions were adopted at Cancun. These however are not legally 
binding but simply received the support of all UNFCCC members except for Bolivia which 
objected.23 
 
Negotiations on the form of the new climate change path were agreed to continue in 2011 in 
Durban with the aim of building on the Cancun Agreements to develop more comprehensive 
agreement(s) and to determine the legal form which might end up being one, two or more 
agreements in the form of a Protocol, other legally-binding mechanism or be a COP 
                                                          
16 D Bodansky (b), ‘The Copenhagen Conference: A Post Mortem’ 2010 available at 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/rome2007/docs/Copenhagen_Climate_Change.pdf, accessed on 22 
October 2014, 4. 
17 Rajamani (a) (n9) at 839. 
18 Ibid at 841. 
19 L Massai ‘The Long Way to the Copenhagen Accord- Climate Change Negotiations in 2009’ (2009) 19 (1)    
RECIEL 119.  
20 Rajamani (a) (note 9 above) 838. 
21 L Rajamani (b) ‘The Cancun Climate Agreements: Reading the text, subtext and tea leaves’ (2011) 60(2) 
ICLQ, 513.  
22 Ibid.  
23 J Liu ‘The Cancun Agreements’ (2011) 13 ENV L REV 43. 
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decision.24 In short therefore, the Cancun Agreements still failed to resolve the question on 
the legal form to any measure such as Copenhagen but simply extended discussions on the 
above mentioned available three legal options.25 
 
5.2.2.3 Durban 2011 
After the rigorous negotiations in Durban, where countries expressed their diverse views,26 
parties under the COP ended up with a decision on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/L.10). They 
agreed to: 
 
Launch a process to develop; a Protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with 
legal force” under the UNFCCC applicable to all parties, through a subsidiary body under the 
Convention established and known as the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action.27 
  
This marked the express declaration for the first time in years of the possible forms which the 
new climate change agreement could take. It is important to note that these three options have 
been regarded as unprecedented by a number of authors in the realm of international law and 
international environmental law as shall be discussed below.  It is thus of paramount 
importance to try and understand these unparalleled three possible forms.  
 
                                                          
24 ‘Analysis from Conservation International: Outcome of Cancun climate Negotiations’ 2010 available at 
http://sp10.conservation.org/Documents/CI_analysis_UNFCCC_COP16_Nov-
Dec_2010_Cancun_outcomes.pdf, accessed on 22 October 2014, 6. 
25 Rajamani (b) (note 21 above) 514; L Rajamani (c) ‘The Climate Regime in Evolution: The Disagreements 
that Survived the Cancun Agreements’ (2011) 5(2) Carbon & Climate Law Review 136; D Bodansky (c). 
‘Whither the Kyoto Protocol? Durban and Beyond’ (August 26, 2011). Harvard Project on Climate 
Agreements, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1917603, accessed on 30 August 2014; IISD (b) ‘Summary 
of the Cancun Climate Change Conference: 29 November – 11 December 2010’ (2010) 12(498) Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin, 29 available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12498e.pdf, accessed 30 August 
2014. 
26 For different countries suggestions and views see; IISD (c) ‘Summary of the Durban Climate Change 
Conference: 28 November-11 December 2011’ (2011) 12(538) Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 22-23 available at 
http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12534e.pdf, accessed 30 August 2014. 
27 Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, UNFCCC 
Decision 1/CP.17, Dec. 11, 2011, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1.   
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5.2.2.4 Understanding the options under the Durban Platform 
Leading scholars in international law and international environmental law have given their 
thoughts into trying to understand these unprecedented terms and options. At the outset, it is 
important to note that protocols are explicitly recognized in the UNFCCC28 as a method of 
expanding the climate regime. Their definition and legal status have been discussed above.29 
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are both legally binding agreements which are 
regarded as the highest forms of expression for political will that the international community 
can bestow.30 
 
Rajamani states that the terms ‘protocol’ and ‘another legal instrument’ in the Durban 
Platform are a reminiscent of the Berlin Mandate of 1995 which launched the process that led 
to the Kyoto Protocol.31 The term ‘legal instrument’ in the context of the Berlin Mandate 
discussions referred to a number of possibilities, including the possibility of amendments to 
the UNFCCC, which were being considered at that time.32 However, the same term used in 
the context of the Durban Platform decision, could refer to any of the legal instruments that 
the COP is empowered to adopt including amendment to annexes and protocols.33 The COP 
is also empowered to take decisions although these are not considered legally binding in the 
absence of explicit treaty authorization.34 If however the term ‘legal instrument’ is not 
automatically interpreted as a legally binding instrument, then it could be logical to bring 
COP decisions within the fold of a ‘legal instrument’.35 
 
Given the gathering momentum towards a ‘legally binding instrument’ in the lead-up to the 
Durban Climate Conference, it would be safe to assume that the majority of countries that 
                                                          
28 Article 17 of the UNFCCC. 
29 See note 5 above.  
30 C Carpenter, ‘Taking Stock of Durban: Review of Key Outcomes and the Road Ahead’ (2012) 
http://www.undpcc.org/docs/Bali%20Road%20Map/English/UNDP_Taking%20Stock%20of%20Durban.pdf, 
accessed on 25 September 2014, 12.  
31 L Rajamani (d) ‘The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action and the future of the Climate Regime’ 
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negotiated the Durban Platform may however not intend the above to be the case.36 There 
comes the second unprecedented term an ‘agreed outcome with legal force.’ The term was  a 
result of a huddle with the EU and India at its centre and was only created 30 intense hours 
after the scheduled end of the Conference in which India insisted that agreeing to a legally 
binding instrument was a red line that it could not cross since there would be legally binding 
commitments.37 Since the terms ‘protocol’ and ‘another legal instrument’ are interpreted by 
most as referring to legally binding instruments under the UNFCCC, a more ambiguous third 
option was necessary to accommodate India.38 India argued that it could agree to launch just 
a process towards a ‘legal outcome’ which would leave the precise legal form of the 
instrument open for negotiation for some time.39 The difference between the two, if there is 
any, leaves a lot to be desired. 
 
However, this formulation ‘legal outcome’ lacked the clarity and ambition that the EU, the 
Alliance of Small Island States, the Least Developed Countries, many Latin American 
countries, and even India‘s BASIC allies, Brazil and South Africa, were seeking.40 Critically, 
this was not sufficient for the EU to endorse a Kyoto second commitment period therefore 
India agreed in the end to substitute the term ‘legal outcome’ with a marginally less 
ambiguous term ‘agreed outcome with legal force’, which then triggered the acceptance of a 
Kyoto second commitment period by the EU and its allies.41 Bodansky asserts that this 
formulation does not have any precedent in international law.42  This makes it the first time 
such a formulation and such a kind of agreement have been talked of not only in the realm of 
international environmental law but in international law as a whole. This was a new option 
that used language not contained in the convention itself.43 Bodansky argues that ‘legal force’ 
means the same thing as legally-binding.44 The addition of ‘with legal force’ to ‘agreed 
outcome’ which is the BAP language means that the outcome is something more than what 
                                                          
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid at 507. 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 D Bodansky (d) ‘Evaluating Durban’ (2011), available at 
http://www.c2es.org/print/blog/bodanskyd/evaluating-durban, accessed on 20 September 2014. 
43 Carpenter (note 30 above) 12. 
44 Bodansky (d) (note 42 above). 
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Bali contemplated (which included COP decisions). However, the inability to reach an 
agreement on the ‘legally-binding’ aspect thus suggests that at least some parties thought that 
the term ‘legal force’ might mean something less than ‘legally binding’.45 Fuhr and others 
argue that this ‘legal outcome’ (wanted by India) could actually result in a set of COP 
decisions that might just be political statements of intent but not necessarily binding 
commitments under international law for which parties could be held accountable for thus 
confirming Bodansky’s assertions.46 
 
Rajamani however suggests that the term ‘agreed outcome with legal force’ is only 
marginally less ambiguous than the term ‘legal outcome’ but its creative ambiguity leans in a 
different direction.47 She argues that while the ambiguity in the term ‘legal outcome’ does 
create room for COP decisions, the ambiguity in the term ‘agreed outcome with legal force’ 
also creates room for a fresh set of possibilities for legal form.48 Whether this was 
contemplated by India and the EU at the time still remains unclear, but among these is the 
possibility that an ‘agreed outcome with legal force’ could be interpreted as an outcome that 
derives legal force from municipal rather than international law.49 This comes from the 
suggestions of the US proposal for an ‘Implementing Agreement’ allowing for legally 
binding approaches based on targets and actions embodied in municipal law rather than 
international law.50  
 
It is also worth noting, that the phrase ‘under the Convention’ that follows ‘agreed outcome 
with legal force’ could be interpreted to limit this range of possibilities to those that exist in 
the UNFCCC, i.e. protocols, amendments and amendments to annexes.51 As a result, the 
option ‘outcome with legal force’ can therefore be taken to allow the negotiations producing 
an outcome other than the legal instruments mentioned above but still ‘under the 
                                                          
45 Ibid. 
46 L Fuhr et al ‘COP 17 in Durban: A largely Empty Package’ 2011 available at 
http://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/assets/boell.de/images/download_de/oekologie/Boell_Analysis_COP_17_
Durban_final.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2014, IV. 




51 Ibid; Carpenter (note 30 above) 12. These are allowed by Art 15, 16, 17 of the UNFCCC. 
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Convention’.52 This could mean something not stronger than the Bali’s ‘agreed outcome’ but 
something closer to a legal instrument which is weaker but definitely not a set of non-binding 
decisions.53 However, the term ‘under the Convention’ has another dimension to it as well 
which could be read as qualifying the legal nature of the instruments referred to.54 This could 
furthermore be read as qualifying the content of the legal instrument that eventually emerges 
as well.55 
 
In summation therefore, the Durban Conference provided a measure of direction on the legal 
form of the agreement to be adopted in 2015 as well as to a lesser extend the legal form of 
the action or commitments within it.56 It however still remains unknown what the contents of 
the agreement will be.57 Durban seems to have left a lot more questions than answers 
however with regards to the form the new climate change agreement would take. 
 
5.2.2.5 Doha 2012  
 
In Durban as mentioned before in this study, the negotiating parties decided to develop ‘a 
Protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the 
Convention applicable to all parties’ with the objective to complete its work as early as 
possible but no later than 2015, so it could be implemented in 2020.58 These negotiations 
have been entrusted to the recently-established Ad hoc Working Group on Enhanced Action 
under the Durban Platform (ADP).59 In Doha, the ADP met and discussed this mandate to 
decide on the legal form of a post 2020 agreement. Only a few things were said or decided 
that point to the ‘form’ of the new agreement. Firstly, there was a discussion on the new 
agreement where divergent views prevailed during many of these exchanges, particularly on 
how the mandate will be “applicable to all.” Discussions also focused on whether the 
                                                          
52 Ibid Carpenter. 
53 A Macey ‘The Road to Durban & beyond-The progress of Int Change Negotiation’ (2012) 8(2) Policy 
Quarterly, 27. 
54 Ibid; Carpenter (note 30 above) 52. 
55 Ibid.  
56 L Fuhr et al (note 46 above) 13. 
57 Ibid. 
58 See note 27 above. 
59 Ibid. 
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Convention’s principles, including the principles of equity and common but differentiated 
responsibilities, would be at the core of the new regime.60 Basically a direct decision or 
pointer to the developments in Durban was not seen. Instead, an agreement on a ‘firm 
timetable to adopt a universal climate agreement by 2015’ and a path to raise necessary 
ambition in the context of discussions on raising ambition for the pre-2020 period under the 
ADP’s work stream 2 was reached.61 This basically means that the discussion on form was 
postponed to a later date. Doha thus strengthened the need to resolve the climate problem and 
set out a timetable to adopt a universal climate agreement by 2015, which will come into 
effect in 2020.62 The important question of form was however not addressed. The only legal 
decision taken was the extension of the Kyoto Protocol which was extended to a second 
commitment period from January 2013 to December 2020.63 
 
5.2.2.6 Warsaw 2013 
At Warsaw, negotiations to clarify the legal form of the post 2020 period climate change 
agreement as the predecessor Conference also left this fundamental issue unresolved.64 The 
only decision made in Warsaw with regards to the new agreement was a decision to agree on 
timeframe for the new agreement due in COP21 in Paris in 2015 and ways to enhance 
ambition levels in pre2020 mitigation pledges.65 This however does not shed light on the 
question of what form the new agreement would take thus the Durban Platform proposals still 
remained unexplained. This therefore makes the question on the form of the 2015 climate 
change agreement to remain stagnant at the 2011 options which however have yet to be 
explained and selected. 
 
                                                          
60 IISD (d) ‘Summary of the Doha Climate Change Conference: 26 November-8 December 2012’ (2012) 
12(567) Earth Negotiations Bulletin available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12567e.pdf, accessed 25 
August 2014, 28. 
61 Ibid. 
62 See https://unfccc.int/key_steps/doha_climate_gateway/items/7389.php accessed on 8 may 2014. 
63 Decision FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9. 
64 IISD (e) ‘Summary of the Warsaw Climate Change Conference: 11-23 November 2013’ (2013) 12(594) Earth   
Negotiations Bulletin available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12594e.pdf, accessed on 1 October 2014, 
29.  
65 N Fujirawa ‘Navigating the road from Warsaw towards a Climate Change agreement in 2015’ 2013 CEPS 
available at http://www.ceps.eu/book/navigating-road-warsaw-towards-climate-agreement-2015, accessed on 2 
October 2014, 1. 
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5.3 THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE: THE BOTTOM UP OR TOP DOWN 
APPROACH? 
The second fundamental legal question that the climate change negotiations need to address 
is the question of the new agreement’s architecture which relates to the regulatory approach 
for GHG mitigation that the post 2020 regime will adopt. The focus question which remains 
to be addressed is whether the new regime will continue with the Kyoto Protocol’s top-down 
approach or whether there will be a switch to a bottom-up approach or even somewhat adopt 
a hybrid approach which will incorporate the two. This study, before giving an analysis of the 
COP negotiation agreements, will first give an analysis of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol to ascertain what approaches they have used, why these were used and the influence 
these may have on the future of the climate change instrument’s architecture.  After doing so, 
it will then analyse the COP decisions and what they point at before trying to draw a 
prognosis into what the new instrument is likely to be shaped, based on the indications from 
these recent COP decisions. 
5.3.1 The definition of concepts: Top-Down versus Bottom-Up approach 
The top-down approach is defined in the field of international law as an approach whereby 
internationally-defined commitments are adopted so as to drive national actions.66 This means 
that as a result of particular policies and measures, what parties must undertake is defined at 
an international level.67 On the other hand, the bottom-up approach is one in which 
participating states are free and are allowed to unilaterally define their own national climate 
change measures, targets and approaches.68 
One may ask why the issue of choosing between the two becomes such a fundamental issue. 
The central question (as this thesis has mentioned before) currently in the climate change 
regime is how to secure the most rapid, deepest global emission reductions over a sustained 
period of time spanning many decades in the new instrument. Typically, the top down and the 
bottom up approaches have been described best in the words of Hare and others in the 
following paragraph: 
                                                          
66 Bodansky (c) (note 25 above) at 4. 
67 D Bodansky (e) ‘A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N. Climate Change Regime’ (March 
1, 2011) 2 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1773865 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1773865, accessed 
on 1 July 2014.   
68 Bodansky (c) (note 25 above) at 4. 
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At one extreme, a strong top-down approach would involve strong global coordination, be 
centred around the pursuit of a common objective, and be implemented through targets and 
timetables based on commonly agreed rules, which would be progressively broadened and 
strengthened over time and would be legally binding, with a strong measuring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) system and compliance mechanism. At the other extreme, a weak bottom-
up approach would have little or no global coordination of efforts, with coordination confined 
to, perhaps, a small group of countries. Countries’ emission actions would be based on 
unilateral pledges, rather than on the outcome of multilateral negotiations with set levels of 
ambition, for which accountability would be assessed domestically and not at the international 
level (i.e. no international compliance). There would be little or weak common MRV and 
accounting rules.69 
 
Basically the advantages and disadvantages of each system can also be observed in this 
paragraph. It is therefore with due care and diligence that the negotiators choose wisely 
between the two or even devise a way to fuse the two as long as positive results come out 
of the process.70  
 
5.3.2 The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
For one to understand the current state of negotiations, it is of paramount importance to first 
trace the roots of the two approaches from firstly the mother Convention, the UNFCCC and 
then to the only legally binding instrument which contains GHG commitments under the 
Convention, namely the Kyoto Protocol. Such a reflection clarifies how these influence  
member countries’ negotiating positions as well as determines the shift in the climate change 
architecture (if there has been any) as well as what is affecting change or lack of change.  
The UNFCCC incorporated aspects of both approaches.71 Article 4.1 reflects a bottom 
approach as it requires all parties to develop and report national policies and measures to 
combat climate change.72 This has been referred to at the ‘pledge and review’ process under 
the negotiations. On the other hand, Article 4.2 reflects a top-down approach whereby it sets 
forth a non-binding aim for developed countries to return their emissions to 1990 levels by 
                                                          
69 W Hare at al ‘The architecture of the global climate regime: A top down perspective’ (2011) 6 Climate Policy 
601. 
70 For full comparison of the two, see Bodansky (e) (note 67 above) 14-17. 
71 Ibid at 6. 
72 Ibid. 
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the year 2000.73 In essence therefore, Bodansky argues that the history of the climate change 
regime has ever since consisted of variations of these two approaches.74   
The Kyoto Protocol however is described by Bodansky as the one that marked the 
ascendency of the targets-and-timetables approach where emissions targets were set for 
developed countries.75 As a result of this, it reflects a strong top-down approach as it sets 
such targets to run for a period of five years from 2008-201276 and finally for a second 
commitment period running from 2012-2020.77 The Kyoto Protocol however gives freedom 
to member parties in how they implement their commitments and also in deciding how to 
reduce emissions.78 It introduces ‘flexible mechanisms’ allowing states to reduce emissions 
wherever emissions are cheapest. The Protocol however does not award the same flexibility 
in defining form and nature of their commitments.79 This shows its strong top-down aspect.  
In short therefore, despite the Kyoto Protocol being a good example of a strong top-down 
kind of architecture in the climate regime, it also has some elements of flexibility in it. One 
could argue that this reflects some components of a bottom-up approach though this 
argument may not be strongly substantiated. Generally, the Protocol is a good example of a 
top down approach though it cannot be said to represent the approach in its extremities as 
stated above.80   
5.3.3 The COPs and what their decisions suggest: An analysis 
5.3.3.1 Copenhagen 2009 
 The Copenhagen Climate Conference, held in December 2009, was originally intended as 
the end point of the parallel negotiating tracks launched under the BAP. Many expected it to 
produce a new legal agreement (or agreements) addressing the post-2012 period and this 
view was reflected in the unofficial slogan of the conference ‘Seal the deal’.81 The 
                                                          
73 Ibid. 
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75 Ibid at 7.  
76 Art 3 Kyoto Protocol. 
77 Decision FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9). 
78 Bodansky (e) (note 67 above) 7-8. 
79 Ibid at 8. 
80 Hare et al (note 69 above) 601.  
81 Bodansky (note 67 above) 10. 
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Copenhagen Accord, a non–legally binding but political decision of the Copenhagen 
Conference, may be perceived as leaning towards a bottom-up non-prescriptive architecture 
in that it allows states to self-elect their targets and actions and inscribe them in the 
Appendices.82 According to the Accord, Annex I parties were to define their own target 
levels, base year and accounting rules to submit their targets in a defined format for 
compilation by the UNFCCC Secretariat.83 Furthermore, Annex I countries agreed to 
“commit to implement” their GHG targets, individually or jointly subject to international 
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV).84 As with developed country emissions 
targets, Copenhagen also established a bottom-up process by which developing countries 
would submit their mitigation actions in a defined format, for compilation by the UNFCCC 
secretariat (including both autonomous and supported mitigation actions).85 However with 
regards to addressing the architecture question, the fact that the Accord contained appendices 
listing targets and actions by countries may not necessarily be a solid pointer that 
predetermines the architecture of the future climate regime.86 Furthermore, the Accord in 
itself faced a lot of opposition and ended up not adopted as a COP decision but merely taken 
note, of thus giving it no official status in the UNFCCC process and hence no much 
conclusion can be drawn from it. 
5.3.3.2 Cancun 2010 
The Cancun Agreements of 2010 brought various elements of the Copenhagen Accord into 
the UNFCCC process (as discussed in the previous chapter). As the agreements were adopted 
as a COP decision, they stand with an amount of authority within the UNFCCC process.87As 
a result, it can be said that the Cancun Agreements legitimised the bottom up approach which 
had been launched by the Copenhagen Accord.88 To further strengthen this assertion, 
Rajamani states that the language of commitments previously used which arguably signifies 
that of an obligatory undertaking was replaced by the aspirational language of targets.89  
                                                          
82 Rajamani (a) (note 9 above) 841. 
83 Bodansky (b) (note 16 above) 6. 
84 Para 4 of the Copenhagen Accord.  
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88 Ibid at 14. 
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5.3.3.3 Durban 2011 
According to Rajamani and Carpenter, the Durban Platform just like the Cancun Agreements, 
strengthened the climate regime with decisions to implement the 2009 Copenhagen Accord 
and the 2010 Cancun Agreements.90 This means that, under Copenhagen, Cancun and 
Durban, all industrialised countries and a list of 49 developing countries have made their own 
pledges covering the period from 2012-2020 thus reflecting a bottom-up approach.91 
However, some academics differ from this view.  Moncel states that:  
In some ways, the Durban conference defied the odds with a decision that signals a move 
towards a “top-down” climate regime after many had assumed that the regime would take a 
“bottom-up” form in the aftermath of the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements.92  
Rajamani goes on to say that there are a number of provisions in the Durban Platform calling 
for better and more ambitious targets93 and this can be argued to support Morcel’s argument. 
Morcel further argues however that a number of elements in the Durban outcome suggest a 
possible shift towards a more inclusive multilateral legal framework.94 While all this may 
suggest a blended approach of both the top-down and bottom-up approaches rather than a one 
sided approach, it does not really shed clear light to the understanding of the decision of the 
architecture of the future climate change regime.95 The primary reason why these do not 
actually shed light is that they are a result of academic analysis rather than actual 
negotiations’ direct decisions where substance is agreed. 
5.3.3.4 Doha 2012 
Just like most of its predecessors after Bali’s declaration, the Doha Conference followed the 
devolution from a top-down approach to a bottom-up approach by “urging” developed 
country parties in Doha to increase the ambition of their emission reduction targets to levels 
recommended by science and it also established a work programme to continue clarification 
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92 R Moncel ‘Unconstructive ambiguity in the Durban Climate Deal of COP17/CMP7’ (2012) 2(12) Sustainable 
Development & Policy, 7. 
93 Rajamani (d) (note 31 above) 515. 
94 Ibid.  
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of these pledges.96 Apart from that, nothing else suggests a direct decision on what turn the 
architecture of the new climate change regime will or may take.  
5.3.3.5 Warsaw 2013 
The Warsaw Conference was a significant meeting because it marked two years before the 
2015 deadline and two years since the launching of the Durban Platform to produce the new 
climate change agreement. Observations made with regards to the architecture seem to be 
pointing out that the 2015 agreement is developing into a purely bottom-up approach.97 This 
has followed the general precedent of the previous three conferences since Copenhagen 
where countries agreed to determine their own nature and extent of contributions.98 Warsaw 
strengthened the bottom-up approach by making a decision that invited all parties to ‘initiate 
or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally-determined contributions’ and 
to communicate them well in advance of COP 21 in Paris, by the 1st quarter of 2015 ‘in a 
manner that facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of the intended 
contributions’.99 However, how the bottom-up approach will be incorporated into the new 
instrument is still unclear as there are questions that still have to be answered.100 Such 
questions include whether these party individually determined emission targets are substantial 
enough to stay within the recommended 2 degrees Celsius target or whether there may arise a 
need for a top-down commitments and pledge and review mechanism that will assess 
countries’ contributions and their effectiveness.  
 
5.4 THE DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 
The principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) is undoubtedly a key 
principle in the climate change regime.101 It is not only a key principle of the regime but it 
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has actually proven to be a central aspect of the regime and has shaped the evolution of the 
climate change regime as a whole as well and affected the way agreements are made within 
the climate change negotiations 20 years after the adoption of the UNFCCC.102 The principle 
has played a major role in the post-2012 climate change agreement negotiations.103This part 
of the research highlights how the climate negotiations have been shaped by the principle of 
CBDR, as well as how the principle itself has evolved and how it has continued to be been 
interpreted under the UNFCCC with a special reference from Copenhagen up to Warsaw. 
This will be done after an analysis as to how the principle has been interpreted from the 
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Bali Action Plan so as to set the basis for analysis. 
Finally, an insight into what the future interpretation of the principle within the new climate 
change regime will be or will look at shall be attempted based on the COP negotiations and 
their decisions. 
5.4.1 The definition 
There is no universally accepted definition of the principle of CBDR. However, it is 
reasonably described and understood as a two folded principle and these are described as 
follows: 
First, all states have a common responsibility for the protection of the environment. Second, 
this common responsibility needs to take into account different circumstances, resources and 
capabilities to carry it out and different contributions to the particular environmental problem. It 
requires all states to participate in the international response to the problem and take measures 
to address it. However, obligations imposed on different states have to be varied depending on 
the level of economic development, circumstances and capabilities.104 
Basically, the principle has been described as a possible articulation of the concept of 
“equity”105 or as having been developed from the application of the principle of equity within 
the international law realm and the realisation that the special needs of developing states need 
to be taken into account.106 This principle has constantly featured and has been accepted in a 
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number of treaties and soft law instruments. It has also been found in important documents 
such as the Stockholm Declaration in Principle 23 in 1972 and the Principle 7 of the Rio 
Declaration 20 years later when the climate change regime was initiated in Rio.107  
Within the climate change regime and negotiation framework, despite garnering different 
interpretations, the principle has been understood as defined above. It is stated that the 
common responsibility that the countries have is differentiated because not every country has 
contributed to the same extent to environmental degradation and certainly not everyone has 
the amount of same resources to devote in addressing of environmental problems.108 
Consequently, a higher standard of conduct has been set for the developed countries on the 
basis that they contributed most to the causing of climate change and that they have better 
resources and capacity to respond to this problem as compared to their developing countries 
counterparts.109 The reason why the differential treatment and the CBDR is the third 
fundamental legal question is that it is of paramount important to have a ‘common 
understanding of the principle of CBDRC is essential for the burden sharing and 
responsibilities under a future climate agreement’.110 
 
5.4.2 The legal status of the principle in international law 
As mentioned above, the principle has been accepted in treaties and ‘soft law ‘instruments.111 
Brunnee and Streck argue that the principle has however not acquired the status of customary 
international law but it has its legal significance determined in the context of every regime 
within which it is incorporated into.112 Within the climate change regime, it has no doubt 
served to frame the on-going negotiations, the treaty interpretation and even the possible 
future agreements.113 Since the principle has its origins in the Rio Declaration which guides 
not only the UNFCCC but a number of other multilateral environmental agreements launched 
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at Rio, it can therefore be implied that the principle CBDR is soft law.114 It therefore has legal 
status and significance in international environmental law.                             
5.4.3 The UNFCCC 
As stated above, the CBDR is a key principle in the climate change regime115 because traces 
of it are visible in both the climate change instruments. The principle is included in the 
UNFCCC as follows: 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations 
of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should 
take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.116 
 
From this provision, the UNFCCC proclamation of the CBDR adds the words ‘respective 
capabilities’ to the normal CBDR principle. This has led to arguments by authors such as 
Deleuil to put forward the reasoning that the fact that developed countries were strongly 
against the idea of making reference to their historical emissions resulted in the parties 
making that addition.117 Brunnee and Streck also acknowledge this addition. They note 
further the emphasis placed especially on the ‘capabilities’ part rather than the 
‘responsibilities’ aspect,118 which strengthens Deleuil’s assertion. The CBDR under the 
UNFCCC also contains commitments by all parties119 which however instead of ending on 
‘respective capabilities’ (as done under Article 3.1) further adds ‘and their specific national 
and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances’ thus becomes the 
CBDRRC.120 This in actual fact marks the first departure from the traditional principle of 
CBDR which is made under the Convention. As a result, it can be understood that 
differentiation (the CBRD Principle) as defined under the UNFCCC (the CBDRRC based) 
suggests that there are two understandings and basis of differentiation. The first one is the 
understanding based on the capacity of the member states and the second one is that which 
                                                          
114 Winkler & Rajamani (note 101 above) 103. 
115 See note above. 
116 Article 3 of the UNFCCC. 
117Deleuil (note 103 above) 272.     
118 Brunnee & Streck (note 101 above) 592-593. 
119 Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC. 
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draws straight form the Rio Principle 7 (CBDR) which has as its basis the historical 
contribution to environmental harm.121  As a result, there is a distinction between the original 
version of the CBDR and the one adopted in the UNFCCC. The one found the Convention 
reads ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ and as such, this 
thesis will differentiate the original principle as the CBDR and refer to the UNFCCC 
version122 as the CBDRRC.123 
 
Also to show the incorporation of the principle under the Convention, commitments are 
placed on the Annex I member parties (the developed countries) to provide developing 
countries with financial assistance,124 assisting developing countries with adaptation costs125 
and to transfer technology.126 Article 4.7 has however been dubbed the “summarised version” 
of the balanced responsibilities under the Convention and this article has been invoked on a 
frequent basis by the developing countries’ negotiators. It reads: 
 
The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments 
under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country 
Parties of their commitments under the Convention…127 
 
Furthermore, the Convention has a number of other provisions for the commitments of 
different states.128 The above provisions are the provisions which are in the UNFCCC and 
advance and support the incorporation of the ‘principle of common but differentiated 





                                                          
121 Winkler & Rajamani (note 101 above) 104.  
122 UNFCCC Art 3. 
123 Deleuil (n101) at 274 and Winkler & Rajamani (note 101 above) 104.  
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126 Article 4.5 UNFCCC. 
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5.4.4 The Kyoto Protocol  
 
The Kyoto Protocol’s Preamble clearly states that ‘the Parties to this Protocol, being guided 
by Article 3 of the Convention’.130 This is in direct relation to the CBDRRC principle that is 
found in the Convention in which the Protocol shows that it will follow the principles as 
outlined and defined in the Convention.131 Article 10 of the Protocol further reaffirms and 
builds upon Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC by stating that: 
 
All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their 
specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, without 
introducing any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I, but reaffirming existing 
commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention, and continuing to advance the 
implementation of these commitments in order to achieve sustainable development, taking into 
account Article 4, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, of the Convention, shall…132 
 
The Protocol focuses mainly on the emissions reduction targets of member parties. In doing 
so, it imposes legally binding GHG emission targets on developed member parties (Annex I) 
and the rationale behind such a move was to allow developed country members to exercise 
leadership by making early reductions.133 Basically, the way the Protocol adopted the 
CBDRRC was that provisions were drawn which created a line between the developed and 
developing country member parties. The result was that, with regards to the central 
obligations of the Protocol, developed country members were given targets and timetables for 
GHG mitigation while developing country members were not given any mandatory 
commitments under the first commitment period (2008-2012).134 Furthermore, this 
interpretation is reflected in a number of provisions that appeal to the developed country 
member states to assist the developing member states in a number of ways including finance, 
technology and helping them to achieve their commitments. This interpretation has however 
                                                          
130 Preamble of the Kyoto Protocol.  
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132 Art 10 Kyoto Protocol.  
133 JC Dernbach ‘Achieving Early and Substantial Greenhouse Gas Reductions under a Post-Kyoto Agreement’ 
(2008) 20 Georgetown Int'l Law Review 592. 
134 L Rajamani (e) ‘Differentiation in the Emerging Climate Change Regime’ 2011 (14)151 Theoretical 
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been dubbed controversial and proven to be contentious. It was opposed by a number of 
members resulting in countries such as the US’ refusal to ratify the Protocol in 2001.135 
 
The Protocol’s model of the CBDRRC has been contentious and created some controversy. It 
has therefore played a central role in the negotiation of a future and new post 2012 climate 
change global agreement as shall be discussed below. The interpretation and trajectory that 
the negotiations have taken since the conference in Bali is of particular interest as shall be 
shown in the following section. 
 
5.4.5 The COP interpretation then and now 
The thesis will now focus on the recent COP/CMP meetings starting from Copenhagen in 
2009 to Warsaw in 2013. It is however of paramount importance for this research to first 
mention what happened in Bali in 2007 as one cannot ignore the important developments of 
this conference that are reflected even in today’s negotiation patterns. The Bali Action Plan 
(BAP) launched a process to reach an ‘agreed outcome’ and made a significant departure 
from the Kyoto Protocol premises that gave only developed countries/Annex I member states 
obligatory commitments by requiring developing country members to take measurable, 
reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation actions.136 It has been argued that 
the BAP may have been carefully drafted to erode and do away with differentiation, and also 
to uplift symmetry which is also termed “parallelism” which exists between developed and 
developing member states.137 It permits the developed and developing countries such as the 
USA and India to be subject to “nationally appropriate mitigation actions” in the future 
climate change regime and these actions will be voluntary and nationally tailored, 
measurable, reportable and verifiable thus placing them in the same bracket as opposed to the 
UNFCCC and mostly the Kyoto Protocol’s interpretation.138 Two years before the 
Copenhagen Conference were thus spent by the developed countries trying to achieve 
parallelism between developed and large developing country actions.139 On the other hand, 
the developing countries hold the argument that any attempt to move away from the 
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UNFCCC and Protocol’s framework and interpretation of differentiation with regards to 
mitigation obligations, amounts to renegotiating and redrafting of the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol140 which they will not take lightly. It is therefore because of this difference in 
views that it comes not as a surprise that the differentiation debate formed and is still a 
central aspect the anticipated 2015 climate change agreement as will be discussed below.                        
5.4.5.1 Copenhagen 2009 
As have been mentioned before, Copenhagen was meant to ‘Seal the Deal’ but the 192 
members failed to reach a consensus during the negotiations at the Fifteenth Session of the 
UNFCCC Conference of Parties in Copenhagen (COP15\CMP5).141 One of the central 
reasons why consensus was not reached in Copenhagen was the differentiation controversy, 
especially the lack of agreement on binding commitments for developing countries.142 
The Copenhagen Accord, a non-legal outcome at the COP15\CMP5 to which a number of 
countries associated themselves, does not offer any guidance on the differentiation debate.143 
The Accord however described as a ‘political necessity’, continues to reflect the principle of 
CBDRRC in a very different manner than in the Kyoto Protocol144 or rather it endorses 
differentiation but in a number of ways145 that have been dubbed ‘special’ by some authors. 
Firstly, the Accord obliges Annex I countries to adopt targets whilst non-Annex I countries 
are only to implement mitigation actions.146 The Accord has two appendices, one for 
developed countries’ economy-wide emission ‘targets’, which will be subject to international 
MRV, the other for developing country ‘actions,’ which will be subject to international MRV 
only if a mitigation action receives international support and to national MRV otherwise.147 It 
is of importance to note that for the first time, the major developing countries agreed to 
reflect their national emissions reduction pledges in an international instrument; to report on 
their GHG inventories and their mitigation actions in biennial national communications; and 
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to subject their actions either to MRV (for internationally supported actions) or international 
consultation and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national 
sovereignty is respected (for domestically supported actions).148 This seems like a rather 
modest achievement but its significance is that it represents the first time that these countries 
have accepted any type of internationalization of their national climate change policies.149 
Thus as modest as it seems, it is of paramount significance. This also marks the beginning of 
the breaking of the so called proclaimed ‘firewall’ which was said to exist between developed 
and developing country member parties as there was a significant shift especially by the 
biggest developing country emitters which include China, Brazil, India and South Africa.150  
 
Thirdly, the language used to frame Annex I Parties’ targets is prescriptive language as it 
states that, ‘Annex I Parties commit to…’151 On the other hand, the language used to frame 
non-Annex I mitigation actions is predictive and it reads ‘Non- Annex I Parties…will 
implement…’152 Moreover, non-Annex I mitigation actions are anchored in UNFCCC 
Articles 4 (1), and 4(7), and sustainable development.153 Although the Accord envisages that 
such mitigation actions will be voluntary and on the basis of support only for least developed 
countries and Small Island states, many large developing countries have in their submissions 
emphasized that their submitted actions are undertaken on a voluntary basis154 which would 
and has created problems as discussed later in the thesis. 
 
There are also still however provisions that that the members still take into consideration the 
differences between developed and developing states capabilities especially with regards to 
meeting the GHG emissions reductions. A good example is one that reads ‘developed 
countries shall provide adequate, predictable and sustainable and financial resources, 
technology and capacity building to support the implementation of adaptation action in 
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developing countries’.155 A number of initiatives under the Accord for example the Green 
Climate Fund156 will also support projects in developing countries. This can be argued to still 
advance and be consistent with the CBDRRC the principle.157   
 
Despite the Accord not giving guidelines on the CBDRRC principle, the above analysis on its 
content reflects how different member parties interpret the principle to their favour in 
negotiating. It is also clear that there have been strong attempts in removing the 
differentiation ‘firewall’ that exists between developed and developing member states and 
that the world is moving towards increased ‘parallelism’.158   
 
5.4.5.2 Cancun 2010 
The Cancun Agreements are similar to the Copenhagen Accord in that they also fail to 
actually settle the debate on the nature of differential treatment between developed and 
developing countries in the post 2012 agreement.159 The Cancun Agreements however do 
signal a shift towards greater parallelism between developed and developing countries in a 
number of ways.160 First and foremost, they anchor the Copenhagen Accord into the 
UNFCCC process as they were adopted as COP decisions and since almost all of its content 
is at the heart of the Accord.161 Secondly, they incorporate the Copenhagen Accord approach 
in that mitigation actions/targets are listed and taken note of terms of requirements related to 
mitigation actions/targets and to related MRV.162 What this means is that the Cancun 
Agreements, like the Copenhagen Accord permit self-elected mitigation targets and actions 
by parties. 163 This aspect endorses differentiation however, this differentiation if for all 
parties rather than differentiation for developing countries only.  
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It is of interest furthermore to note the difference in the language used in the two documents. 
The Cancun Agreements, unlike the Copenhagen Accord, make use of identical framing 
language which is predictive language rather than prescriptive for both mitigation actions 
from developing countries and mitigation targets from developed countries.164  On the other 
hand, the Copenhagen Accord made use of prescriptive language for developed countries and 
predictive for developing countries language to frame their commitments and actions 
respectively.165 Therefore, the gradual shift towards parallelism is thus accompanied by a 
shift towards a less prescriptive and more predictive tone in relation to mitigation.166 
  
In addition, Cancun strengthened the Copenhagen position that had deconstructed a link that 
existed between the MRV for financing and the MRV of mitigation by placing them in 
separate paragraphs and the effect of this in interpretation is that financing becomes a 
precondition of actions achieved by non-Annex I parties.167 All of the above show how the 
road to parallelism from Bali has been cleared slowly but surely. Developing countries have 
thus taken several steps forward since Bali, Copenhagen and Cancun by agreeing to both list 
their actions and permitting in whatever form measurement, reporting and verification 
(MRV) of these actions.168  
 
It is therefore summarised that the Cancun Conference followed the trend of doing away with 
the famous ‘firewall’ that had existed between the developed and developing countries in a 
number of aspects despite not actually settling the differential nature of obligations in the 
future and post 2015 agreement. 
 
5.4.5.3 Durban 2011            
The Durban Conference brought in some surprising changes with regards to the principle of 
CBDRRC and the whole equality debate.169  In a very surprising and striking turn, the 
agreement reached in form of the Durban Platform makes no reference to the principle of 
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equality or the principle CBDRRC.170 A number of indicators in Durban Platform show a 
possibility in the relaxing of the CBDRRC principle however. A good illustration of this is 
that the Durban Platform did not repeat the Convention’s language that developed countries 
should “take the lead” in combating climate change.171 It furthermore made no reference to 
developing or developed and also Annex I or non-Annex I parties, which were the categories 
for classification that had dominated under the regime thus far.172 This may to a greater extent 
suggest that the position on differentiation relaxing as pushed by countries such as the US.173 
In support of that, Moncel quotes the US Climate Envoy Todd Stern who expressly stated 
that he was keen not to use any terms which could ‘be read by others to perpetuate […] that 
firewall.’174 It has been argued that the CBDRRC may have been incorporated in the Durban 
Platform implicitly under the statement ‘applicable to all’.175 The lack of an explicit reference 
to the principle should not be taken lightly however as this is a representation of a significant 
shift in how the Durban decision frames climate negotiations.176  
 
 The above arguments have been regarded by some as enough to conclude that the CBDRRC 
is about to be dropped especially after the Durban decision. As mentioned above, the Durban 
Platform embodies decisions that launched a work plan for enhancing mitigation ambition 
with a view to ensuring the highest possible efforts by all parties.177 The recurrence of the 
phrase “applicable to all parties” which has been viewed as supporting the relaxing of the 
CBDRC is to be noted and can be viewed in a strict light.178 It is of importance to note 
however that the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are both ‘applicable to all parties’ but 
they do not contain symmetrical commitments for all parties.179 It can thus be argued that if 
one looks at the applicability of the UNFCCC and the Protocol’s application that universality 
does not categorically amount to uniformity of application and this argument has been put 
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forward by countries such as India and China.180 The two have essentially offered a different 
interpretation of the Durban Platform particularly by relying on the fact that Paragraph 2 of 
the Platform stated that the new agreement would be ‘under the UNFCCC’ thus there is a 
need to respect principles within the UNFCCC including the CBDRRC.181 They even 
strengthened their argument by stating that doing away with CBDRRC in such a way will be 
tantamount to amending the UNFCCC.182 It is of paramount importance to note that these 
two are leading negotiators of the G77 and thus could influence a number of countries, 
especially most developing countries which if taken in total emit more GHGs, thus their 
position too cannot be taken lightly.  
 
Furthermore, despite the so called ‘explicit’ absence of the CBDRRC in the Durban Platform 
that has been identified by many academics and analysts, there are still a number of 
possibilities that suggest the implicit inclusion of the CBDRRC in the Durban decision. 
Firstly this has been as noted above in the interpretation and secondly, the CBDRRC features 
can be noticed mainly in the decisions in its outcomes which incorporate differentiated 
obligations and assistance.183 These also include the reporting obligations; review 
mechanisms which has two different systems including an ‘international assessment of 
emissions’ related to targets for Annex I parties; and an ‘international consultation and 
analysis of biennial reports’ for developing countries.184 Importantly, on mitigation, the 
Durban decision like the Cancun Agreements creates a division between nationally 
appropriate mitigation commitments or actions by developed country Parties and nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions by developing country parties.185 It is noticeable that the word 
‘commitment’ only concerns developed countries. However, some emerging economies have 
agreed to take on commitments under a future agreement. The Durban decisions also 
recognize that some developing country parties are already contributing to global mitigation 
efforts which are in accordance with the principles and the provisions of the Convention.186 
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This therefore shows how the role of emerging economies and developing countries in 
fighting climate change is growing. 
 
It can therefore be concluded that despite the silence treatment being given to the principle 
CBDRRC especially after Durban, developing countries can still use the term ‘under the 
Convention’ found in the Durban decision and this can still offer them an avenue to engage  
the principles found in the Convention which include the CBDRRC in particular. Despite 
such a statement however, the lack of any explicit reference to the principle as well as the 
complete dropping of the ‘Annex I/non-Annex I or developed and developing’ countries 
distinction could be interpreted to represent a significant shift in how the Durban Platform 
decision frames the new round of negotiations, and in most instance the future climate change 
agreement, especially in the matters relating to differentiation. 
 
5.4.5.4 Doha 2012   
After the Durban Conference where the differentiation question had taken a surprising and 
unexpected twist, it would be natural to be curious as to how the debate would be treated in 
the next set of negotiations. At Doha, the member states managed to engage on the 
differentiation issue. They followed up on the Durban decision. Parties in Durban had agreed 
to develop ‘a Protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under 
the Convention applicable to all parties’.187 The interpretation of the part where the 
agreement states it would be ‘applicable to all parties’ became the centre of discussions in 
Doha.188 Parties had divergent views on how the new instrument would be ‘applicable to 
all.’189 The focus was also on what principles would be at the base of the new instrument and 
the CBDRRC was one of the main principles discussed and that would be at the base of such 
an instrument.190 For some parties, the core of the matter lies in how to apply the CBDRRC 
not whether or not to apply the principle.191 This raises a lot of questions on progress as 
parties seem to hold different views which could actually impact on the 2015 deadline, 
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especially in agreement on real substance such as the differentiation issue. As a result, 
nothing much specifically with regards to the CBDRRC and its interpretation materialised 
from the negotiations except that the Doha decision192 contained specific references to the 
‘principles of the Convention’ which are found only in the in preambular recitals.193 At the 
end of the Conference, Doha did not manage to give any meaningful direction on the level of 
differentiation or the interpretation of the CBDRRC principle in the new instrument. Authors 
such as Roberts thus described the outcome as an ‘Alice in Wonderland-like experience’ 




After such a difficult meeting in Doha, Warsaw had modest expectations and the ‘Alice in 
Wonderland’ experience especially with the interpretation of the CBDRRC principle awaited 
negotiators. It is important to note that the Warsaw Conference marked the halfway point 
from the Durban Conference of 2011 that launched negotiations towards a 2015 climate 
agreement and the Paris Conference of 2015 which is the supposed deadline for these 
negotiations.195 Probably to relieve the mounting pressure, the parties in the run-up to 
Warsaw had extensive discussions with the intention of trying to agree on what the Durban-
born phrase ‘applicable to all’ meant.196 They were also trying to find ways to reconcile the 
concept ‘applicable to all’ with the Convention’s principles especially the CBDRRC 
principle.197 Warsaw, in a surprise move then adopted the term ‘contributions’ instead of the 
usual term, ‘commitments.’198 This may be viewed as representing a division in views 
between the developed and developing country member parties.199 Whether this adoption is 
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destroying the ‘firewall’ and unifying developed and developing country member parties 
remains to be seen however.200 Similar to the Doha Decisions, the Warsaw Outcome also 
does not have specific provisions relating to the CBDRRC principle, but also has specific 
references to the principles of the Convention just in its preambular recitals.201 In conclusion 
therefore, Warsaw also did not provide solid direction on the cross-cutting issues of 
differentiation and equity in the new agreement despite it being viewed as a watermark 
Conference which marked the halfway point on the journey to the much anticipated new 
climate change agreement.202 
 
5.5 PROGNOSIS OF THE NEW CLIMATE CHANGE AGREEMENT BASED ON 
THE ANALYSIS OF THE COP/CMP OUTCOMES 
 
After a critical legal examination of the climate change negotiations’ outcomes with regards 
to the fundamental legal issues above, the study now tries to give a possible prognosis of the 
new and awaited post 2020 climate change agreement as hinted by the negotiations’ 
outcomes.  
 
5.5.1 The possible form of the post-2020 agreement 
As observed by this study, the present day climate change regime is made up of the UNFCCC 
which is an international treaty and its Kyoto Protocol which is a legally binding protocol.203 
At the beginning of the Post-Kyoto negotiations, three options were available and these were 
whether: 
 
a) Kyoto Protocol was to be extended through the adoption of a second commitment period, 
with a new round of emission reduction targets for developed country parties?  
b) A new agreement be adopted under the UNFCCC which addresses the emissions of 
countries that either are not parties to the Kyoto Protocol (the United States) or do not have 
Kyoto emissions targets (developing countries)? Or  
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c) Should a single new agreement be adopted that replaces the Kyoto Protocol and is more 
comprehensive in coverage, addressing both developed and developing country 
emissions?204 
 
This was the departure period until Bali agreed to come up with an ‘agreed outcome’ which was to be 
finalised in 2009 at Copenhagen.205 Copenhagen however failed to finalise the issues of the new 
agreement’s form and neither did it define what the ‘agreed outcome’ would be but simply prolonged 
the discussion to Cancun.206 Cancun also failed to make this fundamental decision as it was busy 
rebuilding the trust that had been lost at Copenhagen and thus extended the discussions.207 A 
breakthrough was however made at Durban where the question of legal form was partially answered. 
Firstly, it was made clear that the Protocol would continue being in place until 2020.208 Secondly, the 
Durban Outcome also agreed to: 
 
Launch a process to develop; a Protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with 
legal force under the UNFCCC applicable to all parties, through a subsidiary body under the 
Convention established and known as the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action.209 
 
Of the above three possible options, only a protocol is a traditionally known form of an 
international instrument. The other two still remain to be defined or at least be interpreted 
by the negotiators.210 Unfortunately the two meetings after Durban held in Doha in 2012 
and Warsaw 2013 have not done anything to define the Durban options or settle the form 
of the post 2020 agreement. As a result, the instrument will definitely be a new instrument 
which will be either another legal instrument or an agreed outcome. The interpretation so 
far is still yet to be officially attended to by the negotiators but possibilities on its legal 
nature have been explored by leading scholars as discussed above.  
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5.5.2 The possible architecture of the post 2010 agreement 
The second fundamental legal question that this dissertation examined was the issue of 
whether the new climate change regime will adopt a top-down approach or a bottom-up 
approach as its regulatory approach for GHG emissions reductions. The study observed 
that the UNFCCC is made up of both approaches whereas the Kyoto Protocol contains a 
strong top-down approach as it sets emissions targets were set for developed country 
member parties alone for the period 2008-2020.211 Since the launch of the Bali Action 
Plan’s agreement to come up with an ‘agreed outcome’ in 2009, the question of what 
architecture the new agreement would take became one of the central legal issues. Firstly, 
an attempt to settle this in Copenhagen was made by the Copenhagen Accord which 
allowed states to self-elect their targets and actions and inscribe them in the Appendices 
which were provided in the Accord.212 The Accord however does not have a legal standing 
in the UNFCCC process as it was not adopted but simply ‘taken note of’ thus one cannot 
really settle on it since it failed to garner enough support to get consensus. At Cancun 
however, the parties legitimised the bottom up approach which had been launched by the 
Copenhagen Accord as the Cancun Agreements which were adopted and incorporated 
aspects of the Copenhagen Accord aspects.213 At Durban, a generalised view of the 
outcome reflects a bottom-approach as Durban agreed to implement the 2009 Copenhagen 
Accord and the 2010 Cancun Agreements.214 Despite the scholarly arguments stating that 
Durban may be viewed as a departure of a blended approach, this cannot be settled upon 
from a scholarly analysis with not much backing from the adopted decisions’ 
provisions.215 Furthermore, Doha simply urged developed country parties to increase the 
ambition of their emission reduction targets to levels scientifically recommended.216 This 
highly suggests that it endorsed self-proclaimed pledges as its predecessors thus leaning 
towards a bottom-up approach. Warsaw also strengthened the bottom-up approach by 
making a decision that invited all parties to ‘initiate or intensify domestic preparations for 
their intended nationally-determined contributions’ and to communicate them well in 
                                                          
211 See section 5.3.2 above. 
212 See section 5.4.1 above. 
213 See section 5.4.2 above. 
214 See section 5.4.3 above. 
215 Ibid. 
216 See section 5.4.4 above. 
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advance of COP 21 in Paris, by the 1st quarter of 2015.217 This implies its strengthening of 
self-proclaimed pledges thus certifying the bottom-up approach.   
 
From the above examination of the recent five COP/CMP negotiations, it is strongly 
evident that the Kyoto top-down strong approach is being abandoned for a bottom up self-
proclaimed pledge system. The only problem is that the pledges made so far fall short of 
the scientifically required amount of reductions. The COP may face a dilemma of calling 
for intensified pledges which may not be a pure bottom-up approach but rather a blended 
approach. It however can be concluded that the post 2020 instrument may to a greater 
extent, adopt a bottom-up approach.  
 
5.5.3 Nature of differentiation in the post 2020 agreement    
Finally, the interpretation of the CBDR principle and issues of differentiation in the new 
instrument were examined. The study observed a pattern of development of the principle 
of CBDR right from its incorporation into the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol further made 
a division creating a line between developed and developing country member parties in the 
sense that with regards to the central obligations of the Protocol, developed country 
members were given targets and timetables for GHG mitigation while developing country 
members were not given any mandatory commitments under the first and second 
commitment periods.218 The negotiations towards a new climate change agreement have 
not provided a UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol straightforward interpretation of the nature of 
differentiation. In fact, this aspect has become the most controversial and most contested 
and a central aspect of the negotiations. 
 
In Copenhagen, the Accord produced two appendices, one for developed countries’ 
economy-wide emission ‘targets’, which will be subject to international MRV; the other 
for developing country ‘actions’, which will be subject to international MRV only if a 
mitigation action receives international support and to national MRV.219 Furthermore, the 
Accord uses different language for mitigations. For Annex I targets it uses prescriptive 
language whereas for non-Annex I mitigation actions there is use of predictive language. 
                                                          
217 Decision, CP19, Further Advancing the Durban Platform; Section 5.4.5 above. 
218 See Section 5.5.4 above.  
219 See section 5.6.1 above. 
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All this shows the shift from the old interpretation where Annex I parties only had 
mitigation targets. Non-Annex I also take actions too under the Accord thus differentiation 
is only now in the implementation. The absolute ‘firewall’ seems to have been done away 
with. The little differentiation does not hide the fact that all members now take some kind 
of action in reducing their GHG emissions. One may however argue that it is not wise to 
settle on the Accord’s interpretation since it does not have a legal standing in the 
UNFCCC process. However, the Accord received confirmation from the Cancun 
Agreements s which incorporated the Accord into the UNFCCC process.220 Cancun even 
went further by using the same predictive language for both Annexes to show the 
deconstruction of the firewall that had existed between the developed and developing 
countries in a number of aspects. This does not however really settle the differential nature 
of obligations in the future and post 2020 agreement. 
 
The Durban Platform in a very surprising and striking turn makes no reference to the 
principle of equality or the principle CBDRRC.221 This has been interpreted by some 
scholars as suggesting that differentiation in the UNFCCC process no longer exists. This 
however cannot go unchallenged as the Durban Agreement proposed to negotiate a 
Protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the 
UNFCCC ‘applicable to all’ parties.222 The phrase ‘applicable to all parties’ have been put 
forward to support the end of differentiation. However, the phrase ‘under the Convention’ 
has been argued by leading scholars like Rajamani as a salvation for major developing 
countries as that means they can invoke the principles of the Convention and the 
CBDRRC is of course one of them.223 In fact, they argue that the CBDRRC has been 
tacitly incorporated into the UNFCCC process again in that phrase. This however remains 
subject to further negotiations but one cannot hide from the fact that greater parallelism is 
being pushed for in the UNFCCC process. As a result, Doha’s central focus was on how 
the new instrument was going to be ‘applicable to all.’ Some member parties argued that 
the only question was how to apply the CBDRRC not whether to or not to apply it as they 
said the term ‘under the Convention’ must be interpreted to include the principle.224 Doha 
                                                          
220 See section 5.6.2 above.  
221 See section 5.6.3 above. 
222 Ibid. 
223 See argument in section 5.6.3 above. 
224 See section 5.6.4 above. 
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however in the end failed to give any meaningful direction on the level of differentiation 
or the interpretation of the CBDR principle in the new instrument. In Warsaw, negotiators 
attempted to find ways how to reconcile the concept ‘applicable to all’ with the 
Convention’s principles especially the CBDR principle225 which they however did not 
achieve. In short therefore, the Warsaw negotiations also failed to produce solid results 
relating to the nature of differentiation of obligations in the new instrument.  
 
The study therefore examines the recent climate change negotiations in light of the CBDR 
principle and what they suggest the principle will be interpreted in the post 2020 
agreement. One striking feature is that the traditional division or firewall between 
developing and developed country members has been done away with as all parties are 
expected under the new agreement to take some form of action. The remaining question is 
therefore how their mitigation actions will be differentiated according to their respective 
capabilities as per the Convention. This however also remains to be defined or interpreted. 
An analysis of the recent negotiations however suggests that the new instrument will give 
emissions targets to all members alike, these may differ in burden if the developing parties 
invoke the principles of the Convention. In conclusion, the negotiations have from the 
adoption of the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and into the negotiation of a post 2020 
agreement resulted in the development, evolution and elaboration of the CBRD principle 
and this still happening by each meeting. The negotiations have however not managed 
provide solid direction on the cross-cutting issues of differentiation and equity in the new 
agreement despite the 2015 deadline drawing closer. 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
The chapter gives a legal analysis of the recent five climate change negotiation meetings 
outcomes. It examines how by trying to settle the fundamental questions within the regime 
which include the form and architecture of the future climate regime; the approach likely to 
be adopted by the climate change regime between a bottom up or a top down approach; and 
the interpretation of the nature and extent of differential treatment between developed and 
developing states in such an instrument have actually affected the legal evolution of the 
climate change regime and the actual future climate change regime. The chapter observed 
that on the question of the ‘form’ of the post 2020 agreement, the UNFCCC parties have not 
                                                          
225 See section 5.6.5 above 
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yet reached a settled agreement. They argue as to whether to agree on an agreement that is 
legally binding or not since major developing countries are not willing to take up legally 
binding emissions reductions as yet because they know the legal consequences of such an 
instrument. The chapter on the question of the architecture of the post 2020 agreement 
observed that negotiators again are in contention as to whether to maintain the Kyoto 
Protocol’s top-down approach or to shift towards the bottom-up approach. The latter 
approach however seems to have been gaining momentum since Copenhagen despite the fact 
that the pledges the member parties are offering to make are not enough to achieve the long-
term aspirational goal which is to limit temperature rise to no more than 2 degrees Celsius. As a 
result, member states are still yet to settle this issue although pointers are highlighting a chance of 
shifting to the bottom-up approach. Lastly, on the question of differentiation which seems to be 
the most contested issue, the members are working towards parallelism that is reflected under the 
Protocol. Despite that fact however, it seems like the applicability of the new instrument may 
vary according to different countries as the members are yet to still come up with the working 
definition of ‘applicable to all’ that is housed in the Durban decision. Developed counties seem to 
be favouring a shift to absolute parallelism but major developing countries still want a measure of 
differentiation, possibly in the applicability of the new instrument. In all, the principle CBDR has 
not remained untouched as it has shifted to become CBDRRC in the UNFCCC. It seems it will be 
very visible in the new instrument by just being interpreted differently; this will most probably be 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
“Let us just agree to disagree then”1 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The dissertation exemplifies the significant issues within the climate change regime and its 
solution seeking process under the UNFCCC annual negotiations. Chapter one introduces the 
subject matter, the research questions and objectives. Chapter two defines what climate 
change is, identifies the causes and potential impacts and consequences of global climate 
change. It also identifies the climate problem and discusses potential solutions to the climate 
problem. The thesis takes a position in this chapter and states mitigation of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) as the most preferable solution. Lastly it ascertains the reasons why international law 
and international environmental law in particular has been the chosen route to address this 
complicated problem. Chapter three introduces the international climate change regime. It 
gives the history of institutional development and then discusses and analyses the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol came as an aid to the UNFCCC so as to 
strengthen mitigating of GHG emissions. An examination of the two instruments identified 
gaps within the UNFCCC that were filled by the Kyoto Protocol. A further analysis of the 
two instruments especially the Kyoto Protocol further revealed more shortcomings that still 
need to be addressed by the COP/CMP. An analysis of the Kyoto Protocol’s potential 
influence on the new climate change agreement was lastly discussed. Chapter four gives a 
brief summary of the climate change conferences from COP15 to COP19 with a special focus 
being a discussion on the significant events that transpired during these meetings and the 
main provisions of the outcomes, especially the provisions directly related to mitigation of 
GHG emission. Chapter five which is the core section is a legal analysis of the recent five 
COP/CMP meetings’ outcomes as they try to settle the outstanding fundamental questions in 
developing a new post-2020 climate change agreement. These fundamental legal questions 
include the legal form of the future climate regime, the legal architecture or approach that is 
likely to be adopted by this new agreement between a bottom up or a top down approach in 
regulating GHG emissions and finally the interpretation of the nature and extent of 
                                                          
1 This is an English expression used if two people agree to differ, or agree to disagree, they accept that they have 
different opinions about something and stop trying to change each other's opinion. See 
https://www.englishclub.com/ref/esl/Idioms/Quizzes/Mixed_2/agree_to_differ_agree_to_disagree_139.htm, 
accessed on 10 November 2014.  
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differential treatment of commitments between developed and developing states in such an 
instrument. An analysis of the possible routes the negotiations are directing towards agreeing 
on the new instrument as hinted by the decisions was done, and a prognosis of what the long 
awaited new legally binding instrument may look like was attempted. This chapter (chapter 
six) will summarise the findings on all the issues raised and discussed.  
 
 The central research question this dissertation intended to answer was “to what extent has the 
annual climate change negotiations contributed to the legal evolution and shaping of the 
future climate change regime or agreement”? This thesis worked through the central research 
question by posing a number of sub-questions in its chapters. To this effect, the findings of 
this research have been divided into four sections and the division flows from the structural 
discussion of the research question and its sub-questions as follows: 
 
6.2 Summary of findings   
 6.2.1 Urgent need to address global climate change 
In response to the first sub-question that was raised in this thesis, Chapter 2 concludes that 
there is urgent need to act primarily in mitigating of GHGs so as to avoid or delay maximum 
consequences of global climate change.2 Despite the uncertainties that exist scientifically on 
the extent of damage and when the damage will exactly transpire, ample and sound scientific 
evidence and consensus that supports the need to act now strongly exists.3 Climate change 
consequences such as increase in temperatures, an increase in precipitation and a serious 
decrease or an unprecedented increase in sea level rise will result if timeous and adequate 
action is not taken and these will negatively impact billions of people and mostly from 
developing nations.4 Finally, this Chapter concluded that legal instruments are favored as a 
way to formulate a solution because they provide solid principles that have the ability to 
compel countries to act responsibly as well as holding the same countries responsible for their 
actions.5 They also provide assurance and insurance that the states involved will do their best 
in meeting their commitments. 
 
                                                          
2 See Chapter 2 section 2.2.1.  
3 See Section 2.2.7. 
4 See section 2.2.4. 
5 See section 2.3.  
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6.2.2 Inadequate and non-effective current international climate change regime on 
mitigation of GHGs 
 
In answering the second question, this thesis concludes that despite being in existence for a 
number of years, the current international climate change regime on the central aspect of 
GHG mitigation is inadequate and non-effective in a number of ways as indicated below: 
 
(i) The first instrument that this thesis introduced was the UNFCCC which has as its 
ultimate objective to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations.6 Being the first 
instrument, one cannot expect it to be a complete silver bullet to the problem at 
hand. The thesis observed that the Convention despite creating a positive first step 
in bringing over 196 nations to the table to discuss a complex issue as climate 
change still falls short of its own objective as it creates vague commitments 
regarding stabilisation of GHGs and also has no specific commitments at on 
reduction of GHGs.7 That became its main weakness. 
 
(ii) The second instrument that the thesis discussed is the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC which claims to uphold the Convention’s objective.8 In trying to uphold 
the Convention’s objective, the Protocol was created to fill the gap that the 
Convention had on GHG mitigation commitments.9 The Protocol then put a 
burden on the developed or Annex I member parties to cut back their emissions of 
GHGs by a total of 5% below the 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012 and this 
was extended to 2020.10 Despite its attempt to cover the gap left by the UNFCCC, 
the Protocol’s major flaw as observed by this thesis was imposing quantified 
emissions only to developed member parties which only covered about two thirds 
of all GHG emissions which has become less than this today as other countries left 
the Protocol.11 The inadequate GHG emissions were not the only observed flows 
of the Protocol as there were a number of weaknesses which include gaps in terms 
                                                          
6 See Chapter 3 section 3.3.1. 
7 3.3.1.4. 
8 See Chapter 3 section 3.4.1. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See section 3.4.3. 
11 See section 3.5.1. 
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of how the flexible mechanisms were be implemented and also inadequate 
provisions on implementation and enforcement of its mechanisms.12 To cover its 
flaws, the COP/CMP meetings since 2005 started working on developing a new 
instrument which would be effective in a way that it would cover an ample 
amount of emissions.  Despite its flows however, the protocol thesis observed that 
it was probably a needed small step to the big journey which as it became 
significant and this has been proven by the way its structure has been the centre of 
the COP/CMP negotiations and a possible build up for a new climate change 
agreement.13 
 
The thesis concluded that the current climate change regime was a step in the right direction 
at the time of adoption. However, today the climate change regime is highly inadequate 
especially on GHG emissions reductions commitments and also non-effective 
environmentally as the covered GHG emissions cannot help in staying below the required 2 
degrees Celsius. This therefore calls for the need of a new agreement which the parties agree 
with hence the annual negotiations happen to cater for this major flow in the regime. 
 
6.2.3 A general lack of meaningful mitigation-effective decisions on the recent 
international climate change negotiation decisions 
 
Given the number of issues the climate change conferences deal with, this thesis was limited 
to GHG mitigation based negotiations and decisions. As in Chapter 2 this thesis identified 
mitigation as the best and cheaper option to prevent climate change. The thesis focused on the 
recent meetings which include the period 2009-2013 in Chapter 4. In response to the second 
sub question, the thesis confirms that the recent annual climate change negotiation meetings 
despite the sense of urgency to act and produce meaningful and effective GHG mitigation 
related decisions. This means that they are short of the Convention’s supposed objective if 
they are strictly viewed. 
 
In coming to this conclusion, this thesis gave a brief outline of events of the recent five 
climate change conferences, their outcomes/decisions and finally an analysis of these 
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
13 See Section 3.6. 
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meetings. Firstly, the thesis observed that in Copenhagen in 2009, the result was a non-
legally binding agreement; the Copenhagen Accord which failed to garner the support of all 
members available thus there was no consensus on adopting it.14 Despite the Accord’s 
acknowledgement of the need to take serious cuts in GHG emissions, it failed to either 
quantify the cuts needed to reach the 2 degrees Celsius goal or indicate how the burden would 
be shared between states.15 The main weaknesses of the Accord was that it is not legally 
binding and the developed countries that decided to take commitments under the Accord are 
not legally bound and further, countries pledge what they can make on their own and if all the 
pledges made are taken into account, they are too weak to stay under the required 2 degrees 
Celsius target.16 In 2010 at Cancun, nothing much materialised except for formalising and 
adoption of what had been agreed at in Copenhagen. Cancun like Copenhagen also 
acknowledged the need for deep cuts in GHG emissions but still did not clarify on the issue 
of how and in what time frames this goal was to be achieved.17 In 2011 in Durban, a decision 
to continue with the Kyoto Protocol was made18 and this implies that the GHG emissions 
reduction targets of 2005 are now in effect up to 2020, and even less since a number of 
countries withdrew from the Protocol’s second commitment period which leaves the Protocol 
even much weaker than before. In 2012 at Doha apart from confirming that the Protocol’s 
second commitment period would last to 2020 the negotiators simply urged members to 
adopt more ambitious emission reduction targets.19 By Doha, about 85 countries including 
developed and developing countries had signed up and made their pledges to reduce GHG 
emissions since the Copenhagen Agreement.20 This thesis however observed that these 
pledges are unclear and have been made conditionally and were also established to be too low 
to achieve the scientifically recommended below 2 degrees Celsius rise.21 Finally in 2013 at 
Warsaw, a number of decisions with regards to mitigation of GHG emissions were reached. 
First, the decision with a timeframe was proposed and agreed for parties to communicate 
                                                          
14 See Chapter 4 section 4.4.8.  
15 See section 4.4.7. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See section 4.5.4. 
18 See section 4.6.4.  
19 See section 4.7.4 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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their ‘intended nationally-determined contributions’ by March 2015.22 In addition, the 
REDD+ mechanism decision which seeks to keep the world's remaining forests standing and 
this reduces emissions from deforestation and degradation.23 These decisions however were 
observed to be inadequate just like their predecessors. 
 
All in all, the thesis came to a stern conclusion that despite the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
member parties meeting annually ever since the coming of the Kyoto Protocol into action so 
as to strengthen the GHG emissions targets, the recent five decisions and pledges made by 
individual countries under these outcomes are not enough in putting the world on the path to 
avoid a 2 degrees Celsius temperature increase in this century.  
 
6.2.4 Vague, imprecise and uncertainty in decisions intended to settle the fundamental 
legal cleavages needed to agree on the new climate change agreement 
 
Chapter 5 discussed the central  question of this dissertation  and in trying to respond to the 
main research question, the dissertation identified and looked at three fundamental legal 
questions which the climate change meetings have been trying to answer to ever since Bali in 
2007. These will now be summarised in turn.   
 
Firstly, on the question of the form of the post 2020 agreement, the thesis observed that this 
fundamental question has not been settled as yet and that the recent five meetings have failed 
to agree on the exact form of the post 2020 agreement, for example whether the agreement 
should be legally binding or not. The only pointer that exists so far has been provided by the 
Durban outcome which made a decision to negotiate ‘a protocol, another legal instrument or 
an agreed outcome with legal force’. However, the options available under the Durban 
outcomes are unprecedented in international law.24 The protocol option was removed in 
favour of the other two which still remain to be defined or at least be interpreted by the 
negotiators.25 Unfortunately the two meetings after Durban held in Doha in 2012 and Warsaw 
2013 have not done anything to shed light on the Durban options or settle the question of 
                                                          
22 See section 4.8.3. 
23 Ibid. 
24 D Bodansky (d) ‘Evaluating Durban’ (2011) Available at http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/12/evaluating-
durban/, accessed on 20 September 2014.  
25 For possible interpretation of the options, see discussion on chapter 5 section 5.2.2.4. 
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form of the post 2020 agreement. It seems like only time will tell whether the awaited 
agreement will be legally binding or not as the two options have attracted different 
interpretations and definitions as observed by this dissertation.26 
 
Secondly, on the question of the architecture of the new instrument as in which approach 
between the top-down approach or the bottom-up approach as its regulatory approach for 
GHG emissions reductions will adopt, the study observed that the decisions suggest that the 
new instrument will most likely adopt the weak bottom-up approach. The decisions showed 
strong evidence of an evolution of abandoning the Kyoto top-down strong approach and 
leaning more towards the self-proclaimed pledge and review system.27 The only remaining 
challenge however is that the pledges made so far fall short of the scientifically required 
amount of reductions thus the COP may face a dilemma as to how it can make a calling for 
intensified pledges. The main question that now remains is how to make sure that pledges 
made are strong enough so as to limit the global climate change to 2 degrees Celsius. 
 
Finally, the quest to settle the differentiation issue under the principle CBDR also still 
remains unsolved. An analysis of the recent negotiations from Copenhagen however 
shows a trend of moving away from the traditional differentiation and drawing closer to 
parallelism which suggests that the new instrument will have emissions reductions 
provisions for both developed and developing member states alike.28 The degree of this 
differentiation is however yet to be defined. The dissertation’s analysis of the negotiations 
also suggest that the new instrument will give emissions targets to all members alike but 
these may differ in burden if the developing parties invoke the principles of the 
Convention as they continue to do. Conclusively, the negotiations have from the adoption 
of the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and into the negotiations of a post 2020 agreement 
resulted in the development, evolution and elaboration of the CBRD principle. As this still 
happens at each meeting, one wonders what the post 2020 agreement will finally settle on. 
The negotiations have however not managed to provide solid direction on the cross-cutting 
issues of differentiation and equity in the new agreement despite tthe 2015 deadline 
drawing nearer. 
                                                          
26 See section 5.5.1 above. 
27 See section 5.5.2 above. 
28 See section 5.5.3 above. 
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6.3 CONCLUSION   
More than two decades after the adoption and coming into force of the UNFCCC and almost 
a decade after its Protocol also came into force, the question as to what happens next in the 
path of trying to combat global climate change remains a concern. The climate change 
negotiations under the UNFCCC have provided the platform to answer such an important 
question. There is however no gainsaying the fact that in negotiating and attempting to come 
up with a global climate change solution, the decisions adopted during the negotiations have 
resulted in the development, evolution and elaboration of certain principles in international 
law and international environmental law.29   
 
The climate change regime currently is still in disarray despite the world expecting a fully-
fledged new agreement by 2015 (which should take effect from the year 2020). Despite the 
nearing of the due date, a number of fundamental questions still remain partially answered or 
unanswered at all. It therefore becomes a case of time will tell as the negotiating process has 
been ‘stuck in perpetual stasis’.30 What the parties agree on though is that for them to avert 
further serious climate destabilisation, deep cuts in global GHG emissions are urgently 
required so as to keep the global temperatures from rising beyond 2 degrees Celsius. 
However, an analysis of the mitigation of GHG emissions related decisions by the recent five 
negotiations observed that the negotiations except for extending life of the Protocol in 2011 at 
Durban tried to come up with GHG emissions targets but they all fall short of the required 
ambition. It was also observed that the negotiations have moved on a string of decisions that 
encourages countries to determine their own mitigation targets as done at Copenhagen and 
confirmed in Cancun, Durban, Doha and Warsaw despite the reality that the pledges fall short 
of the required emissions cuts to stay below 2 degrees Celsius.31 This therefore renders all the 
recent climate change negotiations a failure in this regards, which happen to be the ultimate 
objective of the Convention. 
 
With regards to the three fundamental issues that received the central attention of this study, 
the dissertation observed that decisions adopted during the negotiations have resulted in the 
                                                          
29 A Gilder ‘Climate Change negotiations as a source of legal dynamism’ 2014 Without Prejudice, 1.  
30 Ibid. 
31 See Chapter 4 of this dissertation above. 
152 | P a g e  
 
development, evolution and elaboration of certain principles in international environmental 
law to a greater extent despite failing in settling these outstanding cleavages. What the future 
climate change agreement needs is to create binding commitments and quantified emissions 
reduction commitments for developed countries and a compromise of targets for major and 
economically strong developing countries as well as some voluntary targets for the LDCs.32 
 
It might also be time to start thinking or opting for alternate solutions. It is common cause 
that an agreement with ambitious GHG emission commitments is the ultimate goal. The ADP 
under the UNFCCC is still a good platform to build upon what is in existence thus far under 
the regime and to negotiate a more comprehensive international agreement that covers all 
aspects of the UNFCCC and allows for holistic approaches (an example is a hybrid of 
systems rather than sticking to the traditional ones)33. The major challenges will include how 
to achieve fairness in the targets set for Parties while taking into account the constraint-based 
perspective of the UNFCCC; determination of an approach or approaches to commitments 
consistent with UNFCCC principles; integration of operational mechanisms already 
established under the UNFCCC; and an appropriate legal form that balances wider 
participation with a higher level of binding obligations. 
 
In conclusion therefore, the climate change meetings have no doubt by trying to negotiate 
towards a post 2020 agreement and by making attempts responding to the fundamental 
issues within the climate change regime have to a greater extent resulted in the 
development, evolution and elaboration of certain principles in international 
environmental law such as the principle of CBDR. However, the fundamental legal 
                                                          
32 J Dickason The evolution of the climate change regime after the Copenhagen Accord (unpublished LL.M 
thesis, North-West University). 
33 For discussion on hybrid architectural approaches and the interplay between differentiation see: L Rajamani 
‘The Warsaw Climate Negotiations: Emerging understandings and the battle lines on the road to the 2015 
climate agreement’ (2024) 63(03) Int & Comparative LQ 721-740. For hybrid approaches within the legal form 
issues see: X Ngwadla, A C Abeysinghe & A Freitas, ‘The 2015 Climate Agreement: Lessons from the Bali 
Road Map’ 2013 available at http://www.eurocapacity.org/downloads/2015ClimateAgreement.pdf, accessed on 
5 December 2014; See also D Bodansky ‘Issues for a 2015 climate agreement’ 2014 Center for Climate and 
Energy Solutions available at http://www.c2es.org/publications/issues-2015-climate-agreement, accessed on 07 
December 2014.  
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questions under the climate change regime still need to be resolved so as to come up with 
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